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OPPORTUNITY COST OF LAND AND URBAN GROWTH
This study examines the impact of the opportunity cost of urban land on urban
growth. Based on prices, costs and productivity data on agricultural commodities at
county levels, the opportunity cost of land was measured by the weighted revenue,
cost, and government payment per acre of farm lands. Aggregating county data to
metropolitan area levels, a panel data for 269 metropolitan areas from 1978-2000
were constructed. This study found that, as predicted by the theory, cities grow
slower when revenue increases or cost decrease in the area. The impact of commodity
program payment was also examined. Our results show that price shocks and agri-
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Chapter 1 Introduction
1.1 Issues to Be Addressed
My objective in this dissertation is to offer some empirical evidence on the extent that
metropolitan growth is, in fact, influenced by agricultural land rents as suggested by
the traditional spatial equilibrium model. As agricultural land rents in an area, or
more specifically, changes in these land rents, should be determined by the changes in
the value of agricultural commodity grown in the area, my empirical work addresses
how changes in the agricultural prices affects land uses bordering metropolitan areas
and growth of those areas.
Therefore, the main hypothesis of this dissertation is that populations of metropoli-
tan areas decline as the prices of agricultural products produced on lands bordering
those areas increase. To accomplish this goal, I use county level data on agricultural
products, including the prices, yields, costs, government payments, and lands used,
to measure the value of agricultural land. The county level data is then aggregated
into MSA levels and combined with data on population to examine the relationship.
The focus on how agricultural commodity prices rather than agricultural land
values influence growth is done for several reasons. First, data on agricultural prices
and production at the county level are more available and reliable than data on land
values as most property value data are. In fact, the value of land and capital are
based on assessed or self-reported value. Second, focusing on the value of agricultural
products reduces concerns about endogeneity because the value of agricultural land
is based both on agricultural productivity and on its value in alternative use such
as residential or commercial development. Finally focusing on prices of agricultural
commodities allows for more obvious and direct consideration of a number of interest-
ing policy implications. A particular interest is the consideration of how agricultural
1
pricing policies including price supports, export subsidies and biofuels might affect
metropolitan growth in those areas with a significant and affected agricultural fringes.
1.2 The Relationship between Agricultural Prices and Urban Growth
While economic theory clearly predicts the impact of the opportunity cost of land on
metropolitan growth, which is usually called the agricultural rent, little evidence has
been provided. Figure 1.1 shows one example of such a relationship during 1980s.
Led by a group unfavorable factors such as increased international farm products
output, an overvalued dollar, and high U.S. interest rates1, U.S. farms experienced
their most severe stress since the 1930s. From 1980 to 1984, the average real value
of U.S. farmland dropped by 29 percent2. The decline had been most pronounced in
the Corn Belt and Northern Plains. Meanwhile, as Figure 1.1 shows, the population
growth rate of these regions began to climb. Such a change in growth rate was not
observed in other regions. Considering the long trend that U.S. population migrates
from the North to the South and West, such a change in growth patterns was unusual.
No studies, however, document this change, neither is any explanation provided for
it.
As Figure 1.2 shows, the changes in agricultural land use during and after the crisis
are also consistent with this correlation between land value and population growth.
Figure 1.2 plots lagged corn price and average corn acreage, from 1978 to 2000,
for counties within and out of metropolitan areas respectively. In most years, the
corn acreage fluctuates with the lagged price synchronously, suggesting that farmers
adjusted planted acreage according to the price of the previous year.3 The period of
1989-1993 is an exception, where the corn price declined while the acreage increased.
This was mainly because the cost of corn production also decreased, faster than the
1Calomiris et al. [1986].
2Ibid.
3In 1985, the corn acreage peaked after the lagged price peaked in 1984, which suggests further
lags of prices may also affect farmers’ decision.
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Figure 1.1: The Impact of Farm Crisis on the Population Growth Rate in 1980s
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price, in this period. In 1993, the acreage in non metropolitan area resumed it pre-
crisis level, but this did not happen for metropolitan counties. The corn acreage in
metropolitan areas was actually lower than its pre-crisis level and remained at this
lower level ever since, suggesting a permanent loss. One explanation is that farmers
had converted their crop land into urban uses during the crisis, which was irreversible
in the short run. Such a change in land use is not only for corn. As Figure 1.3 shows,
while the crop land out of metropolitan areas recovered from the crisis during 1990s,
crop land within metropolitan areas never did.4
The price spike in grain prices from 1994 to 1996 provides another example. Be-
ginning in 1994, the prices for crops experienced a rapid escalation driven by economic
growth in newly industrialized Asian countries and the depreciation of the U.S. dol-
lars. The corn and wheat price peaked in 1995, while the soybean price peaked in
4The change of crop land acreage in Figure 1.3 is smoother than that of corn acreage because
the data are from the agricultural census which is conducted every 5 years.
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Figure 1.2: The Change of Corn Acreage: 1980-2000
Lagged Corn Price (CPI Adjusted)
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Data Source: Annual County Crop Survey of NASS
1996. The stock to use ratio of these crops hit a historical low (Peters et al. [2009]).
Beef prices, however, did not rise during this period. Figure 1.4 compares the growth
rate of MSAs in agricultural areas major in crops and major in beef productions. It
can be seen that the average population growth rate in crop areas went down during
the period of spike, while no such pattern was found for either the beef region or
nationwide. The synchronized moves in agricultural prices and urban growth show
the correlation between agricultural prices and urban growth is indeed instantaneous.
Again, no attention has been placed on such a phenomenon during this period.
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Figure 1.3: The Change of Crop Land: 1980-2000
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1.3 Policy Implications and Academic Contributions
Policy Implications
A direct policy implication of this study is the influence of government commodity
payments on urban growth. It is well accepted that agricultural subsidies will be
capitalized into land values via changes in agricultural rents [see Barnard et al. [1997],
Gardner [2002], Roberts et al. [2003], Lambert and Griffin [2004] and Kirwan [2009]]5.
Agriculture subsidies have accounted for a large proportion of farm net income, 38.2%
between 2000 and 2002 as an example, so the value of lands in these areas will be
affected greatly if the payment policy changes. Studies on government payments
focus mainly on policy incidence, but urban growth will also be affected by subsidy
5The recent ethanol subsidies also raised the food commodity prices, which will be passed to
land rents as well [CBO [2009] and Mitchell [2008]].
5
Figure 1.4: The Price Spike and Population Growth in 1990s
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policies. A complete analysis should definitely consider this factor.
Apart from the agricultural policies, this study provides another view of evaluating
fiscal policies. As has mentioned earlier, one of the triggering factor of the farmer crisis
in 1980s was the sharp increase in interest rates led by the controversial fiscal policy
of the federal government. Just as the fiscal policy is not neutral to all industries, it
is not neutral to all urban areas as well.
This study can also help governments better understand growth policies, for ex-
ample, to adjust the timing of these policies according to agricultural price changes.
It is cheaper to enact growth policies when the price of land is lower, and vice versa.
When making growth policies, local government should not focus on factors within
urban areas only, but should also pay attention to current agricultural prices. This
is especially important in this era of rising commodity prices fuelled by burgeoning
demand of food and biofuel.
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Scholarly Contributions
This study provides a direct test for the canonical Alonso–Mills-Muth model that
population will decrease with agricultural rent. Little work has been done for testing
this implication of the AMM model. Studies on urban sprawl typically treat the
opportunity cost of lands as a control but not an academic concern. Moreover, as is
discussed in Chapter 2, their measures of the opportunity cost are problematic.
This study can also serve as a complement for the series of studies on the impact
of urban growth on urban growth. As documented by Glaeser and Gyourko [2005],
Glaeser et al. [2005], Saks [2007], and Glaeser et al. [2006] among others, the sup-
ply side of housing market is an important factor determining urban growth. The
agricultural rents, or the opportunity cost of land, is one important aspect of supply
conditions of the housing market, but it has not received sufficient attention.
1.4 Outline of The Dissertation
Chapter 2 reviews the literature on the impact of the agricultural rent, or, more
generally, the opportunity cost of land, and urban growth. The literature of urban
sprawl, which focuses mainly on land use patterns in urban areas, generally consider
the agricultural rent as a control, but it never treat the rent as a primary academic
concern. Findings regarding the influence of the agricultural rent are also limited.
Furthermore, measures of agricultural rents in the sprawl literature are problematic
because of issues of endogeneity.
The review of the growth literature discusses a recent development focusing on the
housing supply. The role of housing supply in urban growth has not gained sufficient
attention until the past decade. Empirical studies have recognized the importance of
land use policies and local geographic characteristics in determining housing supply,
but no attention has been paid to the opportunity cost of land.
Chapter 3 provides a conceptual model based on the Rosen–Roback framework.
7
The idea of this model is that, as the opportunity cost of urban lands rises, local
wages will increase to compensate individuals, which in turn will decrease the local
labor demand and the local population. A more detailed model for multiple county
MSA is also discussed in this chapter.
Chapter 4 deals with data issues. Details about the data on selected agricultural
products6 are discussed in this chapter, including the process of the data on costs,
revenues, government payments, and land used for each product. Based on these
data, three variables, the weighted revenue, cost, and government payments were
created to measure the agricultural land value for each county. The weight for each
product is the ratio of land used for producing this product to the total farmland. To
examine the validity of the imputation of these three variables, I regressed farmland
values on these variables with a sample of non metropolitan counties. The results
confirm that those variables are capable of measuring farmland values. To account
for spillover effects, a set of MSA buffers was created to determine which counties to
be included for each MSA to aggregate the county level data. Data on the dependent
variable, population in urban areas, and other determinants of growth are discussed
at the end of this chapter.
Chapter 5 discusses the empirical methodology. Alternative measures of the agri-
cultural variables, together with the reasons and the expected consequences of using
them, are discussed first in this chapter. Subsamples that will be used in the empirical
analysis, together with the purposes of using them and the power of each subsample,
are also discussed. At the end of this chapter, the necessity of a dynamic regression
model is discussed, which calls for the use of the Arellano–Bond estimator.
Chapter 6 presents and analyses the empirical results. Results for two subsamples,
the 1978-1990 subsample and the 1990-2000 subsample, are analyzed first. The first
6Eight crops,soybean, corn, wheat, barley, cotton, oats, rice, and sorghum, were selected. The
cropland used for these crops covers about 90% of the total cropland nationwide. Two livestock
products, beef and milk, were also included. The market value of these two products accounts for
over 65% of the total value of all livestock products.
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subsample is featured with a drastic price decline, while the second is featured with
a price spike. Results for these two periods are as expected: both population level
and the growth rate decline as the agricultural revenue and government payments
increase, and the impact of the agricultural cost is the opposite. These results have
passed a series of robustness checks. Because the estimation results are more sta-
ble in areas with more agricultural lands, to provide a final estimation, a subsample
of “agricultural” MSAs was drawn. The results show that as the 3–year agricultural
revenue doubles, the population level will be 1.5% lower, while the population growth
rate will decrease by 1.22 percent point. Using the estimation results above, I simu-
lated the impact of agricultural subsidies for selected MSAs and a hypothesized price
shock of corn for Des Moines.
Chapter 7 summarizes findings and policy implications of this study, together with
caveats of this study and suggestions for future works.
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Chapter 2 Literature Review
Section 2.1 reviews the studies based on the classic Alonso–Mills–Muth (AMM)
model. The AMM model provides a powerful tool to analyze the role of the agri-
cultural rent in urban development. Although the empirical studies based on the
AMM model generally considered the value of land in agricultural uses, it is almost
always treated as exogenously determined and outside the model. Evidence regard-
ing the influence of the agricultural rent on urban growth is very limited. Moreover,
as is shown at the end of this section, measures of agricultural rent of these studies
are problematic because of issues of endogeneity. Section 2.2 reviews the studies of
urban growth under the Rosen–Roback framework.1 These studies have recognized
a group of determinants of urban growth that are always controlled. In the past
decade, a series studies has been conducted on the influence of housing supply on
urban growth. This development of the growth literature is not only required by the
logic completeness of the theory, it is also a response to the findings that the supply
side of housing market is important in practice.
2.1 The Intra–City Spatial Equilibrium
The key idea of the AMM (Alonso [1964], Mills [1967], and Muth [1969]) model is
that the city is in equilibrium when individuals can not increase utility by changing
locations within a city. The crucial necessary condition for this intra–city spatial
equilibrium to exist is that relocation is costless within the city. The equilibrium
is then reached via the adjustment of land price. The comparative statics of the
model were first completely analyzed by Wheaton [1974]. Brueckner [1987] integrated
housing capital into the model and analyzed on the intensity of urban land use.
1Rosen [1979] and Roback [1982].
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According to the AMM model, the city border is at the point at which the rent
for residential use and for agricultural use are equal. In a closed city with a fixed
population, the city will shrink as agricultural rent increases, with both the population
density gradient and the urban land rent gradient shifting upward, and urban lands
will be used more intensively. Because land is more expensive, the utility of urban
residents will decrease. In an open city where individuals are perfectly mobile so that
the utility level is constant over cities, the city will be truncated on the fringe when
the agricultural rent increases. People will move out of the area with high agricultural
rent to avoid the decease in utility. The population density gradient and the land
price gradient, however, do not shift. Whether and how population is affected by
agricultural land values, therefore, depends on whether the city is closed or open. In
a modern world with low transportation costs, the open city model is definitely more
realistic.
Two approaches are used to test the predictions of the AMM model. One is
to compare estimates for a specific city over time. Using historical population data,
McDonald [1997] examines the population density gradient for 1870-1990 in Chicago.2
McMillen [1996] examines the land gradient of Chicago for 1836-1928, using data
from Hoyt [1933], and 1960-1990, using data from Olcott’s Land Values blue Book of
Chicago. Both results show that as commuting costs fell incomes increased over time
in Chicago, both population gradients and land value gradients decreased. I do not
follow this approach because the cross sectional variation of the agricultural rents
cannot be used.
An alternative approach is comparing the urbanized land area while controlling
for population, transportation cost and income. Brueckner and Fansler [1983] was one
of the first studies using this approach. With census data, they examined the spatial
2Because historical population data are only available for larger geographical areas, such as
municipalities and counties, McDonald [1997] applies a two–point method to estimate the population
gradient. Details about this two–point method can be found in Mills [1972].
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area of 40 single-county MSAs in 1970. The opportunity cost of land was measured
by the 1969 median agricultural land value per acre for the county containing the ur-
banized area. Their results showed that high-priced farmland was more resistant to
urban expansion than poor–quality land. More recent studies include McGrath [2005]
and Spivey [2008], which expanded their observations to multiple-county MSAs. Mc-
Grath [2005] pooled 33 largest metropolitan areas from the decennial census from
1950 to 1990 to examine the pattern of urban sprawl over the post-war years. The
agricultural land value was proxied by state level agricultural land value, which was
very imprecise of course. Spivey [2008] updated the study of Brueckner and Fansler
[1983] by using 2000 census data. He also redefined key variables with new mea-
sures, e.g., the observation unit was Urbanized Areas (UAs) instead of MSAs, the
agricultural rents were measured by weighted agricultural farmland value from the
Agricultural Census, and two new measures of transportation cost provided by the
Texas Transport Institute were introduced. The results of these studies are consistent
with the prediction of the AMM model that the spatial size of urban areas decrease
with agricultural rent.
Using the second approach, a group of studies also examines the impact of the
“fiscal- social” factors (Mieszkowski and Mills [1993]), rather than the “natural evolu-
tionary” factors, on the demand for urban land and urban sprawl. These fiscal–social
factors include, central city amenities and disamenities as address by the “flight from
blight” hypothesis(Mills and Lubuele [1997] and Brueckner et al. [1999]), local land
planning and development polices (Burchfield et al. [2006] and Wassmer [2008])3, and
property taxes (Song and Zenou [2006])4 It is worth to note that Song and Zenou
[2006] used income adjusted by the differences n the cost of living to avoid the het-
erogeneity in labor markets across metropolitan areas in their studies. An influential
3Such policies may be motivated by the fiscal revenue associated with land uses (Lewis [2001]),
or by urban residents’ intention to maximize property values (Glaeser et al. [2005])
4Brueckner and Kim [2003] among others argues that property tax will cause inefficient land use
patterns.
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study by Burchfield et al. [2006] used the unique data from high altitude aerial pho-
tographs of 1976 and 1992 examines a wide range of factors that may encourage urban
sprawl. Their findings show that following factors would increase urban sprawl: spe-
cialization in sectors with weaker agglomeration economies (measured by the degree
of employment decentralization), the historical city center being automobile friendly
(so the transportation costs are low, as measured by passengers per capita in 1902),
the uncertainty about future urban growth (measured by the standard deviation of
decennial percentage population growth rates 1920-70), ground water availability, to-
pography (whether close to mountains or hills, for example), favorable temperature
climate, and fragmented local governments where incorporated growth control or zon-
ing is less likely. The opportunity cost of land, however, was not examined in their
study.
Most of these studies do consider agricultural land values, but treat it as a control
rather than a focus of their studies. All of these studies measured the agricultural
rent by using the reported market value of farm lands within metropolitan areas. The
observed market value of farm lands, however, is affected by urban growth because
farmers will consider the likelihood of those land being converted to urban uses in
the future when selling their lands (Capozza and Helsley [1989]). This issue of endo-
geneity is less problematic when the dependent variable is the spatial size of urban
areas and the population is controlled, but will be far more serious if the dependent
variable is population or population growth, as is the case in the present study.
2.2 The Inter–City Spatial Equilibrium
As people become more footloose and locational choices are not restricted to individ-
ual cities, the idea of spatial equilibrium can also be applied to inter–city analyses.
However, while a single urban area can be deemed as a labor market, the analysis of
a system of urban areas need to address the heterogeneity in labor markets. By endo-
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genizing the the local labor market, Rosen [1979] and Roback [1982] first developed
a model addressing the interaction of locational choice, labor market and housing
markets.5 An important insight of this model is that real wages, netting out local
cost–of–living, will be compensated by local amenities or disamenities. The reason is
that workers will flow into cities with higher amenities, which will increase both the
local labor supply and local housing demand so that local wages and housing prices
will respond. Therefore the value of amenities, or quality of life, can be measured
by an index combining local wages and housing prices with proper weights. Roback
[1982] used this framework to evaluate people’s willingness to pay to avoid a variety
of disamenities. Based on this framework, Blomquist et al. [1988] provided an esti-
mation of quality of life of U.S. cities; Gyourko and Tracy [1991] expanded the list of
local amenities to include a wide range of government–related local characteristics;
Albouy [2008] fine–tuned the measure of quality of life by adjusting the weights for
income and housing prices with the federal taxes and non-labor income.
Urban Growth
In an system of open cities, because factor mobility is high so that income (adjusted
by cost of living) and profit are equal spatially, urban growth is usually measured by
employment or population rather than local income or output(Roberts and Setterfield
[2006]). Thererfore, studies on urban growth is always associated with the locational
choices of individuals, which makes the Rosen-Roback framework a natural choice for
analyzing growth. Glaeser et al. [1995] put forward the inter–city spatial equilibrium
framework by integrating Mill’s (1967) formulation of aggregating production at the
city level. Cities are assumed to be in a spatial equilibrium where individual utility
and the returns to capital are equalized across space. Populations, local wages, and
housing prices are determined simultaneously by local productivity and amenities.
5This model was further extended by Hoehn et al. [1987]
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Empirical studies based on the inter–city spatial equilibrium framework highlight
the importance of productivity and amenities. A host of research documents a strong
positive correlation between the skill level of a city’s population and city growth
in recent decades, e.g., Glaeser et al. [2004] and Moretti [2004] among others. An-
other line of literature show that various aspects of amenities or disamenities also
encourage growth, such as air quality (Kahn [2000]), city crimes (Cullen and Levitt
[1999]), favorable climate (Graves [1980]), and consumption amenities such as bars
and restaurants (Glaeser et al. [2001]). Moreover, Shapiro [2006] finds that one-
third of the employment growth effect of college graduates can be explained by the
improvement in the quality of life.
Urban Growth and Housing Supply
The role of housing supply in urban growth has not gained sufficient attention until
the recent decade. In previous studies, the housing price was assumed to be deter-
mined by the demand side only, i.e., individuals’ willingness to pay for a specific
location. The supply side of housing market had been ignored. But the supply condi-
tion of the housing market is always an important factor determining housing prices,
which in turn affects further growth. Several studies confirm the correlation between
housing supply and growth in this decade. Glaeser and Tobio [2008] shows that the
growth of Sun Belt in 1980s and 1990s may have little to do with local amenities or
productivity improvement but more likely to do with favorable development policies;
Glaeser and Gyourko [2005] finds that durable housing can explain the asymmetry
of population changes in growing and declining cities; Saks [2007] finds that em-
ployment growth is lower in places where the housing supply is more constrained;
Gyourko et al. [2006] argues scarce land leads to bidding-up of land prices and sorts
high-income households into “superstar cities”.
These findings of the correlation between housing supply with urban growth sug-
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gest the spatial equilibrium framework should include the supply side of the housing
market. Glaeser [2008] and Glaeser and Gyourko [2006] integrate the housing market
into the inter–city spatial equilibrium framework by introducing an additional equi-
librium condition that the expected profit of housing developers equals zero. The
introduction of the forward looking behavior of developers into the analysis has made
the model dynamic.
Realizing the importance of housing supply in determining urban growth, urban
economists have conducted a series of studies on the heterogeneity in the supply con-
ditions of housing markets across cities. Using cost data from commercial developers,
Gyourko and Saiz [2006] estimates an elastic supply for physical structure and con-
clude differences in construction activities across markets do not explain the variation
in costs. Their findings lead subsequent researches to focus on supply shifters such as
local regulatory environments and local topographies. Using the Wharton Regulatory
Index, Glaeser et al. [2006] examines how growth is affected by local regulatory policy
on land uses6; using satellite-generated data on terrain elevation and presence of wa-
ter bodies, Saiz [2010] finds geography is a key factor in determining housing supply
inelasticities by directly reducing land availability and indirectly inducing anti-growth
regulations via high land values.7
The opportunity cost of urban land is definitely another source of the heterogeneity
in land supply. The productivity of agricultural lands are different according to
their climate and geographic characteristics. Even in areas with similar climate and
geographic characteristic, the inter temporal changes in land values may still differ
because of different crops grown there. Using the information on agricultural prices,
6Glaeser et al. [2005] provide a political economic explanation for the heterogeneity in regulatory
polices
7Saiz [2010] does not find any correlation between the land availability and population by using
his cross–sectional data. He explains that the restriction of land availability will be compensated by
productivity and amenity shocks. He further shows that the shocks drawn from a Pareto distribution
will completely offset the restriction of land. However, there is no mechanism to guarantee that the
agricultural price shocks should follow a Pareto distribution at any time, so the population can still
be correlated with agricultural prices intertemporally.
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we can get a measure of agricultural land value which captures the heterogeneity in
land supply across spaces. The volatility of agricultural commodity prices, moreover,
provides changes in land values over time, which enables us to observe whether spatial
equilibrium would hold in the short run.
2.3 Implications for My Research
The review of previous studies provides several implications for my research. First,
the AMM model provides a clear and intuitive prediction for the impact of oppor-
tunity cost of land, or agricultural land values, on urban growth, i.e., in open cities,
the population of urban areas decreases with the opportunity cost of land. Second,
measures of agricultural land values in previous studies were either imprecise or endo-
geneous, which explains their limited results regarding the opportunity cost of land.
A measure based on agricultural prices is presumably more superior because they
are exogeneous. Moreover, the volatility of agricultural commodity prices can also
provide short term changes in land values, which enables us to observe the response
of urban growth in the short run. Third, recent studies of housing supply and urban
growth have found that housing supply is an important determinant for urban growth.
As an aspect of supply conditions of housing supply, we do expect the opportunity
cost of land will also affect the growth. Finally, studies based the inter city spatial
equilibrium point out other determinants that should be controlled in this study, i.e.,
local amenities and productivities.
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Chapter 3 The Conceptual Framework
Section 3.1 briefly discusses the comparative static results of the traditional Alonso–
Mills–Muth model regarding the opportunity cost of land. The “open–city” version
of this model has an explicit prediction on the impact of agricultural rent that urban
population will be smaller in areas with higher agricultural rent. In Section 3.2, a
model based on the intercity spatial equilibrium framework is presented to analyze
how population is distributed among a system of metropolitan areas. The idea of this
model is that, as the opportunity cost of urban lands rises, local wages will increase
to compensate individuals, which in turn will decrease the local labor demand and
the local population. Unlike Saiz [2010] or Glaeser [2008] where the behavior of
developers are modeled, my model assumes developers are absent so that individuals
consume land directly. No generality will be lost when the opportunity cost of land
is exogeneous.1 Section 3.3 presents a model allowing for multiple-county MSAs.
Counties within a MSA differ in the opportunity cost of land but share the same
labor market. The increase in the opportunity cost of land within a single county
has two effects. First, similar to the result in Section 3.2, local wages must rise to
compensate such an increase in land price, which in turn reduces the population of
the entire MSA. Second, urban residents will be reallocated across counties. These
results together suggest that the population of a single county is also affected by the
agricultural rent in other counties.
1For example, we can model the cost function of developers as the sum of construction cost and
opportunity cost of land, and, as in Saiz [2010] or Glaeser [2008], introduce an additional equilibrium
condition for the housing market that the expected profit equals zero. But as long as developers are
price taking, any exogeneous change in the opportunity cost of land will be passed to the housing
price instantaneously and completely, so the analytical results regarding the cost of land will not
change with or without developers in the model.
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3.1 The Implication of the Canonical Alonso-Mills-Muth Model
Although the traditional AMM model of monocentric city is somewhat outdated, it is
always a good start to understand urban land use and urban population distribution.
The key insight in the monocentric model is that the price of housing varies with
accessibility to the central business district. Individuals residing far from the CBD are
compensated for their long commutes with cheap housing, while individuals living at
central locations pay a premium for space, canceling the advantage of low commuting
cost. That is, as the curve AB in Figure 3.1 shows, the land rent at each location
decreases with its distance to CBD.2 The city border lies in the point where the rent
of land for residential uses equals the value for agricultural uses. In Figure 3.1, the
city border lies in d̄, where the residential land rent equals the agricultural rent rg.
In an open city where utility level is fixed, as the agricultural rent increases to r′g, the
city will shrink to d̄′.
Figure 3.1: Determination of Urban Population: Open Cities
Because the land is expensive near CBD, dwellings near CBD will be smaller
2More specifically, the land rent at location d is a function of transportation cost τ , individuals’
income w, and the utility level u. That is, r = r(τ, w, u; d). And there is ∂r/∂d < 0.
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because of substitution effect. This means the population density at each location
will also decrease with its distance to CBD. Let us still use the curve AB to represent
the downward sloping population density gradient. There are two ways to close
the model: the open-city assumption where utility is fixed because individuals are
perfectly mobile, and the closed-city assumption where the population is fixed. The
open-city assumption is more appropriate because transportation costs have become
so low and individuals have become more footloose. When the agricultural rent equals
rA, the population of the city is the integral of the density over 0 to d̄, i.e., the area
of ArAB. As the agricultural rent increases to r
′
A, the population reduces to the area
Ar
′
AB
′. Therefore, the population decreases with the agricultural rent.3
3.2 A System of Metropolitan Areas
The traditional AMM model is successful in explaining the determination of land
values and population distributions within a city. But when we turn to the population
distribution in a system of metropolitan areas, this model is incapable of handling the
heterogeneity of income. Moreover, local amenities are found to be also important for
locational choice of individuals. The Rosen-Roback model provides a intercity spatial
equilibrium framework dealing with the heterogeneity in incomes and amenities. This
section presents a model based on the intercity spatial equilibrium to analyze the
impact of the opportunity cost land on population. This model consists of two parts.
The first part describes the locational choice of individuals, with the result that higher
land price must be compensated by higher local wages. The second part deems the
metropolitan area as a unit of production, where the employment, or population, is
determined by local wages.
3Under the open-city assumption (constant utility), the density gradient AB does not shift with
the agricultural rent. When cities are closed, however, the density gradient will shift upwards with
the agricultural rent because the city has become smaller and population should be more densely
distributed everywhere.
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3.2.1 Locational Choice of Individuals
Suppose individuals are homogeneous in preference, having a Cobb-Douglas utility
function
U = U(Mit, Lit;Cit)
= MαitL
β
itCit
where, in city i at time period t, Mit is a bundle of private consumption goods
with a price normalized to unity, Lit is the consumption of land, and Cit is local
amenities. Individuals, with labor income Wit, buy land from farmers at the price
of Pit, which is solely determined by the agricultural sector. The spatial equilibrium
condition requires that all cities at all times deliver the same utility Ut to the marginal
residents. Therefore, the locational choice of individuals can be expressed as
max
Mit,Lit
MαitL
β
itCit
s.t. Mit + PitLit = Wit
with the equilibrium condition
Uit = Ut ∀i
Setting α + β = 1, the solution is
lnWit = β lnPit − lnCit + ln Ut − (α lnα + β ln β) (3.1)
and
lnLit = −α lnPit − lnCit + ln Ut + [ln β − (α lnα + β ln β)]
It is can be seen from equation (3.1) that ∂lnWit
∂ lnPit
= β > 0. The result means that, at
equilibrium, wages must be higher to compensate individuals in places where lands
are more expensive,
Labor Demand and Population
Local output for city i at time period t is
Yit = AitN
θ
it
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where Nit is the city employment or population
4, Ait is the city specific production
factor, and θ ∈ (0, 1) is a nationwide constant.
Labor demand of city i in period t then is given by
∂Yit
∂Nit
= Wit
Substituting equation (3.1) for lnWit yields
lnNit =
1
1− θ
[lnAit − β lnPit + lnCit − ln Ut + (α lnα + β ln β + ln θ)] (3.2)
Note that ∂ lnNit
∂ lnPit
= − β
(1−θ) < 0, which says population level will be lower in areas
with higher opportunity costs of lands. This result is similar to the AMM model with
open cities, but it highlights the impacts of local productivity and amenities.
Model Dynamics
Because the spatial equilibrium holds at any point of time by assumption, differencing
equation (3.1), we can derive the dynamics of wages
∆ lnWit = β∆ lnPit −∆ lnCit + ∆ ln Ut (3.3)
The positive sign of ln ∆Pit means that local wages will grow faster in areas where
agricultural land values appreciate faster.
Similarly, differencing equation (3.2) we have the dynamics for populations
∆ lnNit =
1
1− θ
[∆ lnAit − β∆ lnPit + ∆ lnCit −∆ ln Ut] (3.4)
The sign of ∆ lnPit is negative, which suggests population will grow slower in areas
where agricultural land values appreciate faster.
To summarize, equation 3.2 and 3.4 provides the hypotheses that this study will
test: both population level and growth will decline with agricultural prices.
4The assumption that employment equals population is to say people live in the cities where
they work Glaeser et al. [2006].
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3.3 Multiple-County Metropolitan Areas
Previous analysis assumes a single land price for each metropolitan area, but most
MSAs contains more than a single county. So the question is how the agricultural
price change of one county would affect the MSA with multiple counties. To answer
this question, a model for multiple-county metropolitan areas is discussed in this
section. In this model, wages are determined at the MSA level because each MSA
is a labor market by definition. The population of each county is determined by the
metropolitan level wage and its local amenities. As will be seen shortly, unlike the
traditional AMM model, the land rent gradient and the population density gradients
will shift with the agricultural rent even though the open city assumption still holds
in this model. There are mainly two results of this model. First, the population of the
metropolitan area is determined by the agricultural rent of all composing counties.
Moreover, holding the agricultural rent of other counties constant, the impact of
the agricultural rent on population is reduced by a factor of the number of counties
relative to single-county MSA cases. Second, the county population is determined
not only by the MSA level wage, its own amenity, and its own agricultural rent, it is
determined by the agricultural rents of other counties as well. This result shows the
technical difficulties of choosing counties as the observation unit, i.e., we may have
to consider too many factors.
Suppose a metropolitan area j is composed of a system of linear counties denoted
by i, locating around a common downtown core. All individuals are employed in the
downtown core, but choose to live in different counties according to local amenities
and housing prices. So the locational choice of individuals are described by the
optimization problem
max
Mij ,Lij
MαijL
β
ijCij (α + β = 1)
s.t. Mij + pijLij + τd = Wj
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where Mij is the consumption goods with the price being normalized to unity, Lij
is the consumption of land, pij is the price of land, Cij is local amenities, d is the
distance of residence location to downtown, τ is the transportation cost, and Wj is
the MSA level wages which do not depend on the residential choice of individuals.
Individuals are assumed perfectly mobile so that the following equilibrium condition
applies: utilities are constant over all counties and all metropolitan areas.
First order conditions give the standard solution to a Cobb-Douglas utility func-
tion that
pijLij = β(Wj − τd)
Totally differentiating the equilibrium condition U(Mij, Lij;Cij) ≡ Ū with respect to
d in each county, combining FOCs above, generates the standard land price gradient
and population density gradient
pij(d) =
β
kij
(Wj − τd)
1
β
nij(d) =
1
Lij
=
1
kij
(Wj − τd)
α
β
As usual, both land price and population density (the inverse of land consumption
Lij) at local d is decreasing with d. Note these gradients are county specific, picked
up by differentiation constants kij. kij can be derived by plugging pij and Lij back
into the utility function such that
kij =
(
Ū
ααCij
) 1
β
So the prices of land with the same distance to downtown core will be different if local
amenities are different. Another point deserved to mention here is, as opposed to the
traditional AMM model for open cities, the price and population density gradients
do shift with agricultural rents.
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Let p
ij
be the agricultural rents in county i. The physical size of the “urban” ring
in county i, d̄ij is determined by the condition
pij(d̄ij) = pij
which gives
d̄ij =
Wj − (pij
kij
β
)β
τ
Integrating the population density over [0, d̄ij] we can get the population in i
Nij =
d̄ij∫
0
1
Lij
dd =
1
τ
(
β
kij
W
1
β
j − pij
)
(3.6a)
Note β
kij
W
1
β
j is also the land price at the location dij = 0, denoted by p̄ij, so the
population can also be written as
Nij =
1
τ
(p̄ij − pij)
This is because when at locations where transportation costs are the same (d = 0),
with the same income, higher land price must be compensated by less land consump-
tion, so the population density will be higher in counties where land prices are high
(recall land prices also reflects local amenities).
We close the model by introducing the labor market equilibrium in metropolitan
area j. Let the production function of j be
Yj = Aj
(∑
i
Nij
)θ
, 0 < θ < 1
so the wage will be
dYj
dNj
= θAj
(∑
i
Nij
)θ−1
= Wj (3.6b)
The equation system (3.6) describes the urban equilibrium. Unlike the system in
section 2, which is recursive, this system is simultaneous. By totally differentiating
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(3.6b) with respect to p
ij
5 we can solve for the impact of agricultural rents of one
county on the entire metropolitan area
∂ lnWj
∂ ln p
ij
=
β(1− θ)p
ij
βτ
∑
iNij + (1− θ)
∑
i p̄ij
> 0 (3.7a)
∂ ln
∑
iNij
∂ ln p
ij
= −
βp
ij
βτ
∑
iNij + (1− θ)
∑
i p̄ij
< 0 (3.7b)
The direction of the the impact of p on W and N are the same as those of (3.1) and
(3.2). The size of such impact is different. This can be seen if we compare (3.7a)
and (3.7b) for single-county metropolitan areas with multi-county ones with identical
counties. The impact of agricultural rent change in one county for single-county
metropolitan areas are greater than multi-county metros by a factor of the number
of counties, holding agricultural rents in other counties constant.
According to (3.7b), the total differential of the MSA population is given by
d ln
∑
i
Nij = −
∑
i
βp
ij
βτ
∑
iNij + (1− θ)
∑
i p̄ij
dp
ij
Clearly the change in population depends on the changes in agricultural rents in all
counties. If all p
ij
’s increase at the same time, the population of the metropolitan
area will decrease. This is not necessarily the case for all time of course. However, As
the supply and demand conditions of the agricultural section are likely to be similar
in a single metropolitan area, it is very likely that p
ij
’s will move in the same direction
for most of the times.
As for county level populations
∂Nij
∂p
ij
=
1
τ
[
(1− θ)p̄ij
βτ
∑
iNij + (1− θ)
∑
i p̄ij
− 1
]
< 0 (3.7c)
∂Nij
∂p
kj
=
1
τ
(1− θ)p̄kj
βτ
∑
iNij + (1− θ)
∑
i p̄ij
> 0, k 6= i (3.7d)
5Note Ni’s are functions of Wj , and so is
∑
Ni.
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(3.7c) is how county i reacts to agriculturals of itself. The negative sign means
as lands get more expensive, less individuals will flow in. (3.7d) is how county i
reacts to agriculturals in k. The positive sign says as lands in other counties are
getting relatively more expensive, people will move into i. This is because when p
k
changes, wages of all counties will also increase, so land prices for all counties at all
d must increase to eliminate the increase in utility, which suggests population in i
should increase. So (3.7c) and (3.7d) together capture the distributional effect on
metropolitan area population 6. (3.7b)-(3.7d) together also says that, the response
of population to agricultural rent at counties levels will be greater than if measured
on MSA level. To see this, suppose p
ij
increases first. The total population of urban
area j will decrease, while populations in county k’s ( k 6= i) will increase, which
means the population decrease in i must be greater than the that in urban area j.
3.4 Summary
The theoretical analysis of this chapter provides two empirical implications. First,
as is shown in Section 3.2, three categories of factors determine urban growth: the
productivity of urban areas, local amenities, and housing supply. For the purpose
of this study, local productivity and amenities should be controlled to identify the
impact of opportunity cost of land. Second, because of technical difficulties shown in
Section 3.3, the observation unit for the empirical study should not be counties. The
population of a county does not only depend on agricultural rents factors within itself,
but also depends on the rent in other counties in the same urban area. Technically,
to capture such relationship at county levels in the empirical study may require too
many control variables. Moreover, because each MSA is a labor market by definition,
focusing on composing counties may have less economic content.
6The tradition AMM model for open cities does not predict such redistributions because income
is exogeneous in that model.
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Chapter 4 Data and Summary Statistics
Section 4.1 discusses the design of empirical study, which, in turn, serves as a guideline
of information needed to be collected to measure the value of farm land. A potential
endogeneity problem with this measure is also discussed in this section. Section
4.2 discusses the agricultural data, including their sources, coverage, quality, and
imputation issues. Section 4.3 evaluates the validity of the imputed agricultural
variables through a set of regressions. To aggregate county-level data to MSA levels,
I created a buffer for each MSA to account for possible spill over effect. The process
of buffering is presented in Section 4.4. Finally, Section 4.5 presents data on the
dependent variable and other determinants of growth.
4.1 Design of the Empirical Study
Four fundamental questions are raised in designing the empirical study. First, how
should the value of farm land be measured? Second, what are appropriate observation
units, counties or MSAs? Third, how is the dependent variable measured? Fourth,
what factors should be controlled?
The first question, measuring the opportunity cost, is crucial to the empirical
study, so it will be discussed in details in this section. Answers to other questions
will be brief because they are relatively more straightforward and standard in the
literature.
As discussed previously, directly using the market value of farm land in metropoli-
tan areas is problematic because the market value is not only affected by agricultural
practices but by urban demand as well. As an alternative, this study uses the agri-
cultural net revenue as a measure, which is a combination of agricultural commodity
price, cost, yield, and land used. The construction will be discussed in details shortly.
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Agricultural prices can be reasonably deemed as exogenous because they are deter-
mined at national or international levels. Meanwhile, the volatility of agricultural
prices provides possibilities of observing short term changes in land values and the
impact of such changes. Such an advantage is not available in the traditional measure
of the agricultural rent as used in previous studies.
To obtain a measure of the value of farm land, we first define the rental rate of
agricultural land of one county as
rt =
∑
j
wjt(pjtyjt − cjt + gjt) (4.1)
where, at period t, rt is the rental rate, pjt is the market price of product j, yjt is the
yield of j per unit of land1, cjt is the labor and capital cost of producing j per unit
of land, gjt is the government payment or subsidies, and wjt is the share of land used
in producing j with respect to total farm land of the county.2 Assuming a national
financial market where interest rate is equal across all locations, the variation in land
rents will completely capture the variation in farm land value.
Equation 4.1 provides a guideline for collecting the agricultural data needed to
determine agricultural land value, and therefore, the opportunity cost. Constructing
the measure for agricultural land value requires information on prices, yields, and
land used for each agricultural products growing in each county as well as the total
agricultural land to construct the appropriate weight, i.e., wj.
Equation 4.1 also points out a potential endogeneity problem in this measure.
While agricultural prices are exogeneous, other variables may be not. In a von Thünen
world, as urban area grows, the distance of each parcel of land to cities will be
changed, which may induce farmers to change their choices of products on that land,
therefore the composition of products in each county will be changed, and so will
1The presence of yield in equation 4.1 captures the idea of Ricardian Rent.
2The summation of wj ’s does not necessarily equal 1 because of double cropping.
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be the weighting scheme.3 The issue of potential endogeneity will be discussed and
treated in more details in Chapter 5 and Chapter 6.
Equation 4.1 also include government payments because they have long been
an important source of income for farmers. Data on government payment are not
available during the studied period, therefore I imputed the payment according to
1977, 1981, 1985, 1990, and 1996 Farm Acts. The imputation of government payments
will be discussed in the next section.
As seen in the next section, while the agricultural data are at the county level,
counties may not be the appropriate units of observation. The population of one
county in a metropolitan area is not only determined by factors within the county,
but is affected by the whole labor market and housing market in the entire MSA, as
well as amenities and public expenditures of other counties. Therefore, as is standard
in this literature, MSAs will be the units of observation in the empirical study.
As for the dependent variable, as mentioned in Chapter 2 that in a intercity spatial
equilibrium framework, the relevant measure of growth at the regional or urban level
is provided by employment or population growth rather than income/output per
capita or productivity growth. Therefore, this study will measure urban growth by
population growth, which is characteristic of the “North American” growth literature.
(Roberts and Setterfield [2006]) To obtain annual population growth, I will use the
census annual estimates of population at county levels.
Finally, there is the issue of what additional factors affecting urban growrth can
and should be controlled. In the literature of urban growth, three categories of factors
determining growth have been recognized: human capital, local amenities, and land
3The impact of urban growth on farming is actually more complicated than what the von Thünen
model describes. As Heimlich and Anderson [2001] summarize, farmers may be positively affected
because of access to larger pool of labor force, greater off–farm employment opportunities for farmers
to support farming operations, opportunities to grow new crops and market them in new ways, and
they can also be negatively affected because of deteriorating yield from urban pollution, conflicts
between growers and new suburban neighbors, curtailed milk–collection routes and less acess to
grain elevators, and so on.
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supply. This study will follow the growth literature to collect data on these controls.
The panel data constructed in this study will reduce some of these controls, which
will be discussed in Section 4.5.
4.2 Agricultural Data
4.2.1 Data on Crops
Prices, Yields, and Land Used
Eight crops were selected due to the restriction of data: corn, soybean, wheat, cotton,
rice, barley, sorghum, and oats. Data on prices, yield per acre of land planted, and
acreage planted for these crops of each county can be obtained from the Annual
County Crop Survey by National Agricultural Statistics Service of USDA. Acreage
for these eight crops accounts for over 90% of all crop lands nationwide. The longest
possible time span for the data, which are also restricted by the availability of land
variables, other controls, and population data, is from 1978 to 2000. New England
states were dropped because the survey does not cover them.
The rest of this subsection will use corn as an example to present summary statis-
tics for yields and acreage both over time and over regions. Table 4.8 and 4.9 reports
summary statistics for yields. Table 4.8 reports the yield of corn per acre of land
planted over time. From 1978 to 2000, the average yield of corn has increased by
about 20%. Table 4.9 reports the summary statistics for counties within and beyond
metropolitan areas for each Farm Resource Regions.4. Observations of different years
are pooled. In Heartland, Northern Crescent, Northern Great Plains, and Fruitful
Rim, the yields in metropolitan areas are statistically higher than in non metropoli-
tan area. In Prairie Gateway and Basin and Range, yields in non metropolitan areas
are higher. In other Eastern Uplands, Southern Seaboard, and Mississippi Portal,
4See the map of these regions in the Appendix of this chapter.
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Figure 4.1: County Average Yield of Corn Overtime: National Level
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there are no significant differences. The corn yield difference between metropolitan
and non-metropolitan counties, if there is any, is basically constant over time, i.e.,
it is the difference in the intercept. At national levels, as Figure 4.1 shows, such
differences are not significant.
Table 4.10 and 4.11 report the summary statistics of planted acreage for corn. Ta-
ble 4.10 reports the summary statistics over time. While the mean acreage for corn is
increasing over time, the total acreage for corn at national levels are decreasing. This
is partly because farmers in the North switched to more valuable soybean production
starting from 1990s, and partly because small corn operations kept quitting produc-
tion. Table 4.11 reports the summary statistics of corn acreage for metropolitan and
non metropolitan areas for each region.
Figure 4.2 plots overtime movement of corn price, national average of land costs
of corn production (both in 1988 dollars), and average corn acreage for counties in
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Figure 4.2: Corn Prices, Average Acreage Planted, and Land Cost of Corn Production
Overtime: National Level
Lagged Corn Price (CPI Adjusted)
National Land Rent for Corn Production (CPI Adjusted)
County Average Corn Acreage
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year
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Data Source:
(1) Corn prices and acreage: Annual County Crop Survey of NASS;
(2) Land costs of corn production: Annual Cost and Return Estimates of
ERS.
and out of metropolitan areas. The data on prices and planted acreage are from the
Annual County Crop Survey by NASS, and the land cost data are from the Annual
Cost and Return Estimates by ERS as will be seen shortly. Several points are worth
noting according to the graph. First, as mentioned earlier, starting from the mid
1970s, the price fell drastically until 1986. While in 1990s, a price spike during 1994
and 1996 stood out. Prices for other crops fluctuate in a similar pattern. These
two periods provide excellent opportunities for this study to observe the impact of
commodity price on urban growth. Second, the land costs, or land rents, fluctuate
with the lagged price synchronously in most years. This pattern of synchronized
movement of prices and land rents shows that the rent is determined by previous
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commodity prices, which justifies our use of commodity prices as a measure of the
agricultural rent. Third, the corn acreage also fluctuates in the same direction with
the lagged corn price, indicating that farmers adjusted planted acreage with price
changes.
One interesting exception to this synchronized movement of these variables is the
period of 1989-1993, where the acreage did not decrease with declining prices. The
land rent was also stable in this period. The most likely reason for this distinct
movement is that the corn cost declined faster than the price during this period (see
Figure 4.3). This period (1989-1993) was also the period that the agricultural sector
recovered from the crisis5. In 1993, the average acreage in non metropolitan areas
had regained its previous level prior to the crisis. The acreage in metropolitan areas,
however, never resumed its pre-crisis level. Similar to the average corn acreage, at
the national level, permanent decreases were also found for total corn acreage and
total crop land in metropolitan areas, but not in non metropolitan areas. It could be
because that farmers had converted land to urban use during the crisis, which was
not reversible in the short run.6
Some of these crops are highly concentrated in specific regions. For example, corn
and soybean are mainly in the Midwest, while rice are only planted in Mississippi
Portal and California. Table 4.12 reports the mean acreage for each crop for each
region. The variation in crops planted in different regions provide the variation in
the imputed land values. In traditional agricultural regions, e.g. the corn belt and
plain areas, the data coverage is acceptable. But for states such as California and
Florida where a large proportion of land is used by vegetables and fruits, omitting
these crops may understate the land value. A remedy will be discussed in Subsection
5The cost drop itself may be the result of this recovery, say, new technologies were adopted to
reduce costs.
6Other than converting land to urban uses, there were other reasons for losses of crop land, say,
farmers converted farms to recreational uses, or were enrolled into conservation programs by retiring
their crop land. However, such conversions are generally reversible, and can not be accounted for
long term crop land losses.
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4.2.4.
Cost Data
The cost data are from the Commodity Costs and Returns Estimates by the Eco-
nomics Research Service (ERS) of USDA. ERS provides annual cost estimates of the
crops selected. Unlike the County Crop Survey, cost estimates are at regional levels.
The survey provides estimates for a detailed range of cost items Table 4.13 provides
a sample of ERS cost estimates of corn production in 2007. To obtain non land costs,
land rents and land associated taxes were removed from the total cost listed. Cost
items for other crops are similar.7
Table 4.14 reports summary statistics of non-land cost or corn per acre of land
over time. The long trend of cost decline in the 1980s, which extended further to
1993, was mainly due to the decrease in fertilizer, interest rate, and chemicals, while
the increase in cost from 1993 to 1996 was mainly driven by the demand of input of
corn production.
4.2.2 Data on Livestock
Because of data restrictions, only cattle was used to measure livestock use. Because
two final products derived from cattle, beef and diary, account for over 60% of the
total market value of all livestock associated products, we believe omitting other
livestock should not cause serious measurement problem for certain areas.8
7ERS has made two changes in their estimates which causes data inconsistencies. The first is the
account change in the structure of costs, which is less of concern because what the study needs is a
total. The second, which is more problematic, is the change in the definition of agricultural regions.
In 1996, ERS switched from an old system of Farm Production Regions, which is state-based, to a
new system of county–based Farm Resource Regions. This requires a special note in the regression,
say, cut the panel at 1995/1996 to compare the results.
8The grazing lands, which account for nearly 35% of the total land land area in U.S. in 2002
(Lubowski et al. [May 2006]), are mainly consumed by cattle and sheep. The number of cattle is
generally nine times greater than that of sheep. The importance of sheep become even less in terms
of grazing land consumed. As calculated by Daugherty [1989], the total dry forage consumption of
sheep account for 6.4% of that of cattle in the biggest sheep producing state, Texas, in 1982.
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Figure 4.3: Non-Land Cost of Corn Overtime ($/Acre)
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Data on livestock are different from that on crops in two ways that requires dif-
ferent treatment. First, while the data on cattle production are available for every
year with a good coverage, geographical cattle prices are not. I solve this problem by
converting cattle into beef and milk production using information from the Livestock
Yearbook. In other words, the value of cattle is captured by the value of their final
products. Second, there is no data on land used for cattle. I solve this problem by
assuming cattle production only use grazing land and turn to census data to get data
on grazing land. The problem brought by this assumption is that cattle on feed will
be included which may overstate the value of grazing land.
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From Cattle to Beef and Milk Produced
The Annual County Survey data contain the number of all cattle, as well as milk cows,
for each county.9 Deducting the total cattle heads by milk cows heads, I obtained a
count of “beef” cattle. Table 4.15 reports the summary statistics for cattle over time.
The significant decrease in the county mean heads between 1988 and 1992, e.g. from
33780 to 30064 in 1988, is mainly because of the absence of Texas during this period.
Table 4.16 reports the beef cattle and milk cows composition over time. From 1988
to 1992, the share of beef cattle is about 1% higher than other years. Again, this
is caused by the absence of Texas, the beef cattle share of which is higher than the
national average.
To convert beef cattle into beef production, I first imputed the ratio of beef to cat-
tle stock by dividing the total beef production by total beef cattle from the Livestock
Yearbook.10 This ratio was then applied to cattle stock of each county to get the beef
production. Dividing the beef production by grazing acreage, as will be explained in
next subsection, a measure of beef per acre of land was obtained. Similarly, for milk
production, I used the annual data on milk per cow from ERS for each agricultural
region to impute the milk production for each county first, then imputed the milk
production per acreage of grazing land.
Throughout this subsection, the beef will be used as the example to present sum-
mary statistics. Table 4.17 and Table 4.18 reports summary statistics of beef produc-
tion per acre of grazing land over time and across regions. Due to the data missing
for some major cattle states in various years, the overtime comparisons fails to cap-
ture the trend in beef yield changes. As an alternative, I created a balanced panel of
9Several states quitted the survey in various years, e.g., California during 1993 to 2000, Florida
from 1978 to 1989, Idaho in almost the entire 1980s, Iowa between 1991 to 2000, Texas between
1988 and 1992, and Washington from 1978 50 1985.
10The ratio equals beef production divided by cattle stock of the previous year. Regression results
showed that the correlation of beef with the previous year cattle stock is stronger than with the
stock of the current year.
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Figure 4.4: Imputed Yield of Beef Over Time (Lb/Acre)
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Imputed Yield of Beef per Acre of Grazing Land (lb/ac) Fitted values
1,806 counties with full data coverage on cattle production across 1978 and 2000 to
illustrate the overtime changes of relative variables from now on. Figure 4.4 shows
the imputed yield of beef per acre of grazing land over time. On average, the yield of
beef has grown from 120 lb/ac in 1978 to 150 lb/ac in 2000 contributed by increas-
ing beef production per head of cattle, because of faster growing of cattle and the
improvement in slaughter techniques, and decreasing acreage of grazing land.
Grazing Land
Because annual data of grazing land are not available, I turned to census data for three
different categories of grazing land: cropland pasture, grassland pasture and range,
and forest land grazed. Acreage for these three categories of land were summed up
to obtain the total grazing land. Acreage for non census year was fitted with a linear
38
Figure 4.5: County Average Grazing Land Overtime (1000 Acres)
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trend.11 Table 4.19 reports the statistics for grazing land over years, and Table 4.20
compares grazing land across regions. Using the balanced panel of counties with
full cattle data coverage mentioned earlier, the time path of average grazing land is
plotted on Figure 4.5. As the graph shows, the grazing land experienced a sharp
decline prior to 1987 and stayed at a relatively stable level of 80,000 acres since then.
Livestock Cost
Similar to cost data on crops, ERS also provide cost estimation for milk by region
by year, the unit of which is dollars per hundred weight. I converted the unit into
dollars per acre of grazing land by using the production of milk of each county from
the imputation above.
Unlike milk, ERS does not provide cost data on beef. As an indirect measure,
11Data for 1978 and 1982 are hand collected. Data for 1987 and 1992, which are in PDF forms,
are transferred to XML files first, then read into STATA. Data for 1997 and on can be read directly.
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Figure 4.6: Prices, Land Cost, and Non-Land Cost of Beef (1988 Dollars)
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I used the ERS cow-calf cost (dollars/head) estimates, then converted the unit into
dollars per acre of grazing land. The cow-calf cost may be a good measure for small
operations in the North, but not for large feed-slaughter operations, especially in the
South and West (Short [2001]). Table 4.21 provides a sample of cow-calf cost items.
Table 4.22 summarizes the cost over time, while Table 4.23 compares the cost of beef
over regions.12 Costs of cattle are higher in the North because grazing is not feasible
during the winter, and they must be fed with more expensive grains to survive.
Figure 4.6 plots lagged real prices of beef, imputed land and non-land cost of beef
production ($/acre). All these three variables have experienced a long-term decline.
Because the grazing land used to impute the unit cost was smoothed by year, the
land cost (the rent of grazing land) does not show a synchronized movement with
prices as seen for corn production.
12Land cost, including grazing fee and land rent, have been removed from the total cost of calf-cow
cost.
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4.2.3 Government Subsidies and Price Supports
Government payment have long been an important source of income for U.S. farms,
so they need to be included when measuring land values.13 The price support pro-
gram, or Deficiency payment or Production Flexibility Contract payment according
to the nomenclature change in different Farm Bills, has been chosen because it is
associated with market price directly. To get the dollar amount of payment each
county received, I imputed the payment for each crop according to Farm Bills from
1977 to 2002 by using the data in hand, then calculated the weighted average for
each county.14 Generally, the deficiency payment one county received in year t for a
program commodity was imputed by the following formula
St =max[0, (target pricet −market pricet)]×
program yieldt × program acreaget × factort
and the difference between legislation in different years lies in the definition of target
price, program yield, program acreage, and factors.15 Set aside payments between
1978 and 1981 and direct payments between 1996 and 2000 were also imputed for
each crop.16
To calculate the government payment for milk and diary products, because histor-
ical target prices were not available to this study, I divided the federal net expenditure
on dairy product price support and related program by total milk production, and
applied the ratio to milk production in each county. Table 4.24 and 4.27 report
13Various studies have confirmed the capitalization of government payment into farm land values,
e.g., Barnard et al. [1997], Roberts et al. [2003], Kirwan [2009], and Goodwin et al. [2011], a consensus
of the degree of capitalization has not been reached though (Kirwan [2009]). In this study, I assumed
that government payments were completed capitalized.
14Before 1996 Farm Bill act, I used the acreage in the NASS data assuming all farmers in the
program. For 1996 to 2000, I used the ERS data on PFC acreage. The
15For example, the program yield used to be the simple average of previous 5 years from 1977 to
1981, the yield of previous year from 1982 to 1986, the Olympic average of last 5 years, the simple
average of previous 5 years from 1991 to 1995, and a predetermined acreage after 1996. The factors
include set aside ratio for each crop from 1978 to 1981, acreage reduction ratio for each crop from
1982 to 1990, and a universal .85 for all crops from 1996 to 2002.
16The payments each farm can receive are capped. But because farmers can split their farms to
avoid such restrictions, the severity of the imputation error may be reduced.
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Figure 4.7: Mean County Government Payments Over Time (1988 Dollar)
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summary statistics of government payments over time and over regions. Figure 4.7
plots the imputed government payments over time. It can be seen that government
payments peaked in 1986, triggered by the low commodity price that year, and hit a
historical low in 1995 because of the price spike.
4.2.4 Aggregating Revenues, Costs, and Government Payments
Three variables were finally created at county levels: weighted revenue, weighted
cost, and weighted government payment. These three variables together measure the
farm land value, or the opportunity cost of urban lands. Using these three variables
rather than integrating them together into a single rent measure, as suggested by
equation 4.1, enables us to observe whether and how costs and government payments
would affect urban growth other than commodity prices. Table 4.25, 4.26, and 4.27
summarize sample statistics of the weighted revenue, cost, and government payments
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for each Farm Resource Region.
According to equation 4.1, if we were able to obtain information on every agricul-
tural product in each county, the land base would be the county’s total farm land.
Unfortunately, data on a large portion of agricultural products, wood products, are
unavailable. Therefore I removed woodland (not pastured) from the base, and defined
the land base as the sum of crop land and grazing land. Data for these categories of
land are from census of 1978 to 2002, with non census year records being fitted by a
linear trend. The reason for using census data on crop land, rather than using the
sum of planted acreage of observed crops, is to account for double cropping. Directly
using the summation of all observed planted land will overstate crop land and under-
state the weighted revenue, cost, and government payment. Table 4.28 reports the
mean share of land base with respect to total farm land and total land area for each
Farm Resource Region for census years.
Unobserved Crops
Other than wood products, there still are unobserved crops which may cause the
same problem, i.e., understating the value of land. Unlike wood products, we do not
observe directly the land associated with these unobserved crops. As discussed in
the last subsection, using the observed planted acreage will lose the information on
double cropping.
To reconcile, I multiplied the three variables created, revenue, cost, and govern-
ment payment, by a factor equal to max
[
1,
total cropland
Σ(observed planted acreage)
]
. This is to
assume that land with unobserved crops has at least the same value as the land with
observed crops. This assumption is justified by the fact that many of the unobserved
crops are more valuable, such as vegetables, fruits, and tobaccos. Therefore, the ad-
justed measurement of land value can be deemed as the lower bound of the real value
of the farm land in each county.
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4.3 Validity Test of the Imputation
4.3.1 The Relationship between Agricultural Variables and Observed
Land Value
As can be seen from previous subsections, the derivation of the three variables involved
intense imputation. Certain assumptions were also made in some cases. A natural
question, therefore, is whether and how well these variables measure the value of farm
land. To answer this question, I regressed the market value of farm land from census
of 1982, 1987, 1992, and 1997,17 region by region, on the three variables created.
I used counties not in MSAs first to exclude the impact of urban areas. To find
a better measure for the land value, three alternative specifications of independent
variables were tried: single year measures, 3-year moving averages, and 5-year moving
averages. 3-year moving averages turned out to be superior to single year measures,
which is understandable because single year yields are more vulnerable to short term
climate shocks.18. Moreover, they were not inferior to 5-year averages: the R2 did
not improve in most cases using 5-year moving averages, and no significant difference
were found for estimations with these two measures.
Regression results using 3-year averages are presented in Table 4.3.1. The first
panel shows results of dollar–dollar regressions,19 and the second panel shows the log–
log results. Theoretically, coefficients of weighted revenue should be equal to those of
weighted cost with opposite signs in dollar–dollar regressions. However, because the
cost estimates by ERS is region based, coefficients of cost will be biased down due
to the measurement error, and coefficients of revenue will be biased up because costs
and revenues are positively correlated. This can be seen in the first panel of Table
17The market value is the average of all farm land, including woodland not pastured. This
certainly is a problem for areas major in commercial logging.
18It may also be because that farmers refer to historical prices of multiple years rather than a
single year in determining land values.
19All variables were adjusted by CPI with 1988 dollars being the base.
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4.3.1.
The R2’s for Southern Seaboard and Basin and Range are relatively lower. These
two regions have the lowest share of the “base land” relative to the total land area,
and the lowest share of farm land relative to total land area. This may suggest some
impact of non–farmland on the farmland which was not observed.20 When pooling
data of all regions together, the overall R2 was 50% for the dollar–dollar regression
and 60% for the log–log regression.
The coefficient of the imputed government payments is a puzzle. Theoretically, it
should be positive, but the regression results show that, except for Heartland, North-
ern Plains, and Basin and Range, it is negative. It might be the correlation between
the government payment and the unobserved products. Unobserved products are
generally more valuable so that the land value is high even without any government
payments. It might also be the correlation between the government payment and the
measurement error of cost. For example, the cost of calf-cow production may over
state the cost of feed-slaughter cattle production, which is more popular in the South
and West. Our agricultural variable predict a low land value for counties majored in
beef production in these area, but the true land value may be high. Meanwhile, these
counties also receive less government payments because beef is not subsidized. Such
a correlation may also lead to a negative coefficient for government payments.
A similar set of regressions were also run for counties within metropolitan areas.
Results are presented in Table 4.2. In these regressions, our independent variables
(weighted revenues, costs, and government payments) generally did not fit the land
value well, which is expected due to the unobserved urban impacts.
20In Northern areas where grazing is not feasible year around, the imputed variables may have
overstated the value of grazing land. Another set of regressions were also run with milk products
being removed from the imputation because diary cattle may not ever be turned out to graze
(Daugherty [1989]), results for Heartland and Northern Crescent were improved, but this was not
the case for Eastern Upland, Fruitful Rim, and Basin and Range. These results suggest extra
information on cattle on feed, which is not available for this study, will improve the measure of land
values.
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Table 4.1: Validity of Imputations: Rural Areas
Northern Northern Prairie Eastern Southern Fruitful Basin Mississippi
Variable Heartland Crescent Plains Gateway Uplands Seaboard Rim Range Portal
(1) Dollar Vs. Dollar (3-year Averages)
Revenue 5.602*** 4.521*** 1.953*** 3.646*** 5.561*** 5.067*** 6.436*** 5.414** 0.867
Cost -3.877*** -4.127*** 0.393 -2.340** -3.617*** -4.652*** -4.936*** -0.776 0.665
Gov’t Payment 1.776** 4.855*** 1.562** -4.340*** -0.336 4.794*** -11.119** 0.640 -1.565*
R2 0.722 0.305 0.780 0.472 0.410 0.161 0.351 0.271 0.516
N 1040 438 437 514 903 777 294 262 393
Log Vs. Log (3-year Averages)
Revenue 1.159*** 0.549** 0.509*** 0.713*** 0.793*** 0.697*** 1.059*** 0.882*** -0.049
Cost -0.419*** -0.480*** -0.070 -0.119 -0.255*** -0.404*** -0.550*** -0.276 0.154
Gov’t Payment 0.032* 0.193*** 0.057** -0.113*** 0.021** 0.002 -0.031* 0.040* -0.048***
R2 0.714 0.375 0.839 0.599 0.443 0.168 0.486 0.463 0.448
N 1038 438 436 476 815 739 232 186 393
Significance levels ∗ : 5% ∗∗ : 1% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 0.1%
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Table 4.2: Validity of the Imputation: Metropolitan Areas
Northern Northern Prairie Eastern Southern Fruitful Basin Mississippi
Variable Heartland Crescent Plains Gateway Uplands Seaboard Rim Range Portal
(1) Dollar Vs. Dollar (3-year Averages)
Revenue 5.794*** 0.803 12.711** 3.706** 8.977*** 5.011*** 1.897 17.568*** 4.724***
Cost -5.866*** -5.161** -11.555 -1.526 -6.311*** -4.271*** 0.636 -12.632* -5.254***
Gov’t Payment 7.222*** -1.832 -2.879 -13.310*** -3.148 3.016 -13.865** 2.270 0.105
R2 0.338 0.135 0.497 0.211 0.296 0.065 0.137 0.415 0.257
N 932 770 71 269 625 979 434 91 230
(2) Log Vs. Log (3-year Averages)
Revenue 0.615*** -0.222 1.754*** 0.990*** 1.262*** 0.549*** 0.898*** 0.267 0.406*
Cost -0.465*** -0.327 -1.016* -0.396 -0.577*** -0.254** -0.474** 0.585 -0.279
Gov’t Payment 0.196*** 0.250*** -0.077 -0.102** -0.008 0.006 -0.087*** -0.024 -0.046
R2 0.409 0.213 0.714 0.332 0.348 0.071 0.262 0.707 0.312
N 932 763 71 262 605 950 323 62 220
Significance levels ∗ : 5% ∗∗ : 1% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 0.1%
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4.3.2 The Impact of Unobserved Products
Although the signs of the coefficients of the agricultural variables are correct in previ-
ous regressions, it is unclear how the unobserved products would affect the effective-
ness in measuring the land value. Among all unobserved products, wood products are
the most prominent because woodland accounts for over 30% of the total agricultural
land nationwide. Other agricultural land not covered by the base land includes land
for buildings, stables, ponds, roads, in conservation programs, and being idled. If the
value of these categories of land is correlated with the agricultural variables created21,
using these variables to measure the land value may have introduced biasness.
Although the information on unobserved products is limited, the agricultural cen-
sus provides complete information on different land categories, which gives us an
opportunity to decompose the land value. Because the agricultural land value is a
weighted sum of the value of land with observed products and unobserved products,
i.e.,
V = soV o + suV u (so + su = 1) (4.2)
where so is the share of land with observed products and su(= 1− so) is the share of
land with unobserved products. In this equation, so is know (and so is su) because
base land is known, V is known from the census data, V o can be estimated by
V o = β0 + β1R + β2C + β3G + ε, therefore V
u can be solved. More specifically, we
can regress V on soV o and su on the regional basis to estimate the average value of
V u in each region.22.
Table 4.3 compares the results for rural areas with and without decomposition
for dollar–dollar regressions. As can be seen, the signs of agricultural variables re-
serve, while the coefficients of revenue and cost increase in magnitude, suggesting
21For example, woodland may have negative impact on cattle production because owners of the
land may require cattle operators to fence their grazing land.
22In the following regressions, I actually estimate the equation Vs0 = β0 + β1R + β2C + β3G +
su
so V
u + ν so that I can directly compare these β’s with those in Table 4.3.1 and 4.2
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the existence of woodland or other categories of land may reduce the profitability
of the traditional agricultural production. Moreover, R2 has been improved in most
regions, especially for mountain areas (Eastern Upland and Basin and Range). The
estimated average value of land with unobserved products for each region (the coeffi-
cient of sU/so) is generally less than the average value of all land, suggesting the land
of unobserved products is lower than that used for traditional agriculture. While the
decomposition changes the coefficients of agricultural variables significantly in dollar–
dollar regressions, log–log results, as shown in Table 4.4, of the two specifications are
very similar, suggesting the log form reduces the correlation between the unobserved
product and the traditional sector.
When the similar decomposition process was applied to counties in metropolitan
areas, nearly no improvement was gained (Table 4.5 and 4.6) . The main reason may
be there were more alternative uses for agricultural land within urban areas than
in rural areas, e.g., recreational farms and adaptive farms, and metropolitan areas
are very different from each other in land use patterns. Therefore, the average value
for land with unobserved products at regional levels does not measure the real value
correctly.
Land Conversion between Crops
Another problem caused by the unobserved products is that not all land conversion
land can be observed. In other words, changes in relative prices may induce farmers
convert land from one crop to another rather than to urban uses. However, even
the statement is true, there are two reasons that our agricultural variable are still
valid in measuring the land value. First, the most prominent such conversion was
from wheat to soybean started in the early 1990s. As acreages for both crops were
observable on an annual basis, our agricultural variables can capture a large part of
such conversions. Second, most crops in the data were covered by the commodity
49
program. The only exception was soybean, which was not included until 1996. Before
1996, the subsidy policy required farmers stick to the registered program acreage in
previous years for each crop to be eligible to claim payment for another year. Such
requirement had restricted the flexibility of converting crops.23 Therefore, even land
conversion between crops can be an issue that should be noticed, this impact may be
limited.
4.4 Sample Construction
Because the units of observation of this study are metropolitan areas, county data
are aggregated to MSA levels. I started with the OMB definition of MSA/PMSA
first and included all MSA counties as defined by the 1990 definition. To account
for the spillover effect, counties not defined by the 1999 definition but adjacent or
close to each MSA should also be included. To find such counties, I followed Saiz
[2010] and created a buffer of 20 miles in radius about the centroid of the principal
city of each MSA or PMSA. Any non MSA county touched the buffer, not necessar-
ily completely fell in, this buffer were included as components of the corresponding
MSA.24 Metropolitan areas in the six New England states25 were dropped because
they do not have agricultural data. By buffering MSAs, 1323 counties were included
for 301 metropolitan areas in contiguous states. Figure 4.9 shows these MSAs and
their buffers. Figure 4.10 shows two specific MSAs, Louisville and Lexington, and
their composing counties as defined by their buffers. As Figure 4.10 shows, the choice
of 20 miles is appropriate for inland MSAs such as Louisville and Lexington.
23The 1996 Farm Bill cancelled such requirement to allow for more flexibility. In empirical
studies, we can compare results before and after 1996 to examine whether the conversion between
crops should be an issue.
24In Saiz [2010], the buffer size is 30 miles. But his observation units are land parcels instead of
counties. Considering each county has its own geographical size, I reduced the radius to 20 miles.
The 30-mile buffer covered 1900 counties as a total in my sample, which was unnecessary.
25Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and Connecticut
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Overlapping Buffers
One problem created by those buffers is that they may overlap. As can be seen in
Figure 4.9, this issue is especially serious in coastal areas. To solve this problem, when
a MSA county was covered by multiple buffers, I stuck to the original definition; when
a non MSA county was covered by multiple buffers, I divided its population by the
number of buffers covering it, and added the quotient into each MSA’s population.
For example, in Figure 4.10, Shelby County was covered by both Lexington and
Louisville. I divided its population by two and added the quotient into Lexington
and Louisville’s population respectively. As for county agricultural variables, I simply
added them into each buffer to calculate the averages.
4.5 Population and Other Determinants of Growth
The literature of urban growth and locational choice and has recognized three cate-
gories of factors that determine urban growth: human capital, local amenities, and
housing and land supply. However, most studies in this literature used either cross-
sectional data (Albouy [2008], Blomquist et al. [1988], and Saiz [2010] among others)
or low frequency panel data (for example, Glaeser et al. [2001], Glaeser and Gyourko
[2005], Glaeser and Shapire [2003], and Shapiro [2006]). Very few studies used high
frequency panel data. In Glaeser and Gyourko [2006] where the housing prices at
annual level were examined, only violent crime rate was included as a high frequency
measure, while no impact on both housing price and housing stock was found.
The strategy is to control those variables that have been used frequently in studies
with cross–sectional data or low frequency data, then examine the sensitivity of em-
pirical results to the presence of these variables. Specifically, this study will measure
the human capital with the share of labor force with at least a bachelor degree, to-
gether with measure s on income levels, including poverty rate, and share of families
with income below national 20 percentile; use share of elder population and share of
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high income families as proxies for local amenities; use imputed population density
to proxy whether the urban area is automobile friendly (Glaeser and Shapire [2003]);
use the immigrants to capture the correlation between the pre-determined settlement
patterns and immigration shocks (Altonji and Card [1991]).26
As for the housing and land supply, two measures have been used in the recently
literature: the Wharton Regulation Index on local land use control and Saiz’s (2010)
measure of land availability. None of these two measures provides over-time changes.
Although the land availability can be removed as a fixed effect, local land use control
is definitely not fixed over time. This issue can be handled but splitting the panel
into shorter ones with an assumption that land regulations do not change frequently.
The dependent variable, population growth, is from the annual estimation of
county population by Census Bureau, which is a combination of tax return records and
administrative records on birth and death. The problem of using annual estimation is
that it undercounts population with significant jumps in decennial census years, 1990
and 2000 in this study, where adjustments were made according to census counts.
This issue will be addressed in empirical analysis.
Table 4.7 provides sources of these data. Table 4.29 reports summary statistics for
all MSAs observed. The list of these MSAs, together with their agricultural variables,
is in Table 4.31. In Chapter 6, a group of agricultural MSAs are identified to better
estimate the impact of agricultural prices. Summary statistics for these agricultural
MSAs are in Table 4.30, and Table 4.32 lists these MSAs and their average agricultural
variables.
26Annual variation of these variables are obtained by smoothing decennial census data, which
clearly will introduce the problem of endogeniety. However, as just mentioned, we can examine
whether the empirical results are sensitive to these controls.
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Table 4.3: Decomposition of Land Value in Rural Areas (Dollar Measure)
Northern Northern Prairie Eastern Southern Fruitful Basin Mississippi
Variable Heartland Crescent Plains Gateway Uplands Seaboard Rim Range Portal
(1) Without Decomposition
Revenue 5.602*** 4.521*** 1.953*** 3.646*** 5.561*** 5.067*** 6.436*** 5.414** 0.867
Cost -3.877*** -4.127*** 0.393 -2.340** -3.617*** -4.652*** -4.936*** -0.776 0.665
Gov’t Payment 1.776** 4.855*** 1.562** -4.340*** -0.336 4.794*** -11.119** 0.640 -1.565*
R2 0.722 0.305 0.780 0.472 0.410 0.161 0.351 0.271 0.516
N 1040 438 437 514 903 777 294 262 393
(2) With Decomposition
Revenue 6.251*** 5.871*** 2.426*** 4.499*** 8.707*** 8.097*** 8.664*** 8.531*** 0.995
Cost -4.258*** -5.238*** 0.197 -3.057*** -5.731*** -7.566*** -6.756*** -5.051 0.91
Gov’t Payment 3.315*** 9.452*** 2.187** -3.672*** -2.223 8.039*** -18.164*** -1.297 -1.642
Value of all
other land 771*** 932*** 289*** 32 728*** 647*** 842*** 2494*** 700***
R2 0.704 0.287 0.803 0.547 0.558 0.237 0.412 0.401 0.461
N 1040 438 436 511 902 777 291 255 393
Average agricultural land value†
1062 878 298 540 942 1264 939 619 799
Average share of agricultural land with unobserved products‡
0.175 0.337 0.156 0.107 0.295 0.357 0.246 0.112 0.275
Significance levels ∗ : 5% ∗∗ : 1% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 0.1%
† Data are from Agricultural Census 1978-1997 and pooled together.
‡ This category of land include woodland, idle land or land enrolled in conservation program, and land for pond, roads and buildings.
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Table 4.4: Decomposition of Land Value of Rural Areas: Logarithm Measures
Northern Northern Prairie Eastern Southern Fruitful Basin Mississippi
Variable Heartland Crescent Plains Gateway Uplands Seaboard Rim Range Portal
(1) Without Decomposition
Revenue 1.159*** 0.549** 0.509*** 0.713*** 0.793*** 0.697*** 1.059*** 0.882*** -0.049
Cost -0.419*** -0.480*** -0.070 -0.119 -0.255*** -0.404*** -0.550*** -0.276 0.154
Gov’t Payment 0.032* 0.193*** 0.057** -0.113*** 0.021** 0.002 -0.031* 0.040* -0.048***
R2 0.714 0.375 0.839 0.599 0.443 0.168 0.486 0.463 0.448
N 1038 438 436 476 815 739 232 186 393
(2) With Decomposition
Revenue 1.156*** 0.780*** 0.498*** 0.749*** 0.726*** 0.619*** 0.950*** 1.204*** -0.109
Cost -0.396*** -0.686*** -0.060 -0.141 -0.237*** -0.375*** -0.552*** -0.735*** 0.143
Gov’t Payment 0.028 0.201*** 0.067** -0.105*** 0.023*** 0.007 -0.046** -0.008 -0.059***
Value of all
other land 0.227*** 0.359*** 0.082*** 0.030 0.352*** 0.244*** 0.339*** 0.438*** 0.122***
R2 0.689 0.324 0.857 0.648 0.633 0.229 0.731 0.617 0.443
N 1038 438 435 475 815 739 232 181 393
Significance level: * p < 0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<.001
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Table 4.5: Decomposition of Land Value of Metropolitan Areas: Dollar Measures
Northern Northern Prairie Eastern Southern Fruitful Basin Mississippi
Variable Heartland Crescent Plains Gateway Uplands Seaboard Rim Range Portal
(1)Without Decomposition
Revenue 5.794*** 0.803 12.711** 3.706** 8.977*** 5.011*** 1.897 17.568*** 4.724***
Cost -5.866*** -5.161** -11.555 -1.526 -6.311*** -4.271*** 0.636 -12.632* -5.254***
Gov’t Payment 7.222*** -1.832 -2.879 -13.310*** -3.148 3.016 -13.865** 2.270 0.105
R2 0.338 0.135 0.497 0.211 0.296 0.065 0.137 0.415 0.257
N 932 770 71 269 625 979 434 91 230
(2) With Decomposition
Revenue 5.608*** 0.338 15.162** 4.449** 14.486*** 6.745*** 2.576 18.781** 5.876***
Cost -5.784*** -7.364** -14.04* -1.672 -10.279*** -6.109*** 0.611 -12.632 -7.219***
Gov’t Payment 10.147*** -7.104 1.564 -14.478*** -6.568 4.491 -18.733*** 5.985 0.722
Value of all
other land 944*** 982* -477 322 1091*** 928*** 407** 226 675***
R2 0.253 0.180 0.525 0.231 0.358 0.113 0.142 413 0.291
N 932 769 71 269 647 979 431 87 230
Average agricultural land value†
1556 1817 494 817 1285 1729 2186 877 1087
Average share of agricultural land with unobserved products‡
0.154 0.273 0.140 0.084 0.274 0.349 0.232 0.115 0.252
Significance levels ∗ : 5% ∗∗ : 1% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 0.1%
† Data are from Agricultural Census 1978-1997 and pooled together.
‡ This category of land include woodland, idle land or land enrolled in conservation program, and land for pond, roads and buildings.
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Table 4.6: Decomposition of Land Value Metropolitan Areas: Log Measures
Northern Northern Prairie Eastern Southern Fruitful Basin Mississippi
Variable Heartland Crescent Plains Gateway Uplands Seaboard Rim Range Portal
(1) Dollar Vs. Dollar (3-year Averages)
Revenue 0.615*** -0.222 1.754*** 0.990*** 1.262*** 0.549*** 0.898*** 0.267 0.406*
Cost -0.465*** -0.327 -1.016* -0.396 -0.577*** -0.254** -0.474** 0.585 -0.279
Gov’t Payment 0.196*** 0.250*** -0.077 -0.102** -0.008 0.006 -0.087*** -0.024 -0.046
R2 0.409 0.213 0.714 0.332 0.348 0.071 0.262 0.707 0.312
N 932 763 71 262 605 950 323 62 220
(2) Log Vs. Log (3-year Averages)
Revenue 0.262 -0.83*** 1.805*** 0.908*** 1.457*** 0.453*** 0.937*** 0.093 0.254
Cost -0.244* 0.124 -1.067* -0.280 -0.749*** -0.235** -0.528** 0.760 -0.161
Gov’t Payment 0.201*** 0.188*** -0.066 -0.104** -0.005 0.008 -0.084*** -0.045 -0.080**
Value of all
other land 0.022 -0.071 0.069 0.026 0.333*** 0.265*** 0.250*** 0.132 0.075
R2 0.334 0.239 0.742 0.373 0.445 0.111 0.354 0.752 0.358
N 932 762 71 262 627 950 322 58 220
Significance level: * p < 0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<.001
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Table 4.7: Data Sources
Data Item Sources
Annual County Crop
Crops price, yield, acreage planted Survey by NASS, USDA
Commodity Costs and
Crops, milk, calf-cow cost Returns by ERS, USDA
Agricultural census
Farm land cateories 1978 - 2002. See notes.
Milk per cow ERS survey
National beef production Livestock Yearbook
1996 PFC acreage ERS data
Population Estimates Census annual estimates.
Share of elder population Census annual estimates.
MSA Population Density Imputed from census data
Share of Bachelor degree Huduser, 2000
Share of workers in manufacture sector Huduser, 2000
Poverty Rate Huduser, 2000
Share of families below 20 pctile income Huduser, 2000
Share of families above 80 pctile income Huduser, 2000
Notes:
Data for 1978 and 1982 were hand collected.
Data for 1987 and 1992 were transferred from PDF files
Data from 1997 and on can be read directly into STATA.
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Table 4.8: Summary Statistics: Yield of Corn Over Time
(lb/ac)
Year Mean s.d. Min Max N
1978 76.27 26.43 14.70 150.00 2836
1979 84.85 26.29 10.00 149.00 2861
1980 68.11 30.77 12.20 160.00 2860
1981 87.63 28.26 12.80 159.20 2822
1982 92.43 25.42 10.50 180.00 2830
1983 73.49 28.07 15.00 195.00 2829
1984 91.52 27.65 16.90 183.00 2826
1985 97.64 26.87 7.90 180.00 2821
1986 94.81 32.72 13.20 197.30 2795
1987 97.45 30.09 21.50 208.00 2778
1988 77.81 31.66 11.50 217.80 2792
1989 97.34 29.35 10.60 209.00 2774
1990 94.00 33.30 10.00 199.00 2778
1991 93.11 28.66 16.00 204.50 2792
1992 108.53 32.35 20.00 224.70 2799
1993 87.36 32.31 7.00 237.00 2799
1994 112.70 29.07 25.00 210.00 2806
1995 100.58 24.63 28.00 224.00 2753
1996 108.36 30.49 12.20 226.20 2776
1997 110.16 29.45 35.00 244.90 2810
1998 101.26 37.72 10.00 246.00 2789
1999 106.10 34.08 17.10 214.00 2695
2000 115.11 33.10 17.00 215.00 2668
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Table 4.9: Summary Statistics: Yield of Corn by Region (lb/ac)
Region Metro/Non Metro Mean s.d. Min Max N
Heartland Metro 116.99 25.07 16.00 184.00 251
Non Metro 107.96 28.37 19.10 175.00 292
Northen Metro 101.45 19.59 17.10 170.00 232
Crescent Non Metro 92.01 21.60 19.00 172.00 120
Northern Metro 88.71 31.91 11.00 164.50 21
Great Plains Non Metro 80.86 31.67 7.00 166.00 148
Prairie Metro 86.80 35.04 12.20 215.10 109
Gateway Non Metro 107.90 37.62 10.00 224.70 263
Eastern Metro 84.19 22.56 14.70 165.00 166
Uplands Non Metro 85.01 21.31 13.70 159.40 231
Southern Metro 73.46 26.86 14.10 190.00 265
Seaboard Non Metro 74.37 26.87 11.50 195.00 203
Fruitful Metro 100.13 40.09 11.50 246.00 129
Rim Non Metro 94.92 42.04 10.00 216.00 96
Basin Metro 117.21 36.19 15.00 217.40 27
and Range Non Metro 121.03 34.52 7.90 233.00 80
Mississippi Metro 86.10 27.40 24.00 168.80 56
Portal Non Metro 85.68 26.45 20.00 174.40 98
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Table 4.10: Summary Statistics: Acreage of Corn Over
Time (100 ac)
Year Mean s.d. Min Max N
1978 323.15 484.02 0.20 3923.00 2510
1979 322.48 485.55 0.10 3753.00 2507
1980 332.69 498.25 0.20 3869.00 2507
1981 337.40 504.76 0.10 3840.00 2473
1982 331.91 496.56 0.50 3891.00 2448
1983 249.00 348.89 0.30 2849.00 2395
1984 330.61 485.93 0.50 3738.00 2418
1985 343.54 499.01 0.50 3539.00 2410
1986 319.86 451.42 0.50 3168.00 2376
1987 279.49 395.35 0.50 2813.00 2350
1988 290.30 421.38 0.50 2977.00 2315
1989 312.19 466.04 0.50 3332.00 2301
1990 328.63 480.88 0.50 3384.00 2240
1991 334.11 486.27 1.00 3480.00 2258
1992 344.14 500.44 0.50 3490.00 2289
1993 324.53 464.58 0.50 3300.00 2240
1994 355.73 506.89 1.00 3600.00 2203
1995 332.34 474.63 2.00 3100.00 2133
1996 363.71 503.25 1.00 3320.00 2162
1997 368.81 502.08 0.50 3370.00 2139
1998 371.52 499.28 1.00 3380.00 2140
1999 371.33 496.70 1.00 3200.00 2064
2000 385.60 506.69 1.00 3310.00 2043
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Table 4.11: Summary Statistics: Acreage of Corn by Region (100 ac)
Region Metro/Non Metro Mean SD Min Max N
Heartland Metro 871.03 583.13 3.00 3923.00 249
Non Metro 814.13 613.46 3.00 3274.00 290
Northen Metro 417.57 377.51 1.00 2530.00 212
Crescent Non Metro 286.02 379.63 0.10 2455.00 103
Northern Metro 337.33 513.18 1.00 2400.00 20
Great Plains Non Metro 218.68 300.01 1.00 2320.00 143
Prairie Metro 127.69 183.15 0.30 1350.00 77
Gateway Non Metro 335.91 471.70 0.10 2450.00 190
Eastern Metro 60.83 74.78 0.70 544.00 135
Uplands Non Metro 56.39 69.67 0.50 550.00 162
Southern Metro 102.76 134.17 0.50 938.50 212
Seaboard Non Metro 79.75 96.59 0.50 757.00 160
Fruitful Metro 108.97 164.41 1.00 1275.00 91
Rim Non Metro 89.74 103.27 1.00 962.00 62
Basin and Metro 48.50 53.66 0.50 224.00 16
Range Non Metro 34.00 44.52 0.40 270.00 45
Mississippi Metro 76.53 102.26 0.50 760.00 44
Portal Non Metro 72.82 114.86 1.00 950.00 83
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Table 4.12: Acreages for All Observed Crops (100 ac)
Heartland Northen Northern Praire Eastern Southern Fruitful Basin and Missi
Crop Crescent Great Plains Gateway Uplands Seaboard Rim Range Portal
Corn Acreage 840 374 233 276 58 93 101 38 74
N 539 315 163 267 298 373 153 62 127
Soybean Acreage 733 192 252 167 79 147 127 0 620
N 534 210 67 184 201 348 50 0 146
Wheat Acreage 134 65 1260 832 51 60 332 211 160
N 472 252 167 344 213 361 122 82 119
Cotton Acreage 402 0 0 488 72 77 403 42 296
N 6 0 0 101 28 185 56 4 98
Rice Acreage 244 0 0 159 32 39 296 113 333
N 3 0 0 3 10 6 25 1 60
Barley Acreage 41 13 291 15 7 16 133 102 6
N 59 182 151 102 27 125 89 75 0
Oats Acreage 95 69 131 48 19 17 46 26 21
N 374 290 168 222 76 201 108 72 12
Sorghum Acreage 61 3 58 254 30 14 252 9 72
N 224 3 57 327 66 193 52 8 85
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Table 4.13: Cost data of corn, 2007. (U.S., dol/acre)
Item Value
Gross value of production:
Primary product: Corn grain 467.61
Secondary product: Corn silage 1.33
Total, gross value of production 468.94
Operating costs:
Seed 49.04
Fertilizer 93.13
Chemicals 24.38
Custom operations 10.93
Fuel, lube, and electricity 31.58
Repairs 14.86
Purchased irrigation water 0.13
Interest on operating capital 4.94
Total, operating costs 228.99
Allocated overhead:
Hired labor 2.26
Opportunity cost of unpaid labor 24.34
Capital recovery of machinery and equipment 69.77
Opportunity cost of land (rental rate) 97.21
Taxes and insurance 7.52
General farm overhead 13.88
Total, allocated overhead 214.98
Total costs listed 443.97
Land cost (Rent + Taxes and insurances) 104.73
Cost as used in this study(cost - rent - tax) 339.24
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Table 4.14: Summary Statistics: Cost of Corn Over Time
(1988 dol)
Year Mean s.d. Min Max
1978 204.49 5.62 200.63 214.03
1979 214.53 7.50 209.06 227.09
1980 220.81 5.66 214.70 234.27
1981 226.87 14.16 211.44 250.84
1982 209.55 3.90 203.20 213.26
1983 197.20 4.22 188.83 202.59
1984 197.07 1.69 194.79 199.07
1985 189.03 5.77 176.27 198.61
1986 166.88 5.27 162.40 174.68
1987 162.89 2.97 158.11 166.31
1988 162.63 3.83 156.29 167.13
1989 170.93 4.34 160.84 177.80
1990 164.99 4.70 157.87 170.05
1991 159.26 12.04 145.55 189.61
1992 159.62 17.82 137.13 188.56
1993 149.21 13.90 133.60 182.93
1994 161.73 16.99 147.44 190.40
1995 166.97 18.30 149.63 198.01
1996 177.28 19.21 139.75 201.10
1997 172.82 16.20 140.31 193.98
1998 167.78 14.34 137.13 184.38
1999 165.42 14.09 135.77 180.98
2000 167.12 17.08 130.96 188.47
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Table 4.15: Summary Statistics: Cattle by Year (1000
heads)
Year Mean s.d. Min Max N
1978 39.13 39.22 0.10 635.00 2600
1979 36.86 39.08 0.10 644.00 2706
1980 36.87 38.59 0.10 584.00 2699
1981 37.83 39.47 0.10 638.00 2720
1982 38.41 39.55 0.10 599.00 2691
1983 38.11 39.84 0.10 595.00 2717
1984 37.46 39.99 0.10 597.00 2719
1985 36.24 39.68 0.10 580.00 2718
1986 35.10 37.99 0.10 532.00 2800
1987 33.78 35.94 0.05 460.00 2738
1988 30.64 33.76 0.05 354.00 2433
1989 29.92 33.40 0.10 374.00 2482
1990 29.77 33.86 0.10 400.00 2542
1991 29.36 34.41 0.10 450.00 2443
1992 29.63 34.82 0.10 495.00 2439
1993 31.26 33.95 0.10 480.00 2635
1994 31.95 35.97 0.10 595.00 2637
1995 32.58 36.56 0.10 628.00 2627
1996 32.97 37.32 0.10 684.00 2619
1997 32.44 37.83 0.10 772.00 2606
1998 32.09 37.56 0.10 691.00 2578
1999 31.50 36.88 0.10 669.00 2602
2000 31.68 37.28 0.10 723.00 2674
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Table 4.16: Beef Cattle and Milk Cows
All Cattle Share as of all cattle, %
Year (1000 heads) Beef Cattle Milk Cows
1978 39.13 89.39 10.61
1979 36.86 89.00 11.00
1980 36.87 89.11 10.89
1981 37.83 89.34 10.66
1982 38.41 89.42 10.58
1983 38.11 89.25 10.75
1984 37.46 89.22 10.78
1985 36.24 88.88 11.12
1986 35.10 88.51 11.49
1987 33.78 88.59 11.41
1988 30.64 87.60 12.40
1989 29.92 87.32 12.68
1990 29.77 87.46 12.54
1991 29.36 87.30 12.70
1992 29.63 87.50 12.50
1993 31.26 88.27 11.73
1994 31.95 88.50 11.50
1995 32.58 88.55 11.45
1996 32.97 88.65 11.35
1997 32.44 88.48 11.52
1998 32.09 88.23 11.77
1999 31.50 88.06 11.94
2000 31.68 87.86 12.14
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Table 4.17: Summary Statistics: Yield of Beef Over Time
(lb/ac)
Year Mean s.d. Min Max N
1978 115.86 107.91 2.43 1544.52 2263
1979 103.62 99.65 2.60 1475.80 2344
1980 114.44 112.96 3.57 1711.86 2341
1981 121.88 122.16 3.03 1888.84 2360
1982 127.32 126.51 1.56 1812.93 2429
1983 127.84 126.32 1.75 1739.42 2434
1984 128.53 126.52 1.84 1665.25 2434
1985 129.27 126.54 2.21 1688.39 2434
1986 134.51 131.22 2.69 1762.18 2500
1987 130.26 130.50 1.49 1858.09 2567
1988 134.15 126.90 1.34 1877.67 2309
1989 127.00 119.56 1.38 1663.38 2352
1990 126.71 120.89 1.31 1698.65 2411
1991 124.25 119.64 1.37 1884.91 2313
1992 125.92 125.46 1.38 2059.42 2333
1993 121.53 125.64 1.27 2026.63 2457
1994 125.39 124.58 1.15 2011.50 2454
1995 127.10 125.94 1.17 2158.99 2444
1996 128.03 131.54 0.85 2368.39 2439
1997 124.59 129.25 0.94 2522.76 2443
1998 124.05 130.23 2.68 2690.88 2384
1999 128.50 134.99 2.79 2693.57 2410
2000 130.72 142.98 2.85 3005.41 2476
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Table 4.18: Summary Statistics: Yield of Beef by Region (lb/ac)
Region Mean s.d. Min Max N
Heartland 221.05 193.86 25.98 3005.41 480
Northen Crescent 193.89 145.02 18.31 1333.36 307
Northern Great Plains 51.86 39.14 4.88 207.27 96
Prairie Gateway 62.90 52.86 1.98 788.70 275
Eastern Uplands 88.59 35.51 2.68 251.86 396
Southern Seaboard 108.84 40.44 5.44 431.53 438
Fruitful Rim 79.11 92.94 0.85 1858.09 162
Basin and Range 28.61 28.57 1.56 273.26 96
Mississippi Portal 98.53 35.95 19.04 310.42 153
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Table 4.19: Summary Statistics: Grazing Land (1000
Acres)
Year Mean SD Min Max N
1978 123.79 237.68 0.30 3306.07 2589
1979 115.39 216.06 0.36 3346.86 2526
1980 113.22 213.60 0.40 3387.65 2526
1981 111.04 211.82 0.43 3428.45 2526
1982 109.98 273.78 0.46 6148.87 2632
1983 108.91 207.89 0.63 3483.87 2493
1984 108.56 207.75 0.53 3498.50 2493
1985 108.20 207.71 0.42 3513.13 2493
1986 107.85 207.78 0.32 3527.76 2493
1987 113.26 294.55 0.21 7329.41 2643
1988 118.66 245.58 0.32 3526.60 2541
1989 118.49 245.62 0.35 3510.80 2541
1990 118.32 245.80 0.37 3495.01 2541
1991 118.15 246.11 0.40 3479.21 2541
1992 117.25 294.76 0.42 5718.17 2663
1993 116.35 237.01 0.69 3456.84 2528
1994 116.15 236.13 0.62 3450.27 2528
1995 115.95 235.59 0.56 3443.70 2528
1996 115.75 235.39 0.49 3437.12 2528
1997 115.26 259.32 0.43 3430.55 2627
1998 114.78 230.69 0.84 3420.53 2539
1999 114.47 230.44 0.78 3410.51 2539
2000 114.16 230.35 0.69 3400.49 2539
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Table 4.20: Summary Statistics: Grazing Land by Region (1000 Acres)
Region Metro/Non Metro Mean SD Min Max N
Heartland Metro 32.30 32.67 0.54 340.11 249
Non Metro 51.62 48.21 1.33 335.59 288
Northen Metro 25.93 27.37 0.21 236.69 212
Crescent Non Metro 27.85 29.24 0.63 147.96 110
Northern Metro 438.14 563.00 6.88 2478.14 18
Great Plains Non Metro 441.10 547.68 16.20 3542.40 90
Prairie Metro 288.81 258.70 5.16 2541.73 95
Gateway Non Metro 316.72 295.82 22.00 2993.41 177
Eastern Metro 66.76 88.33 1.12 1107.65 167
Uplands Non Metro 71.61 65.18 0.77 453.30 230
Southern Metro 41.04 51.69 0.65 362.94 258
Seaboard Non Metro 38.98 56.06 0.22 439.35 200
Fruitful Metro 185.75 275.60 2.38 2064.04 125
Rim Non Metro 245.32 373.42 3.14 7329.41 76
Basin and Metro 361.78 449.42 28.42 2768.58 23
Range Non Metro 447.04 496.24 2.38 6148.87 71
Mississippi Metro 45.78 36.16 2.07 210.98 56
Portal Non Metro 38.17 27.31 1.49 159.12 93
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Table 4.21: Cow-calf production cost, 2007. (U.S., dol/bred cow)
Item Value
Gross value of production:
Steer calves 186.82
Heifer calves 116.49
Yearling steers 127.08
Yearling heifers 55.34
Other cattle 96.69
Total gross value of production 589.54
Operating costs:
Purchased cattle for backgrounding 82.55
Feed:
Concentrates and other feed 34.53
Supplemental feed 28.11
Harvested forages 192.17
Cropland pasture 16.18
Private pasture 110.16
Public land 2.83
Total feed costs 383.98
Other:
Veterinary and medicine 26.29
Bedding and litter 0.50
Marketing 7.12
Custom operations 36.62
Fuel, lube, and electricity 57.68
Repairs 30.58
Interest on operating inputs 10.47
Total operating costs 635.79
Allocated overhead:
Hired labor 4.31
Opportunity cost of unpaid labor 273.83
Capital recovery cost of machinery and equipment 3/ 172.36
Opportunity cost of land 2.95
Taxes and insurance 37.70
General farm overhead 70.68
Total allocated overhead 561.83
Total costs listed 1197.62
Land cost (Rent + Taxes and insurances) 169.82
Cost as used in this study(cost - rent - tax) 1027.80
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Table 4.22: Summary Statistics: Non-land Cost of Beef
Production ($/ac, 1988 dol.)
Year Mean SD Min Max N
1978 68.39 66.09 0.27 998.60 2522
1979 61.07 59.46 0.65 942.07 2463
1980 66.16 66.39 0.35 1076.34 2464
1981 70.32 72.05 0.21 1182.33 2469
1982 70.40 72.01 0.20 1100.54 2572
1983 70.80 70.90 1.20 1045.40 2450
1984 69.48 68.31 0.30 977.70 2452
1985 63.13 60.91 0.79 810.03 2452
1986 63.16 60.18 1.21 812.64 2452
1987 59.95 60.95 0.68 819.58 2601
1988 59.49 59.21 1.27 856.64 2503
1989 54.07 52.92 1.38 723.23 2502
1990 66.12 64.44 1.89 918.61 2504
1991 64.10 63.49 1.94 954.43 2504
1992 61.98 63.58 0.91 1017.58 2620
1993 64.08 65.44 1.07 1012.52 2491
1994 63.03 61.99 1.11 959.49 2490
1995 64.20 63.14 1.18 1034.68 2490
1996 98.13 110.64 1.77 2001.04 2491
1997 98.10 112.22 2.05 2202.83 2584
1998 92.02 103.88 1.71 2141.10 2498
1999 92.22 104.18 1.75 2052.23 2499
2000 93.40 110.47 1.70 2269.58 2498
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Table 4.23: Summary Statistics: Non-land Cost of Beef by Region ($/ac, 1988 dol.)
Region Metro/Non Metro Mean SD Min Max N
Heartland Metro 139.00 128.90 1.91 2269.58 248
Non Metro 126.08 118.07 1.27 1325.51 284
Northen Metro 117.80 79.40 6.77 764.29 193
Crescent Non Metro 83.97 78.73 11.69 867.40 110
Northern Metro 33.35 26.38 0.27 106.17 18
Great Plains Non Metro 26.19 20.29 0.20 124.14 88
Prairie Metro 30.85 17.42 1.86 151.80 95
Gateway Non Metro 32.86 29.04 0.86 416.80 177
Eastern Metro 52.30 20.13 0.00 146.84 165
Uplands Non Metro 45.21 20.30 0.00 159.33 229
Southern Metro 58.93 22.95 2.98 235.14 250
Seaboard Non Metro 57.42 22.61 8.95 289.26 194
Fruitful Metro 41.89 42.69 0.33 817.25 124
Rim Non Metro 38.87 31.56 0.68 250.64 75
Basin and Metro 18.62 18.12 1.37 135.84 23
Range Non Metro 15.48 12.86 0.00 120.78 71
Mississippi Metro 63.60 28.22 16.39 211.12 56
Portal Non Metro 56.35 24.44 9.64 203.29 93
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Table 4.24: Summary Statistics: Government Payments
($/ac, 1988 dol.)
Year Mean SD Min Max N
1978 2.09 2.79 0.00 26.03 2503
1979 3.18 6.06 0.00 118.05 2461
1980 4.73 9.14 0.00 169.96 2463
1981 7.27 11.09 0.00 181.05 2466
1982 12.23 12.76 0.00 195.84 2564
1983 7.39 8.35 0.00 118.71 2537
1984 15.20 13.86 0.00 159.41 2539
1985 26.08 21.68 0.00 173.56 2541
1986 36.75 33.62 0.00 169.42 2545
1987 22.02 20.50 0.00 112.65 2705
1988 9.89 11.80 0.00 119.18 2684
1989 10.29 10.21 0.00 68.80 2682
1990 12.52 11.29 0.00 74.34 2712
1991 7.92 7.61 0.00 62.15 2711
1992 10.22 10.45 0.00 76.73 2755
1993 5.63 6.14 0.00 52.32 2722
1994 6.10 6.86 0.00 50.02 2719
1995 0.21 1.47 0.00 20.39 2711
1996 5.37 15.86 0.00 499.91 2705
1997 7.13 13.10 0.00 388.60 2731
1998 6.78 13.97 0.00 426.05 2665
1999 8.39 15.14 0.00 454.38 2677
2000 8.20 12.15 0.00 326.07 2682
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Table 4.25: Weighted Revenue Statistics (County levels, 1988 dollar)
Region mean min max N
Heartland 221.69 42.52 1635.59 10,955
Northern Crescent 263.56 8.54 1742.86 6,928
Northern Great Plains 77.23 6.48 263.23 1,751
Prairie Gateway 105.00 6.29 475.79 5,646
Eastern Uplands 137.74 27.92 567.27 9,045
Southern Seaboard 157.65 9.62 691.56 9,892
Fruitful Rim 162.66 2.67 1627.67 3,134
Basin and Range 52.58 4.32 689.94 1,646
Mississippi Portal 172.56 5.34 540.48 3,367
Table 4.26: Weighted Cost Statistics (County level, 1988 dollar)
Region mean min max N
Heartland 144.19 23.37 855.14 10,955
Northern Crescent 232.51 5.44 1048.23 6,928
Northern Great Plains 55.78 2.53 153.69 1,751
Prairie Gateway 63.19 2.43 287.63 5,646
Eastern Uplands 91.05 13.43 553.04 9,045
Southern Seaboard 114.00 2.73 811.73 9,892
Fruitful Rim 132.22 1.66 1877.87 3,134
Basin and Range 34.26 2.11 457.62 1,646
Mississippi Portal 134.96 2.28 433.79 3,367
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Table 4.27: Summary Statistics: Government Payments by Region ($/ac, 1988 dol.)
Region Metro/Non Metro Mean SD Min Max N
Heartland Metro 16.84 19.71 0.00 136.95 248
Non Metro 13.92 17.54 0.00 169.42 290
Northern Metro 19.43 17.70 0.00 128.75 200
Crescen Non Metro 13.23 13.44 0.00 111.40 112
Northern Metro 7.75 10.41 0.00 58.60 21
Great Plains Non Metro 6.74 8.69 0.00 93.65 111
Prairie Metro 5.80 8.26 0.00 111.28 100
Gateway Non Metro 6.72 10.22 0.00 151.16 202
Eastern Metro 5.09 6.78 0.00 72.05 168
Uplands Non Metro 4.16 5.97 0.00 89.11 233
Southern Metro 7.91 10.19 0.00 101.21 257
Seaboard Non Metro 7.46 9.81 0.00 79.83 202
Fruitful Metro 11.56 19.46 0.00 195.84 123
Rim Non Metro 7.78 13.79 0.00 175.11 81
Basin and Metro 3.29 7.81 0.00 79.82 28
Range Non Metro 5.79 33.02 0.00 499.91 92
Mississippi Metro 15.39 21.33 0.00 157.44 57
Portal Non Metro 14.65 18.83 0.00 134.72 97
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Table 4.28: Share of farmland (County levels)
Region 1982 1987 1992 1997
Heartland Base/Farmland 0.861 0.772 0.837 0.837
Farmland/Total land 0.782 0.769 0.716 0.745
Base/Total land 0.68 0.599 0.609 0.633
N 522 521 419 420
Northern Base/Farmland 0.754 0.688 0.707 0.704
Crescent Farmland/Total land 0.41 0.387 0.37 0.392
Base/Total land 0.329 0.28 0.277 0.291
N 293 316 312 304
Northern Base/Farmland 0.818 0.764 0.815 0.835
Great Plains Farmland/Total land 0.855 0.848 0.847 0.873
Base/Total land 0.699 0.65 0.694 0.732
N 84 82 93 86
Prairie Base/Farmland 0.861 0.825 0.858 0.888
Gateway Farmland/Total land 0.829 0.831 0.845 0.856
Base/Total land 0.711 0.681 0.723 0.76
N 303 281 174 275
Eastern Base/Farmland 0.702 0.703 0.715 0.71
Uplands Farmland/Total land 0.432 0.42 0.406 0.429
Base/Total land 0.321 0.311 0.306 0.322
N 394 394 397 392
Southern Base/Farmland 0.672 0.634 0.635 0.633
Seaboard Farmland/Total land 0.349 0.318 0.282 0.327
Base/Total land 0.24 0.206 0.181 0.215
N 446 445 402 436
Fruitful Base/Farmland 0.782 0.75 0.755 0.738
Rim Farmland/Total land 0.475 0.417 0.325 0.367
Base/Total land 0.408 0.334 0.262 0.293
N 117 159 182 173
Basin Base/Farmland 0.863 0.845 0.867 0.866
and Range Farmland/Total land 0.296 0.377 0.379 0.411
Base/Total land 0.252 0.316 0.326 0.357
N 61 100 106 86
Mississippi Base/Farmland 0.782 0.714 0.749 0.708
Portal Farmland/Total land 0.501 0.463 0.444 0.471
Base/Total land 0.403 0.336 0.346 0.352
N 158 152 151 146
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Table 4.29: Summary Statistics of MSAs
Variable Mean s.d. Min Max
Revenue 203.227 114.734 2.666 942.498
Cost 158.905 107.639 1.657 1111.708
Gov’t Payments 13.337 16.278 0 128.752
Base Land Share 0.382 0.222 0.019 0.851
Population 580605 963675 56507 9242506
Popu Growth Rate 0.009 0.014 -0.075 0.122
College 0.192 0.066 0.073 0.474
Poverty Rate 0.127 0.038 0.042 0.266
Unemployment Rate 0.061 0.016 0.020 0.149
Manufacture 0.195 0.081 0.038 0.532
Popu Density 0.646 0.617 0.033 4.052
Low Inc Families 0.202 0.053 0.067 0.365
High Inc Families 0.171 0.06 0.069 0.431
Black 0.123 0.112 0 0.515
Elder 0.16 0.035 0.049 0.424
N=267, Avg. T=20.9
Table 4.30: Summary Statistics of Agricultural MSAs∗
Variable Mean s.d. Min Max
Revenue 217.659 114.936 2.666 716.827
Cost 162.628 98.620 1.657 708.114
Gov’t Payments 15.793 18.611 0 128.752
Base land share 0.549 0.16 0.303 0.851
Popu. 497596 823598 56507 8291553
Popu Growth Rate 0.009 0.013 -0.044 0.097
College 0.192 0.064 0.087 0.44
Poverty Rate 0.118 0.034 0.049 0.266
Manufacture 0.202 0.083 0.041 0.447
Popu Density 0.63 0.552 0.033 3.445
Low income families 0.19 0.049 0.094 0.365
High income families 0.175 0.054 0.075 0.429
Black 0.088 0.087 0.001 0.515
Elder 0.158 0.034 0.084 0.424
N=136, Avg. T = 19.58
∗ Base land share > 30%
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Table 4.31: List of MSAs (All Obs)
MSA/PMSA Revenue Cost Gov T
Akron, OH 364.94 324.62 23.34 23
Albany, GA 158.17 121.98 12.29 23
Albany-Schenectady-Troy, NY 298.23 281.90 18.53 23
Alexandria, LA 186.94 128.56 13.33 23
Allentown-Bethlehem-Easton, PA 194.10 185.99 20.10 15
Altoona, PA 329.40 345.58 17.03 15
Ann Arbor, MI 246.75 190.38 20.02 23
Anniston, AL 145.44 89.38 2.89 23
Appleton-Oshkosh-Neenah, WI 462.73 420.32 30.46 23
Asheville, NC 172.79 122.75 6.51 23
Athens, GA 192.38 138.79 5.80 23
Atlanta, GA 148.43 88.27 3.20 23
Auburn-Opelika, AL 114.69 74.25 4.21 23
Augusta-Aiken, GA-SC 168.87 140.38 9.77 23
Baltimore, MD 228.40 204.87 20.35 23
Baton Rouge, LA 132.52 74.60 2.27 23
Bellingham, WA 838.75 889.12 23.49 13
Benton Harbor, MI 179.46 143.57 16.29 23
Biloxi-Gulfport-Pascagoula, MS 169.50 95.31 2.69 23
Binghamton, NY 346.99 331.99 19.33 23
Birmingham, AL 154.96 93.73 3.79 23
Bismarck, ND 59.75 47.00 4.55 23
Bloomington, IN 187.82 124.25 12.93 23
Bloomington-Normal, IL 257.65 148.15 20.22 23
Boise City, ID 277.79 205.89 9.42 10
Boulder-Longmont, CO 159.07 94.72 9.91 9
Bremerton, WA 62.88 27.50 0.00 13
Buffalo-Niagara Falls, NY 346.55 340.20 21.97 23
Canton-Massillon, OH 323.41 292.25 20.10 23
Cedar Rapids, IA 304.33 173.51 24.26 13
Champaign-Urbana, IL 252.80 147.34 20.07 23
Charleston-North Charleston, SC 151.19 128.42 8.48 23
Charleston, WV 61.96 34.74 0.96 23
Charlotte-Gastonia-Rock Hill, NC-SC 192.16 145.50 8.84 23
Charlottesville, VA 190.95 127.08 6.23 23
Chattanooga, TN-GA 164.73 108.31 4.33 23
Chicago, IL 266.11 170.74 22.55 23
Chico-Paradise, CA 166.33 115.35 44.24 15
Cincinnati, OH-KY-IN 137.20 89.12 6.91 23
Clarksville-Hopkinsville, TN-KY 185.31 126.06 11.61 23
Cleveland-Lorain-Elyria, OH 256.71 225.40 15.86 23
Colorado Springs, CO 25.65 13.94 0.88 9
Columbia, MO 142.74 87.40 5.88 23
Columbia, SC 178.73 140.71 9.94 23
Columbus, GA-AL 105.19 71.31 5.08 23
Columbus, OH 223.49 151.44 16.23 23
Corvallis, OR 116.03 85.48 17.00 18
Cumberland, MD-WV 186.07 164.19 9.92 23
Danville, VA 110.74 75.61 5.24 23
Davenport-Moline-Rock Island, IA-IL 312.51 178.53 27.36 13
Dayton-Springfield, OH 260.98 169.82 19.01 23
Daytona Beach, FL 38.65 19.41 0.00 9
Decatur, AL 177.38 119.83 8.30 23
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Table 4.31: List of MSAs (continued)
MSA/PMSA Revenue Cost Gov T
Decatur, IL 254.77 146.16 19.91 23
Denver, CO 46.41 27.35 3.80 9
Des Moines, IA 269.39 148.69 19.95 13
Detroit, MI 210.66 162.45 16.55 23
Dothan, AL 152.94 126.21 8.81 23
Dover, DE 236.13 198.45 21.86 23
Dubuque, IA 358.38 253.82 28.74 13
Duluth-Superior, MN-WI 99.36 77.56 3.89 23
Dutchess County, NY 235.07 205.70 15.47 23
Eau Claire, WI 349.22 312.18 21.83 23
Elkhart-Goshen, IN 268.86 204.34 22.05 23
Elmira, NY 298.23 305.76 12.71 15
Enid, OK 118.48 73.09 13.14 23
Erie, PA 248.64 255.95 13.39 15
Eugene-Springfield, OR 103.36 74.36 12.42 18
Evansville-Henderson, IN-KY 225.34 154.15 18.81 23
Fargo-Moorhead, ND-MN 128.55 95.54 14.51 23
Fayetteville, NC 158.64 148.25 12.18 23
Fayetteville-Springdale-Rogers, AR 148.07 78.14 1.89 23
Flint, MI 211.15 164.76 17.66 23
Florence, AL 156.72 114.53 8.66 23
Florence, SC 167.45 164.80 16.32 23
Fort Collins-Loveland, CO 112.26 61.94 6.51 9
Fort Myers-Cape Coral, FL 34.16 17.19 0.00 9
Fort Pierce-Port St. Lucie, FL 58.84 40.29 0.31 9
Fort Smith, AR-OK 97.59 52.90 1.48 23
Fort Walton Beach, FL 96.26 87.32 3.65 9
Fort Wayne, IN 238.18 160.40 17.92 23
Fresno, CA 286.84 220.36 32.15 15
Gadsden, AL 156.75 109.32 5.90 23
Gainesville, FL 102.17 77.71 1.48 9
Gary, IN 231.89 157.04 20.48 23
Goldsboro, NC 162.34 152.83 14.50 23
Grand Forks, ND-MN 112.59 80.58 17.64 23
Grand Junction, CO 83.52 37.86 3.01 9
Grand Rapids-Muskegon-Holland, MI 278.20 239.25 20.76 23
Greeley, CO 203.83 101.56 11.87 9
Green Bay, WI 447.68 417.09 28.06 23
Greensboro–Winston-Salem–High Point, NC 181.06 137.57 8.32 23
Greenville, NC 171.20 157.27 15.13 23
Greenville-Spartanburg-Anderson, SC 150.92 95.11 3.89 23
Hagerstown, MD 321.22 338.33 18.62 15
Hamilton-Middletown, OH 234.63 157.66 18.65 23
Harrisburg-Lebanon-Carlisle, PA 356.41 362.01 21.63 15
Hattiesburg, MS 159.47 94.01 3.32 23
Hickory-Morganton-Lenoir, NC 225.12 165.51 8.22 23
Houma, LA 83.84 42.84 0.59 23
Huntington-Ashland, WV-KY-OH 94.17 63.97 3.27 23
Huntsville, AL 177.59 138.06 11.90 23
Indianapolis, IN 242.28 147.22 19.23 23
Iowa City, IA 288.47 164.92 23.48 13
Jackson, MI 258.84 211.71 21.66 23
Jackson, MS 160.26 112.60 8.63 23
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Table 4.31: List of MSAs (continued)
MSA/PMSA Revenue Cost Gov T
Jackson, TN 188.29 171.60 16.91 23
Jacksonville, FL 184.39 190.85 3.20 9
Jacksonville, NC 161.16 153.17 13.44 23
Jamestown, NY 311.78 299.73 17.22 23
Janesville-Beloit, WI 377.12 310.19 27.40 23
Johnson City-Kingsport-Bristol, TN-VA 171.52 108.89 4.73 23
Johnstown, PA 259.27 270.21 13.66 15
Jonesboro, AR 219.09 188.22 33.67 23
Joplin, MO 145.89 93.95 5.14 23
Kalamazoo-Battle Creek, MI 202.54 163.54 18.10 23
Kankakee, IL 241.21 153.00 19.64 23
Kansas City, MO-KS 150.11 94.44 6.40 23
Kenosha, WI 323.54 247.91 25.81 23
Knoxville, TN 167.35 98.51 3.60 23
Kokomo, IN 262.23 158.65 20.64 23
La Crosse, WI-MN 332.47 287.82 20.62 23
Lafayette, LA 182.68 154.97 23.18 23
Lafayette, IN 240.76 145.13 19.70 23
Lake Charles, LA 149.55 133.69 21.00 23
Lakeland-Winter Haven, FL 54.15 31.75 0.13 9
Lancaster, PA 631.77 625.45 32.93 15
Lansing-East Lansing, MI 266.70 214.25 20.45 23
Lawrence, KS 167.09 91.30 5.79 9
Lawton, OK 101.21 69.70 9.49 23
Lexington, KY 125.20 69.72 2.81 23
Lima, OH 253.16 174.55 18.04 23
Lincoln, NE 223.60 130.18 11.94 23
Little Rock-North Little Rock, AR 177.49 130.38 18.06 23
Los Angeles-Long Beach, CA 97.61 61.14 3.51 15
Louisville, KY-IN 185.06 128.57 9.98 23
Lynchburg, VA 136.42 80.78 3.21 23
Macon, GA 165.95 135.96 9.26 23
Madison, WI 400.72 337.34 28.91 23
Mansfield, OH 248.95 190.28 17.25 23
Medford-Ashland, OR 57.84 33.33 1.31 18
Memphis, TN-AR-MS 169.42 145.10 12.45 23
Merced, CA 341.47 251.21 27.13 15
Middlesex-Somerset-Hunterdon, NJ 174.34 139.52 12.06 23
Milwaukee-Waukesha, WI 419.05 366.34 29.67 23
Minneapolis-St. Paul, MN-WI 299.91 247.29 21.50 23
Mobile, AL 206.34 140.16 8.18 23
Modesto, CA 420.24 300.01 26.36 15
Monmouth-Ocean, NJ 135.23 99.19 8.84 23
Monroe, LA 252.58 227.05 38.87 23
Montgomery, AL 133.54 89.38 5.81 23
Muncie, IN 233.43 149.46 16.61 23
Myrtle Beach, SC 131.29 120.01 9.61 23
Nashville, TN 142.66 86.96 4.13 23
New Orleans, LA 142.32 79.53 1.95 23
Newark, NJ 271.17 237.44 18.91 23
Norfolk-Virginia Beach-Newport News, VA-NC 175.55 136.14 13.62 23
Oakland, CA 55.79 30.08 1.97 15
Ocala, FL 93.12 72.71 1.22 9
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Table 4.31: List of MSAs (continued)
MSA/PMSA Revenue Cost Gov T
Oklahoma City, OK 106.52 64.86 6.19 23
Olympia, WA 386.92 369.69 8.41 13
Omaha, NE-IA 244.68 153.82 15.72 23
Orlando, FL 76.24 68.19 1.00 9
Owensboro, KY 191.09 131.90 12.94 23
Panama City, FL 141.45 135.40 5.70 9
Parkersburg-Marietta, WV-OH 100.05 65.71 3.46 23
Pensacola, FL 180.90 206.74 13.38 9
Peoria-Pekin, IL 236.48 144.07 18.54 23
Philadelphia, PA-NJ 296.93 256.92 18.91 23
Pine Bluff, AR 226.71 178.96 32.20 23
Pittsburgh, PA 172.47 163.53 9.25 15
Pocatello, ID 21.30 14.85 8.46 10
Portland-Vancouver, OR-WA 194.50 151.06 16.83 18
Provo-Orem, UT 90.54 73.75 4.75 16
Pueblo, CO 23.40 13.47 1.01 9
Punta Gorda, FL 143.53 138.78 2.25 9
Racine, WI 298.33 227.45 22.75 23
Raleigh-Durham-Chapel Hill, NC 157.18 125.42 7.80 23
Reading, PA 295.36 291.77 20.31 15
Redding, CA 49.45 21.73 0.98 15
Reno, NV 62.21 25.04 0.75 15
Richland-Kennewick-Pasco, WA 154.44 118.80 16.35 13
Richmond-Petersburg, VA 176.71 130.76 9.71 23
Riverside-San Bernardino, CA 314.29 248.49 20.85 15
Roanoke, VA 177.72 124.45 5.93 23
Rochester, MN 309.37 230.13 22.92 23
Rochester, NY 313.63 294.42 25.32 23
Rockford, IL 315.83 222.30 26.83 23
Rocky Mount, NC 160.77 150.62 14.17 23
Sacramento, CA 247.63 153.21 22.44 15
Saginaw-Bay City-Midland, MI 187.04 137.08 15.80 23
St. Cloud, MN 316.76 281.94 21.35 23
St. Joseph, MO 177.01 117.66 9.19 23
St. Louis, MO-IL 185.21 128.80 12.45 23
Salem, OR 159.39 128.16 20.96 18
Salinas, CA 49.51 21.38 0.91 15
Salt Lake City-Ogden, UT 136.48 122.37 6.04 16
San Diego, CA 126.13 89.13 6.18 15
San Francisco, CA 213.21 157.92 12.82 15
San Jose, CA 73.51 39.87 2.86 15
San Luis Obispo-Atascadero-Paso Robles, CA 46.34 25.59 1.55 15
Santa Barbara-Santa Maria-Lompoc, CA 53.77 25.41 1.27 15
Santa Cruz-Watsonville, CA 67.72 33.21 1.66 15
Santa Fe, NM 10.40 4.81 0.12 23
Santa Rosa, CA 175.19 123.71 9.35 15
Sarasota-Bradenton, FL 101.06 75.37 0.68 9
Savannah, GA 125.80 102.08 7.32 23
Scranton–Wilkes-Barre–Hazleton, PA 244.60 253.31 12.24 15
Seattle-Bellevue-Everett, WA 843.59 863.65 22.16 13
Sharon, PA 269.99 276.50 14.93 15
Sheboygan, WI 462.92 424.96 29.95 23
Sherman-Denison, TX 95.55 51.92 3.67 23
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Table 4.31: List of MSAs (continued)
MSA/PMSA Revenue Cost Gov T
Shreveport-Bossier City, LA 148.69 93.96 6.85 23
Sioux City, IA-NE 239.71 158.12 14.28 23
South Bend, IN 242.39 178.76 21.70 23
Spokane, WA 48.52 33.21 3.43 23
Springfield, IL 249.79 144.64 18.94 23
Springfield, MO 155.03 107.37 3.82 23
State College, PA 330.66 345.05 18.78 15
Steubenville-Weirton, OH-WV 108.70 82.27 4.56 23
Stockton-Lodi, CA 302.57 200.95 23.52 15
Sumter, SC 176.91 170.41 18.73 23
Syracuse, NY 390.87 379.69 26.10 23
Tacoma, WA 425.16 408.67 9.78 13
Tallahassee, FL 134.39 113.94 9.26 9
Tampa-St. Petersburg-Clearwater, FL 113.88 88.07 0.95 9
Terre Haute, IN 223.36 140.59 18.14 23
Texarkana, TX-Texarkana, AR 133.30 81.03 5.30 23
Toledo, OH 242.32 151.53 18.50 23
Topeka, KS 134.95 67.22 4.88 9
Trenton, NJ 144.39 104.62 10.11 23
Tulsa, OK 66.23 33.49 1.29 23
Tuscaloosa, AL 148.88 99.92 5.97 23
Utica-Rome, NY 370.47 368.75 21.12 23
Vallejo-Fairfield-Napa, CA 37.74 21.03 1.29 15
Vineland-Millville-Bridgeton, NJ 147.65 110.92 10.14 23
Washington, DC-MD-VA-WV 192.86 154.90 11.44 23
Waterloo-Cedar Falls, IA 333.59 198.90 27.22 13
Wausau, WI 358.51 339.94 21.42 23
West Palm Beach-Boca Raton, FL 4.80 2.32 0.23 9
Wheeling, WV-OH 99.49 70.00 3.34 23
Wichita, KS 158.22 87.01 10.71 9
Wichita Falls, TX 89.69 66.28 9.25 23
Williamsport, PA 265.81 260.83 18.92 15
Wilmington-Newark, DE-MD 239.24 215.34 20.50 23
Wilmington, NC 152.55 139.80 11.03 23
Yakima, WA 74.20 47.80 1.48 13
York, PA 215.58 204.08 15.86 15
Youngstown-Warren, OH 281.94 254.32 18.60 23
Yuba City, CA 144.92 86.04 23.64 15
83
Table 4.32: Agricultural MSAs∗
Base Land Growth Gov’t
Share, % Rate, % Cost Payment Revenue
Akron, OH 32.02 0.25 324.62 23.34 364.94
Albany, GA 36.69 0.49 121.98 12.29 158.17
Ann Arbor, MI 41.61 1.27 190.38 20.02 246.75
Appleton-Oshkosh-Neenah, WI 52.16 1.05 420.32 30.46 462.73
Benton Harbor, MI 40.55 -0.29 143.57 16.29 179.46
Bismarck, ND 76.19 1.04 47.00 4.55 59.75
Bloomington, IN 35.78 1.00 124.25 12.93 187.82
Bloomington-Normal, IL 85.12 1.14 148.15 20.22 257.65
Boise City, ID 81.51 3.78 205.89 9.42 277.79
Canton-Massillon, OH 41.81 0.03 292.25 20.10 323.41
Cedar Rapids, IA 76.47 0.09 173.51 24.26 304.33
Champaign-Urbana, IL 83.52 0.22 147.34 20.07 252.80
Chicago, IL 61.33 0.60 170.74 22.55 266.11
Chico-Paradise, CA 38.70 2.61 115.35 44.24 166.33
Cincinnati, OH-KY-IN 38.98 0.55 89.12 6.91 137.20
Clarksville-Hopkinsville, TN-KY 44.20 1.55 126.06 11.61 185.31
Colorado Springs, CO 49.27 2.84 13.94 0.88 25.65
Columbia, MO 63.02 1.54 87.40 5.88 142.74
Columbus, OH 55.89 1.10 151.44 16.23 223.49
Davenport-Moline-Rock Island, IA-IL 73.73 -0.71 178.53 27.36 312.51
Dayton-Springfield, OH 63.41 0.05 169.82 19.01 260.98
Decatur, AL 32.77 0.92 119.83 8.30 177.38
Decatur, IL 80.59 -0.66 146.16 19.91 254.77
Denver, CO 34.19 2.01 27.35 3.80 46.41
Des Moines, IA 73.33 0.65 148.69 19.95 269.39
Dothan, AL 30.73 0.60 126.21 8.81 152.94
Dover, DE 53.92 1.17 198.45 21.86 236.13
Dubuque, IA 74.00 -0.67 253.82 28.74 358.38
Eau Claire, WI 48.85 0.65 312.18 21.83 349.22
Elkhart-Goshen, IN 58.49 1.38 204.34 22.05 268.86
Enid, OK 83.73 -0.32 73.09 13.14 118.48
Evansville-Henderson, IN-KY 57.16 0.42 154.15 18.81 225.34
Fargo-Moorhead, ND-MN 81.10 1.13 95.54 14.51 128.55
Fayetteville-Springdale-Rogers, AR 43.36 2.80 78.14 1.89 148.07
Flint, MI 45.80 -0.13 164.76 17.66 211.15
Fort Collins-Loveland, CO 30.29 2.94 61.94 6.51 112.26
Fort Pierce-Port St. Lucie, FL 52.24 2.27 40.29 0.31 58.84
Fort Smith, AR-OK 35.73 1.21 52.90 1.48 97.59
Fort Wayne, IN 67.75 0.59 160.40 17.92 238.18
Fresno, CA 44.05 2.80 220.36 32.15 286.84
Gary, IN 44.32 -0.09 157.04 20.48 231.89
Goldsboro, NC 35.71 0.72 152.83 14.50 162.34
Grand Forks, ND-MN 64.95 -0.18 80.58 17.64 112.59
Grand Rapids-Muskegon-Holland, MI 48.81 1.32 239.25 20.76 278.20
Greeley, CO 65.36 1.71 101.56 11.87 203.83
Green Bay, WI 42.08 1.25 417.09 28.06 447.68
Hagerstown, MD 37.68 0.89 338.33 18.62 321.22
Hamilton-Middletown, OH 53.97 1.29 157.66 18.65 234.63
Harrisburg-Lebanon-Carlisle, PA 30.36 0.71 362.01 21.63 356.41
Huntsville, AL 32.02 1.67 138.06 11.90 177.59
Indianapolis, IN 59.81 0.99 147.22 19.23 242.28
Iowa City, IA 72.58 1.62 164.92 23.48 288.47
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Table 4.32: Agricultural MSAs (continued)
Base Land Growth Gov’t
Share, % Rate, % Cost Payment Revenue
Jackson, MI 39.53 0.21 211.71 21.66 258.84
Jackson, TN 42.01 1.10 171.60 16.91 188.29
Janesville-Beloit, WI 62.79 0.45 310.19 27.40 377.12
Johnson City-Kingsport-Bristol, TN-VA 31.26 0.59 108.89 4.73 171.52
Jonesboro, AR 67.12 1.25 188.22 33.67 219.09
Joplin, MO 60.39 1.06 93.95 5.14 145.89
Kalamazoo-Battle Creek, MI 56.63 0.37 163.54 18.10 202.54
Kankakee, IL 82.18 0.04 153.00 19.64 241.21
Kansas City, MO-KS 57.91 0.98 94.44 6.40 150.11
Kenosha, WI 45.80 0.90 247.91 25.81 323.54
Kokomo, IN 73.07 -0.11 158.65 20.64 262.23
La Crosse, WI-MN 48.09 0.67 287.82 20.62 332.47
Lafayette, LA 33.94 0.89 154.97 23.18 182.68
Lafayette, IN 78.57 0.86 145.13 19.70 240.76
Lakeland-Winter Haven, FL 49.51 1.81 31.75 0.13 54.15
Lancaster, PA 60.15 1.32 625.45 32.93 631.77
Lansing-East Lansing, MI 50.27 0.41 214.25 20.45 266.70
Lawrence, KS 68.37 1.58 91.30 5.79 167.09
Lawton, OK 72.11 -0.11 69.70 9.49 101.21
Lexington, KY 74.53 1.28 69.72 2.81 125.20
Lima, OH 73.94 0.10 174.55 18.04 253.16
Lincoln, NE 75.06 1.34 130.18 11.94 223.60
Louisville, KY-IN 40.15 0.34 128.57 9.98 185.06
Madison, WI 60.23 1.39 337.34 28.91 400.72
Mansfield, OH 56.70 -0.17 190.28 17.25 248.95
Memphis, TN-AR-MS 38.71 0.99 145.10 12.45 169.42
Merced, CA 77.08 2.87 251.21 27.13 341.47
Milwaukee-Waukesha, WI 48.02 0.36 366.34 29.67 419.05
Minneapolis-St. Paul, MN-WI 44.25 1.50 247.29 21.50 299.91
Modesto, CA 75.15 3.40 300.01 26.36 420.24
Muncie, IN 66.29 -0.40 149.46 16.61 233.43
Nashville, TN 41.97 1.87 86.96 4.13 142.66
Oakland, CA 54.79 1.74 30.08 1.97 55.79
Oklahoma City, OK 62.69 1.23 64.86 6.19 106.52
Omaha, NE-IA 78.58 0.75 153.82 15.72 244.68
Orlando, FL 49.39 2.91 68.19 1.00 76.24
Owensboro, KY 50.69 0.39 131.90 12.94 191.09
Peoria-Pekin, IL 71.00 -0.20 144.07 18.54 236.48
Pine Bluff, AR 35.15 -0.20 178.96 32.20 226.71
Pocatello, ID 41.72 1.23 14.85 8.46 21.30
Provo-Orem, UT 30.27 2.79 73.75 4.75 90.54
Pueblo, CO 31.23 0.01 13.47 1.01 23.40
Punta Gorda, FL 76.42 2.05 138.78 2.25 143.53
Racine, WI 52.70 0.43 227.45 22.75 298.33
Richland-Kennewick-Pasco, WA 53.66 2.27 118.80 16.35 154.44
Rochester, MN 68.69 1.45 230.13 22.92 309.37
Rochester, NY 34.46 0.29 294.42 25.32 313.63
Rockford, IL 70.36 0.66 222.30 26.83 315.83
Sacramento, CA 31.93 3.22 153.21 22.44 247.63
Saginaw-Bay City-Midland, MI 47.38 -0.20 137.08 15.80 187.04
St. Cloud, MN 56.42 1.12 281.94 21.35 316.76
St. Joseph, MO 68.98 0.01 117.66 9.19 177.01
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Table 4.32: Agricultural MSAs (continued)
Base Land Growth Gov’t
Share, % Rate, % Cost Payment Revenue
St. Louis, MO-IL 44.42 0.36 128.80 12.45 185.21
Salinas, CA 62.57 1.99 21.38 0.91 49.51
Salt Lake City-Ogden, UT 46.27 1.82 122.37 6.04 136.48
San Francisco, CA 46.04 0.74 157.92 12.82 213.21
San Jose, CA 38.38 1.47 39.87 2.86 73.51
San Luis Obi-Ata-Paso Robles, CA 58.40 3.04 25.59 1.55 46.34
St Barbara-St Maria-Lompoc, CA 43.40 1.86 25.41 1.27 53.77
Santa Fe, NM 64.93 2.29 4.81 0.12 10.40
Santa Rosa, CA 31.48 2.60 123.71 9.35 175.19
Sarasota-Bradenton, FL 57.06 2.00 75.37 0.68 101.06
Sheboygan, WI 56.04 0.53 424.96 29.95 462.92
Sherman-Denison, TX 65.88 1.22 51.92 3.67 95.55
Sioux City, IA-NE 74.98 0.16 158.12 14.28 239.71
South Bend, IN 54.36 0.43 178.76 21.70 242.39
Springfield, IL 76.93 0.32 144.64 18.94 249.79
Springfield, MO 63.04 1.76 107.37 3.82 155.03
Stockton-Lodi, CA 84.57 3.11 200.95 23.52 302.57
Syracuse, NY 38.22 0.02 379.69 26.10 390.87
Tampa-St. Petersburg-Clearwater, FL 34.37 1.56 88.07 0.95 113.88
Terre Haute, IN 62.17 -0.14 140.59 18.14 223.36
Texarkana, TX-Texarkana, AR 31.63 0.74 81.03 5.30 133.30
Toledo, OH 70.89 0.05 151.53 18.50 242.32
Topeka, KS 70.03 0.37 67.22 4.88 134.95
Tulsa, OK 66.52 1.25 33.49 1.29 66.23
Vallejo-Fairfield-Napa, CA 38.44 3.17 21.03 1.29 37.74
Waterloo-Cedar Falls, IA 79.20 -0.78 198.90 27.22 333.59
West Palm Beach-Boca Raton, FL 42.80 2.65 2.32 0.23 4.80
Wheeling, WV-OH 30.30 -0.88 70.00 3.34 99.49
Wichita, KS 76.86 0.96 87.01 10.71 158.22
Wichita Falls, TX 77.73 0.41 66.28 9.25 89.69
Wilmington-Newark, DE-MD 30.57 1.10 215.34 20.50 239.24
York, PA 41.29 1.23 204.08 15.86 215.58
∗ Base land share > 30%
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Figure 4.8: Farm Resource Regions
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Figure 4.9: MSA Buffers: 2000 Definition
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Figure 4.10: MSA Buffers: Lexington and Louisville, KY
Lexington-Fayette
Louisville
Hardin
Clark
Bath
Owen
Nelson
Harrison Shelby
Scott
Bullitt
Estill
Madison
Henry
Clark
Lincoln
Grant
Meade
Washington
Jefferson
Jefferson
Fayette
Scott
Harrison
Mercer
Crawford
Bourbon
Boyle
Garrard
Powell
Floyd
Franklin
Oldham
Nicholas
Spencer
Trimble
Anderson
Woodford
Jessamine
Montgomery
Notes: The yellow area is Lexington defined by its buffer, and the shaded area is Lexington–Fayette MSA by OMB definition.
Other counties belong to Liousville. Shelby County is covered by both buffers.
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Chapter 5 Empirical Methodology
Section 5.1 discusses alternative measures of the agricultural variables that will be used in
the regressions, including the reason of why a specific form of a measure is considered, and
the expected results or the implications of using it. Section 5.2 discusses the subsamples that
will be used in the regressions, together with the information each subsample is capable of
conveying, together with the expected results of using it. Section 5.3 discusses the regression
specifications. The need for a dynamic framework will be shown in this section. Section
5.4 discusses the estimation technique used to address the dynamic panel bias.
5.1 Measuring the Agricultural Rent at the MSA Level
Simple Averages and Weighted Averages
As shown in Chapter 4, the appropriate observation levels for this study are MSAs, so we
need to aggregate the county-level agricultural variables into MSA levels. Two methods
of aggregation are used: simple averages, and weighted averages, with the weight for each
county being its share of agricultural land within the metropolitan area.
There are two reasons that the weighted average may be superior to simple averages.
First, counties with less agricultural land are presumably closer to cities, so farming prac-
tices for observed crops in these counties will be more likely affected by urban development.
Giving them a smaller weight helps reduce the endogeneity problem as mentioned in Section
4.1. However, as discussed in Section 4.1, the impact of urban areas on farming can be both
positive and negative, therefore we can not determine the direction of bias caused by this
issue of endogeneity.
Second, counties with less farm land and closer to cities may have more unobserved
crops. This can be seen in Table 5.1, which compares the simple averages and weighted
averages for revenues, costs and government payments. Nearly in all regions, except for
Northern Great Plains and Prairie Gateway (Southern Plains) where simple averages are
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slightly (and insignificantly) higher, weighted averages for both revenue and cost are higher,
which can not be completely attributed to differences in farming practices or productivities
in metropolitan and non-metropolitan areas. The most likely reason for this phenomena
is that counties with less agricultural land have more unobserved crops. As the revenue
and cost are county averages, i.e., total revenue and cost divided by agricultural land, the
observed average revenue and cost will be both lower in counties with more unobserved
crops.For example, the difference between the simple averages and weighted averages are
the most significant in the Northern Crescent and the Fruitful Rim. Relative to other
regions, Northern Crescent has more unobserved tobaccos, beans, and potatoes; while the
Fruitful Rim, as its name suggests, is highly concentrated in vegetables and fruits in certain
areas. Moreover, if the unobserved crops are correlated with the distance to cities, say, the
closer to cities the more unobserved crops, the observed revenue and cost will be negatively
correlated with distance to cities. In dynamic cases, this means the changes in observed
revenue and cost are negatively correlated with urban growth,1 suggesting the unobserved
crops are not fixed and panel data techniques will not help. Moreover, if shocks to urban
labor markets have persistent impact so that population growth are serially correlated,
using lagged revenue and cost in regressions will not eliminate the correlation either. This
source of endogeneity will bias our estimation down.
Dollar Measures and Log Measures
While the agricultural variables are in dollar measures, logarithmic transformation of the
agricultural variables are also considered. This not only allows us to interpret the results
in elasticities, it is also more appropriate than the dollar measure in an intercity spatial
framework. The impact of a one–dollar increase in land values, and in turn, a one-dollar
increase in housing prices may be non-linear across locations considering the differences in
1Taking the revenue for an example, the real average revenue at time period t equals
TROt +TR
UO
t
Lt
,
while the observed average revenue is
TROt
Lt
, where TROt is the total observed revenue, TR
UO
t is the
total unobserved revenue, and Lt is the agricultural land. When urban area grows so that Lt
decreases in t+1, TRO decreases faster than TRUO, so the change in observed average revenue does
not equal the change in the real revenue.
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Table 5.1: Simple Averages Vs. Weighted Averages: Revenues, Costs, and Govern-
ment Payments
Average Revenue Average Cost Average Gov’t Pymt
Region Simple Weighted Simple Weighted Simple Weighted
Heartland 236.23 237.88 154.48 155.35 17.53 17.54
Northen Crescent 290.43 301.52 255.87 266.52 19.74 20.39
Nother Great
Plains 100.94 100.87 68.07 67.92 8.43 8.41
Prairie Gateway 85.28 85.00 54.12 53.83 4.94 4.92
Eastern Uplands 150.60 154.58 105.61 109.53 5.95 6.49
Southern Seaboard 159.48 162.23 120.44 124.63 8.99 9.57
Fruitful Rim 170.07 182.95 128.68 141.80 10.53 9.89
Basin and Range 94.03 100.21 64.73 68.45 7.31 7.78
Mississippi Portal 161.39 166.53 120.61 127.10 12.86 14.57
incomes and amenities. Using the logarithmic form will reduce such heterogeneities.
One problem brought by using the log form is that the agricultural rent (Revenues -
Costs + Gov Payments) may be negative or zero in some periods. In this case, the strategy
is letting the log of revenues, costs, and government payments enter into the regressions
separately instead of integrating them into a single rent measure. We then examine the
coefficients of each agricultural variable. While we expect the coefficients for the dollar
revenues and costs to be equal in size with opposite signs, we do not expect such equality
would hold for agricultural variables in log forms. In fact, the coefficients of the agricultural
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variables should be proportional to the value of the sample mean of these variables. 2
Time Structures
Several alternative time structures are also considered because they have different implica-
tions for farmers’ decisions. To see this, suppose the value of a parcel of land for agricultural
use, not adjusting for risks, is the present value of the stream of future agricultural rents,
i.e., Vt = Σ
∞
k=t+1
rk
(1+i)k
. Farmers may look forward or backwards when trying to determine
the value of the land. Using the lagged term of the agricultural variables implies farmers
look backwards, while using the current or forward terms suggests they look forward and
some process of rational expectation may apply3.
When different time structures are tried, one natural question is how long farmers would
look forward or backword. Two measures are considered: 3–year moving averages and single
year measures. As is discussed in Chapter 4, while 3–year moving averages is no worse than
5–year moving averages in terms of R2, it is better than single year measures in determining
land values.4 But single year measures are more capable of capturing short term changes
in agricultural prices. Therefore in cases where short term changes in agricultural variables
2To see this, suppose the population is a function of the agricultural rent (log) , thus a function
of ln (Revenue - Cost + Gov Payment), i.e.,
lnN = f [ln(r)] = f [ln(R− C +G)]
The partial derivative of lnN with respect to Revenue, for example, is
∂ lnN
∂R
= f ′
∂ ln r
∂R
= f ′
∂r
∂R
1
r
which implies
∂ lnN
∂ lnR
= f ′
R
V
Therefore, for regressions with log agricultural variables, the coefficient of each agricultural variable
will be proportional to its sample averages, i.e.,
∂ lnN/∂ lnR
∂ lnN/∂ lnC
= −R
C
3If the behavior price of products follows a unit root process, we may expect forward prices have
no impact on urban growth
4The exponential moving average is not considered because it introduces inconsistency in the
measure of agricultural variables in different years. For example, both starting in 1978, exponential
moving averages for 1979 and 1989 are different in structure. Interpretation of the estimation results
based on exponential moving averages is impossible.
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need to be addressed, single year measures will be used with additional lagged measures
being controlled.
5.2 Alternative Samples
Samples by Base Land Share
As shown in Chapter 4, the agricultural variables together measure the value of the base
land in each county and, after aggregating, in each MSA. If the base land share is very
low in one metropolitan area, it is hard to believe that our agricultural variables actually
measure the opportunity cost of urban lands. The lowest MSA base land share in the data,
for example, is below 7%.5 In this case, there is a strong possibility that correlation between
population and agricultural land value, if any, is spurious. It is possible that our measures
and the population are affected by the same unobserved factors, e.g., industrial land uses,
military land use, and so on. Therefore, to both examine the robustness of the empirical
results and to estimate the impact of agricultural variables accurately, it is necessary to
restrict observations to samples with a minimum of agricultural land. To determine a
sensible threshold for the base land share, several subsamples by base land share will be
used.6
Samples by Periods
Between 1978 and 2000, there were periods with drastic price changes such as 1978 to 1986
and 1994 to 1996. It is natural to argue that the correlation between price changes and
urban growth would be stronger in these periods. In the regressions in the next chapter,
the two periods mentioned will be examined with special notes.
5Charleston-North Charleston, SC and Savannah, GA.
6For an example, see Table 4.32 for a sub sample of MSAs with base land share greater than
30%, and Table 4.30 for its summary statistics.
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Samples with and without Declining MSAs
As argued by Glaeser and Gyourko [2005], supply conditions of the housing market do
not bind for declining MSAs, i.e., these MSAs are not in equilibrium. However, including
declining MSAs could affect our results in predictable manners. For example, in periods
when the commodity prices drop, the theory predicts metropolitan areas to grow faster.
In declining MSAs, however, the correlation between agricultural prices and population
could be positive, which blurs our results. On the contrary, when the commodity prices
increase and the theory predicts slower growth, including declining may magnify our results
artificially. To address this issue, samples with and without declining populations will also
be examined.
5.3 Specifications of the Regression Models
5.3.1 Baseline Specification
Examining the impact of agricultural variables on population levels
As suggested by Equation 3.2, the preliminary regression model is specified as
lnNi,t = β0 + β1Vi,. + γZi,t−1 + νi + εi,t (5.1)
whereNi,t is the population of metropolitan area i of period t, Vi,. is the vector of agricultural
variables (alternative measures and time structures may apply), Zi,t−1 represents all other
determinants discussed in Section 4.5, such as measures of human capital and amenities, νi
is the fixed effect, and εi,t is the error. The lag of Zi,t suggests that the contemporaneous
population level is determined by the past local productivity and amenities.
With the high frequency annual data, several reasons imply a dynamic model should be
considered. First, unlike the analysis in in Chapter 3 where no adjustment cost is assumeed,
the adjustment of capital or labor may be costly exist in high frequency observations.
Therefore the contemporaneous level of population depends on the level of the previous
period. Second, shocks for local markets may be persistent so that the population level is
serial correlated. Third, as noted by Glaeser and Gyourko [2006], because housing prices
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and housing units are both serially correlated in the short run, population may also be
serially correlated. These factors suggest a dynamic model
lnNi,t = α0 + α1 lnNi,t−1 + β1Ri,. + β2Ci,. + β3Gi,. + γZi,t−1 + νi + εi,t (5.2)
where N is the population, R is the revenue, C is the cost, G is the government payment,
and Z represents all other controls. We expect a negative sign for the revenue R and
government payment, and a positive sign for the cost C. As mentioned earlier, various
forms and time structures of R, C, and G will be examined in regressions.
Population Growth Rate
If the agricultural variables created do affect population levels, it is reasonable to argue
that they should also affect population growth rate. However, the sizes of the impacts may
differ. Taking the lagged revenue for an example
∂∆ lnNt
∂Rt−1
=
∂ lnNt
∂Rt−1
− ∂ lnNt−1
∂Rt−1
Therefore the impact of Rt−1 on the population growth rate depends on how Rt−1 affects
both Nt and Nt−1. If
∂ lnNt−1
∂Rt−1
= 0, then the impact of R on population growth rate should
be equal to that on levels.
The empirical model for population growth rate is then specified as
∆ lnNi,t =θ0 + θ1∆ lnNi,t−1 + θ2 lnNi,t−1 + φ1Ri,. + φ2Ci,. + φ3Gi,.
+ πZi,t−1 + νi + εi,t
(5.3)
The lagged growth rate, ∆ lnNi,t−1, is included because shocks to labor market may be
persistent. lnNi,t−1 is also included as a natural control. Zi,t−1 is the same as in (5.2).
7
As have mentioned, agricultural variables will be included with various forms and time
structures.
7According to equation 3.4, we should include changes in amenities and productivities when
examining the population growth rate. Following Glaeser and Shapire [2003] and Glaeser and Tobio
[2008], we can assume that Zi,t−1 also determines the increase in amenities and productivities and
estimate a reduced-form equation. So π does not equal γ.
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5.4 Estimation Technique
In this dynamic panel setup, the fixed-effect estimator is biased and inconsistent because
of the dynamic panel bias arises (Nickell [1981]). To see this, consider first differencing
Equation 5.2 (other regressors are omitted here to focus on the dynamic bias)
lnNi,t − lnNi,t−1 = α1(lnNi,t−1 − lnNi,t−2) + (εi,t − εi,t−1)
Although the fixed effect νt has been differenced out, (lnNi,t−1− lnNi,t−1) is now correlated
with (εi,t−εi,t−1) because lnNi,t−1 is correlated with ln varepsiloni,t−1. When α1 is positive,
(Ni,t−1 −Ni,t−2) and (νt − νt−1) will be negatively correlated, so the impact of Ni,t−1 will
be underestimated in a degree of 1/T . Moreover, when the estimation α is biased, so will
be the estimation of β’s if our agricultural variables are correlated with population, which
is what we want to show.
The Arellano–Bond estimator is chosen to deal with the dynamic panel bias, i.e., using
Ni,t−2 to instrument for ∆Nt−1. There are two methods dealing with dynamic panel bias:
the Arellano–Bond estimator and Arellano–Bover/Blundell-Bond estimator. Although the
latter is more efficient, it requires the fixed effect to be uncorrelated with regressors (Rood-
man [2006]). In this study, two factors may lead to violations of this condition: first, as
found by Burchfield et al. [2006], access to water supply affects urban sprawl; second, as
Saiz [2010] points out, flat land is an important in determining housing supply. Both fac-
tors also favor farming by either increasing the yield or lowering the cost. Therefore, the
Arellano–Bover/Blundell-Bond estimator is out of consideration.
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Chapter 6 Empirical Results
Section 6.1 reports preliminary results using the entire sample. As our agricultural variables
fail to measure the opportunity cost of land in areas with little agricultural land, these
results should be analyzed and tested further. Section 6.2 reports and analyses empirical
results for the period of 1978 to 1990. This period was featured by a long and drastic
price drop starting from the late 1970s, and the correlation between agricultural variables
and growth was strong enough to provide important lessons to examine the impact of
agricultural prices on urban growth. Section 6.3 presents the results for 1990s, which was
featured by a price spike in 1994-1996. Results for this period are not as significant as the
first period. As I restricted observations to MSAs with more agricultural land, however,
some significant results were obtained. Results show that the growth was indeed affected
by agricultural prices even in a short term change of two years. Guided by the findings
in previous two sections, in Section 6.4, data from 1978-1990 and 1990-2000 were pooled
together to estimate the impacts of agricultural variables. By using the estimation results,
Section 6.5 simulates the impact of a series of hypothesized corn price shock.
6.1 Preliminary Results: Entire Sample
Table 6.1 reports the estimation results using the entire sample for both Equation (5.2) and
(5.3). Year dummies are also included to capture possible correlation across idiosyncratic
errors.1 Several states did not join NASS’s survey on cattle in every year, including Cal-
ifornia (missing from 1993 to 2000), Colorada (from 1987 to 2000), Florida (from 1978 to
1989), Idaho (from 1978 to 1988), Iowa (from 1991 to 2000), Oregon (from 1978 to 1980),
Texas (from 1988 to 1992), Utah (from 1978 to 1982), and Washington (from 1978 to 1985).
Keeping observations of these states in these periods without cattle data will create unrea-
sonable jumps at both ends of these periods, therefore observations for these periods were
1Year dummies were also added in all following regressions.
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dropped.2 The final panel is therefore unbalanced, with 267 MSAs of an average of 20.90
years of observations. Fortunately, the Arellano-Bond can handle unbalanced panel. As
discussed in Chapter 4, 3-year moving averages of agricultural variables fit the farm land
value better than single-year measures, this section starts with 3-year moving averages for
regressions. Results with single-year measures are left for subsequent sections. As discussed
in Chapter 5, we expect weighted averages of agricultural variables to be superior to simple
averages in the sense of reducing endogeneity, therefore this section only reports results
with weighted averages. Results with simple averages are left for subsequent sections.
Table 6.1: Emtire Sample Estimation: The Impact of Agricultural Variables on
Population and Population Growth
Variables Population Level Population Growth
log(Revenue)t−1 -0.0100*** -0.0060*
log(Cost)t−1 0.0080*** 0.0040*
log(Gov’t payment)t−1 -0.0008*** -0.0008***
log(population)t−1 0.9470*** -0.0320***
∆log(population)t−1 0.2950***
Colleget−1 0.1899*** 0.1631***
Blackt−1 0.1036*** 0.0908*
Eldert−1 0.2025*** 0.1866***
Poverty ratet−1 -0.1230*** -0.0583
Manufacturet−1 -0.0038 -0.0062
Immigrantst−1 0.3269*** 0.2651***
Unemploymentt−1 -0.1212*** -0.0767***
Popu densityt−1 -0.0383*** -0.0437***
†Low inc familiest−1 -0.1949*** -0.1471***
††High inc familiest−1 -0.1652*** -0.1269***
N 267 267
Avg T 20.90 19.90
SignificanceLevel: *0.05; **0.01; ***0.001
† Share of family below national 20 percentile income.
†† Share of family above national 80 percentile income.
Agricultural variables are county weighted averages.
As Table 6.1 shows, as the 3-year moving average of agricultural revenue doubles, urban
2Because data on cotton for Texas are also missing before 1988, there is little hope to consistently
measure the agricultural variables for counties in Texas, therefore MSAs in Texas were not included
in the analysis in this chapter.
99
population will be 1% lower, and the population growth rate will be 0.6% percent point
lower; as the 3-year moving average of agricultural cost doubles, the population will be
0.8% higher, and the growth rate will be 0.4% higher; as the 3-year moving average of
agricultural subsidy doubles, the population will be 0.08% lower, and the growth rate will
be 0.08% percent point lower. All impacts are significant with expected signs. However,
several reasons suggest that these results may be inconsistent. First, a certain proportion of
these MSAs do not have much agricultural land. As our agricultural variables only measure
the value of agricultural land, it is likely that these variables are subject to unobserved
impact of other factors. Second, these results do not pass the panel cointegration test,
which suggests spurious correlation may exist. Third, the series of population growth rate
do not pass panel unit root tests when observations of 2000 is included, suggesting decennial
years should be treated. These issues will be treated in subsequent sections.
6.2 Results for 1978-1990
6.2.1 Population Levels: 1978 - 1990
Results
The model estimated is as specified by Equation 5.2 with the level of population as the
dependent variable. Table 6.2 reports the baseline results. The first column of Table 6.2
reports the baseline result, where all observations were used.3 The agricultural variables
were 3–year moving averages weighted by the base land area share. Coefficients of these
three agricultural variables are all significant at 0.1% level with correct signs. However,
as declining MSAs were excluded (column (2)), coefficients for revenues and costs become
insignificant. The decrease in significance is actually as expected. In a period of price drops,
say 1980s, we would expect urban areas to grow. Adding declining areas into our sample
then will dampen the results.4 This result suggests including declining MSAs may cause
problems. More results regarding declining MSAs will be discussed with other results.
3See Table 4.31 for the list of these MSAs, and Table 4.30 for summary statistics.
4Including declining MSAs does not necessarily always dampen the results. In periods where
commodity prices increase, including them may increase significance artificially.
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Table 6.2: The Impact of Agricultural Variables on Population: 1978-1990
Declining MSAs Southern Seaboard Base Land Share> 20% Base Land Share> 30%
Varible All Obs Excluded Excluded 1978-1990 1978-1989 1978-1990 1978-1989
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
log(Revenue)t−1 -0.0070** -0.0038 -0.0081* -0.0122*** -0.0130*** -0.0214*** -0.0236***
log(Cost)t−1 0.0071** 0.0045 0.0079* 0.0093** 0.0089** 0.0180*** 0.0196***
log(Gov’t Payment)t−1 -0.0009** -0.0012** -0.0005 -0.0007 -0.0006 -0.0011* -0.0014**
log(population)t−1 0.9720*** 0.9664*** 0.9721*** 0.9893*** 0.9521*** 0.9980*** 0.9642***
Colleget−1 0.1454*** 0.1623*** 0.0960 0.1566** 0.2583*** 0.1637** 0.3050***
Blackt−1 0.4008*** 0.4751*** 0.6398*** 0.2667*** 0.1771* 0.2107* 0.0797
Eldert−1 0.3633*** 0.3013*** 0.2040** 0.2452* 0.2558* 0.1144 0.1516
Poverty ratet−1 0.3812*** 0.2648*** 0.1711** 0.2783*** 0.2514*** 0.2267** 0.2078**
Manufacturet−1 -0.0708*** -0.0776*** -0.0921*** -0.1237*** -0.1086*** -0.1377*** -0.1154***
Immigrantst−1 0.4482*** 0.5092*** 0.5239*** 0.4132*** 0.3968*** 0.3122*** 0.2910***
Popu densityt−1 -0.0280*** -0.0371*** -0.0430*** -0.0308** -0.0448*** -0.0293* -0.0571***
†Low income familiest−1 -0.8581*** -0.7787*** -0.7281*** -0.7369*** -0.7543*** -0.6640*** -0.6626***
††High income familiest−1 -0.3215*** -0.3255*** -0.3211*** -0.3227*** -0.2973*** -0.2451*** -0.2046***
N 232 178 142 130 129 99 98
Avg T 9.841 9.826 9.528 10.223 9.357 10.232 9.398
Significance Level: * 0.05 ** 0.01 *** 0.001
Agricultural variables are weighted moving averages.
† Below national 20 percentile
†† Above national 80 percentile
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A closer look at the sample shows that the insignificant results in (2) were caused by the
presence of the Southern Seaboard. Column (3) reports the results using the same sample
as (2) but without the Southern Seaboard. Significant results were regained when excluding
this region. However, this result does not necessarily suggest that the opportunity costs
of land do not affect urban growth in this region. Note the average base land area of this
region is the lowest among all regions with the base land share of over 90 percent of MSAs
in this region below 30 percent. It is more likely that because base lands are rather limited
in this region so that our agricultural variables poorly measure the opportunity cost in that
region.
Column (4) and (6) restricted observations to base land share greater than 20% and
30% respectively. As can be seen, the significance of these results increases monotonically
with the base land share threshold. These results suggest that the insignificant results in
column (5) is not caused by the inclusion of the Southern Seaboard, but rather the inclusion
of MSAs with less agricultural lands surrounding them.
Column (5) and (7) report results without 1990. The results for agricultural variables
are similar qualitatively but more significant, especially for the subsample with base land
share greater than 30%. It seems that Census’s adjustment of population estimation does
cause some problems to our estimations.
Most of the coefficients of other independent variables are as expected except for that
of the poverty rate. The positive sign for poverty is due to the inclusion of the percentage
of low income families. When low income families were dropped, the coefficient of poverty
rate is negative and significant. This is because when the share of low income families is
held constant, increasing poverty rate means bigger family sizes of the poor which leads to
larger populations.
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Table 6.3: The Impact of Agricultural Variables on Population Level with Different Measures: 1978-1990
Base Land Share > 20% Base Land Share > 30%
Weighted Simple Weighted Simple
average(log) average(log) Dollar average(log) average(log) Dollar
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Revenuet−1 -0.0122*** -0.0196*** -0.00004*** -0.0214*** -0.0284*** -0.00006***
Costt−1 0.0093** 0.0202*** 0.00005*** 0.018*** 0.0283*** 0.00008***
Gov’t paymentst−1 -0.0007 -0.0009 -0.00002* -0.0011* -0.0012** -0.00002***
log(population)t−1 0.9893*** 1.0051*** 0.9970*** 0.9980*** 0.9646*** 1.0040***
Colleget − 1 0.1566** 0.0707 0.1051* 0.1637** 0.2389*** 0.0924
Blackt−1 0.2667*** 0.1823* 0.2281** 0.2107* -.01843 0.2022*
Eldert−1 0.2452* -0.0341 0.2081* 0.1144 -0.1764 0.0314
Poverty ratet−1 0.2783*** 0.1422* 0.2792*** 0.2267** 0.1321 0.1913**
Manufacturet−1 -0.1237*** -0.1343*** -0.0994*** -0.1377*** -0.1600*** -0.1058***
Immigrantst−1 0.4132*** 0.2975*** 0.3644*** 0.3122*** 0.1633*** 0.2586***
Popu densityt−1 -0.0308** -0.0451*** -0.0264* -0.0293* -0.07946*** -0.0212
†Low income familiest−1 -0.7369*** -0.5912*** -0.6739*** -0.6640*** -0.6123*** -0.5678***
††High income familiest−1 -0.3227*** -0.2340*** -0.2138*** -0.2451*** -0.1044* -0.1042
N 130 130 130 99 98 99
Avg T 10.223 8.362 10.223 10.232 7.500 10.232
Significance Level: * 0.05 ** 0.01 *** 0.001
† Below national 20 percentile
†† Above national 80 percentile
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The size of the impact of revenue is impressive: doubling the revenue lead to a 2.36% de-
crease in population. However, note that holding cost and government consistent, doubling
revenue will lead to the rent more than doubled. Fore example, the mean revenue is 225
and the mean cost is 158, doubling the revenue leads to a 336% increase in the agricultural
rent. When factoring by the discount rate, say 4%, the value of the land will be 80 times
higher. Of course, this requires the increase of the revenue to be permanent. But the point
is the change in land value led by changes in the agricultural variable may be enormous,
which helps to explain the sizable impact of the revenue.
As the results show, the coefficient of the revenue is always greater than that of the
cost. Recall the analysis in 5.1, the ratio of the two coefficients should equal the ratio of
the sample means. Because the mean revenue is greater than the mean cost, we do expect
the impact of log revenue is stronger. The impact of log government payments is one
seventeenth that of the revenue, which is also as expected because the mean government
payments is $16, or about one sixteenth of the mean revenue.
Table 6.3 reports the results with different measures, say, simple averages of revenues
and costs, and dollar measures of revenues and costs. Two subsamples withbase land
share greater than 20% and 30% respectively were used. Similar to previous results, the
signifances of agricultural variables increase monotonically with the base land share. In
these results, the coefficient for costs are higher in sizes, which is out of expectation. As
for the dollar measures, we reject the null that the coefficient for costs is equal to that of
revenues at 5% level, but not at 1%.
Robustness
Because the analysis is national based, it might be possible that these results are subject to
the presence of influential regions. Moreover, as shown in Chapter 1, the difference between
growth pattern in the first half of 1980s was mainly the difference between the North and
other regions. Considering the growth pattern of the North has long been different from
that of the West and the South, one could argue that the correlation between population
is actually due the unobserved difference between the North and other regions, but not the
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difference in agricultural variables. To address such a possibility, regressions were run for
the North (Heartland, Northern Crescent, and Northern Great Plains) and all other regions
(basically the South and the West) separately. The results show that even within the North,
the impacts of our agricultural variables are still significant and as expected. These results
are presented in Table 6.4.
Table 6.4: The Impact of Agricultural Variables by Regions: 1978-90
‘
Other Regions (West and South)
Southern
Other Seaboard
Variable North Regions Excluded Base Land >20%
log(Revenue)t−1 -0.0109** -0.0056 -0.0218*** -0.0233***
log(Cost)t−1 0.0105** 0.0061 0.0152** 0.0152***
log(Gov’t payments)t−1 -0.0009 -0.0020*** -0.0018* 0.0000
N 67 101 65 63
Avg T 10 10 9 11
Significance Level: * 0.05 ** 0.01 *** 0.001
Note: Agricultural Variables are MSA weighted averages.
To deal with potential influential years, I cut the panel at 1986, where the price fall
came to an end. The initial results with all observations are restricted, but as I restricted
to observations with base land share greater 40% (30% for 1979 to 1986), significant results
were obtained. The significance of the results do not change in different periods. Table 6.17
shows the results.
Different Time Structures
Table 6.5 examines the impact of agricultural variables with different time structures. The
moving averages were not used in this set of regression because they are a combination
of three single–year measures by definitions, and it is impossible to identify the impact of
one particular structure. For this set of regression, as an alternative,, single year measures
were used while lagged measures were controlled. For example, to examine the impact of
contemporaneous agricultural variables, the following model is used
lnNt = β0 + β1 lnVt + β2 lnVt−1 + β3 lnVt−2 + εit
where Vt represents the agricultural variables in single year measures.
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As the results show, only the first order lags, both the lagged level and the lagged
changes, has an impact with correct sign. This result may suggest farms and landowners
look backward to determine the current land use. More importantly, the results show that
populations do respond to short term shocks. The fact that future prices do not have
any impact does not necessarily suggest farmers do not look forward. If agricultural prices
follow a unit-root process, which is true, this fact is also consistent with rational expectation
hypothesis.
Table 6.5: Time Structures of Agricultural Variables on Population: 1978-1990
Variable Lagged Contempo. Future
log(Revenue) -0.0118*** 0.0051 0.0004
log(Cost) 0.0119** 0.0008 0.0017
log(Gov’t payments) -0.0001 0.0000 0.0000
∆log(Revenue) -0.0099*** 0.0054 0.0004
∆log(Cost) 0.0113** -0.0031 0.0017
∆log(Gov’t payments) -0.0003 -0.0004 0.0000
Significance Level: * 0.05 ** 0.01 *** 0.001
Note: Agricultural variables are single year measures.
Cointegration Test
As discussed in Section 5.2, in areas where base land share is low, spurious correlation
may emerge. Therefore, to test cointegration, I used the sample with base land share
greater than 30%. The panel unit root tests show that the population level, agricultural
revenues, and costs are first-order integrated, while government payments are not. So a
panel cointegration test is conducted for population, revenue, and cost. The results show
that the series is cointegrated.
6.2.2 Population Growth Rate: 1978-1990
To examine the impact of agricultural variables on population growth rate, a similar set
of regressions was run to estimate the model specified by Equation 5.3 for the period of
1978-1990. According to Equation 5.3, the lagged population growth rate is controlled to
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capture persistent labor shocks, and the lagged population level is controlled to address the
different growth pattern of MSAs of different sizes. Most of the results are similar to those
in the last sub section.
Results
Table 6.18 reports the base results. The regression of column (1) used all MSAs from
1978 to 1990. While no significant results were found, dropping the Southern Seaboard
regained significance. Column (2) reports the result without the Southern Seaboard. When
excluding observations in 1990, the sizes of the coefficients of our agricultural variables have
increased, and the government payments have become significant, suggesting the population
data adjusted by census is more problematic for estimation of population changes rather
than levels. The regression in column (4) excluded declining MSAs, which dampens our
estimation. Again, when I restricted observations to more agricultural area, both the size
of. The regression in column (5) used the simple averages instead of weighted averages,
which made the result insignificant. The regression in column (6) used dollar values for our
agricultural variables, where the sign of the government payment switched, which may be
caused by outliers.
Again, the influence of the Southern Seaboard is more likely a measurement problem
because the base land share is the lowest in this region. In Table 6.6, I kept MSAs with
their base land share greater than 20% and 30% respectively, and also keep MSAs in the
Southern Seaboard. The results are significant again. As Table 6.6 shows, the coefficients
of the coefficients increase in sizes monotonically with the threshold of base land share.
Table 6.6: The Impact of Agricultural Variables on Population Growth: 1978-1990
Base land Base land
Variables share> 20% share> 30%
log(Revenue)t−1 -0.0137*** -0.0235***
log(Cost)t−1 0.0096** 0.0187***
log(Gov’t payments)t−1 -0.0006 -0.0014**
Significance Level:* 0.05; ** 0.01; *** 0.001
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Robustness
Similar to last subsection, I also checked for influential regions. Results are reported in
Table 6.7. These results confirm that the directions of the impacts of agricultural variables
on population growth are not region sensitive. That is, we still have significance with correct
signs for revenue, cost, and government payments in both the North (Heartland, Northern
Crescent, and Great Northern Plains) and all other regions (the South and the West). In
estimations with all other regions (column (3) and (4)), population growth rate is lower
in MSAs with higher land value. Moreover, when excluding the Southern Seaboard, the
effects are also significant, except for the government payment, for other regions. Although
the sample sizes may seem too small for these region based regressions, but the purposes
of these regressions is not to get an consistent estimation but to examine whether we can
trust comparisons across regions.
Table 6.7: The Impact of Agricultural Variables on Growth by Regions:1978-1990
All Other Regions
Southern Seaboard
All Obs North All Other Excluded
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
log(Revenue)t−1 -0.0041 -0.0212*** 0.0014 -0.0143*
log(Cost)t−1 0.0030 0.0136*** 0.0018 0.0143**
log(Gov’t Payment)t−1 -0.0012** -0.0008 -0.0007 -0.0014
N 157 66 87 51
Significance Level: * 0.05; ** 0.01; *** 0.001
I also examine the impacts of agricultural variables for shorter periods. Table 6.8
reports these results. Originally no significant results were found. But when I restricted
observations with based land share greater than 30%, significant results (at 0.1%) for 1979-
86 were obtained. As for the period of 1986 to 1989, no significant results were found
until the restriction of observations was raised up to 40%, but only the revenue shows
the significant result at 5% level. However, when I included 1990, the significant result
disappear. One explanation for these results may be the agricultural commodity market
finally came to a rest after 1986, where there was no enough variations in prices for us to
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observe their impacts.
Finally, I examined the impact of the changes in agricultural variables on population
growth rate, but no significant results were found.
Table 6.8: Influential Years between 1978 and 1990 for Population Growth
1986-90 1986-89 1978-1986
Base land Base land Base land
Variables All Obs >30% All Obs >40% All Obs >30%
log(Revenue)t−1 -0.016 -0.0048 -0.0185* -0.0045 -0.0215*** -0.0052
log(Cost)t−1 0.0048 -0.004 0.0116 -0.0038 0.0167*** 0.0039
log(Gov’t Pymt)t−10.0001 0.0028* 0.0006 0.0005 -0.0019** -0.0007
Significance Level: * 0.05; ** 0.01; *** 0.001
6.3 Results for 1990-2000
6.3.1 A Glance at the Population Growth during the Price Spike
Before proceeding to regression results, some phenomena may help understand the impact
of price spike in this period. Starting from 1994, the prices for crops experienced a rapid
escalation driven by economic growth in newly industrialized Asian countries and the de-
preciation of the U.S. dollar. The corn and wheat prices peaked in 1995, while the soybean
price peaked in 1996. Figure 6.1 illustrates these price changes. The stock to use ratio of
these crops also hit a historic low in this period (Peters et al. [2009]). Because the feed
grains was an important input in milk production, the milk price also rised in 1995 (Figure
6.2). However, by resorting to grazing lands, the beef production had avoided such an
increase in cost, and the beef price actually dropped during the same period (Figure 6.3).
To observe the impact of the price spike, I focused on the sample agricultural MSAs,
i.e., MSAs with base land share greater than 30%. Then I divided these MSAs into the
“Beef Area” and the “Crop Area” according to their historical beef production and crop
production.5 Figure 6.4 compares the growth patterns of these two groups. First note the
population growth rate of the “Crop Area” was always lower than both the “Beef Area” and
5The “beef” group contains MSAs with beef production above the sample median. The similar
criterion applies to crops area.
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Figure 6.1: Price Indices of Corn, Wheat, and Soy (1993=100)
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Figure 6.2: Price Indice of Corn and Milk (1993=100)
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Figure 6.3: Price Indice of Corn and Beef (1993=100)
60
80
10
0
12
0
P
ric
e 
In
de
x 
(1
99
3=
10
0)
1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000
year
Beef Corn
the national average. This is because the “Crop Area” is basically in the North, while a large
portion of the “Beef Area” is either in the South or in the West. Starting from 1995, the
average population growth rate of the crop area started to decrease, while similar changes
did not happen in the beef area or nationwide. The decrease in population growth rate
was relatively sizable, from 0.9% to 0.7%, a decrease of 20% relative to the average growth
rate of the crop area. No explanation has been given to this growth rate change during this
period previously, and the changes in the opportunity cost is definitely a appealing one.
6.3.2 Population Levels: 1990-2000
Unlike the period of 1978 to 1990, results for 1990 to 2000 are rather limited. One reason
may be that variations in prices were limited in most years in this period. Moreover,
although there was a price spike during the mid 1990s, there were also considerable amount
of idle lands accumulated during the depressed decade prior it, which were brought back
to use quickly in response to the price spike (Peters et al. [2009]). Put it another way,
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Figure 6.4: Population Growth Rate - MSAs Major in Grains Vs. MSAs Major in
Beef
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land supply was not tight during this period. However, when focusing on this short period
of spike, some significant results were still found by restricting observations to MSAs with
large amount of agricultural land.
In the first set of regressions for this period with all observations, no significant results
were found. Therefore I restricted my observations to MSAs with base land share greater
than 30%. The subsample contains 95 MSAs. Table 6.19 reports the regional composition
of these MSAs, Table 6.20 reports sample statistics of these MSAs. The mean population
is 503,875, and the mean population growth rate is 0.9%. As mentioned earlier, restricting
samples with base land share greater than 30% gives a bias toward the North: MSAs in
Heartland and Northern Crescent together accounts for 63% of this subsample. Because
of this restriction, it is not feasible to study specific regions (it is mainly the North after
all). Therefore for the robustness check, I only cut this period in 1996, which is the turning
point of the price spike.
Column (1) of Table 6.21 reports the results for the sample of 95 MSAs from 1990 to
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2000. It can be seen that only the revenue is significant at 5%. However, when 2000 was
excluded, both revenue and cost are significant with correct signs. The reason may be the
miscounting of census’s annual population estimation.
Column (3) reports the result without declining MSAs, which is improved compared
with the result in column (1). However, when comparing column (4) where both 2000
and declining MSAs were dropped, no difference were found. This suggests that the miss
counting problem is more serious in growing areas, but nothing can be say how declining
MSAs affect our estimation at this point.6
Column (5) and (6) report results with simple averages of agricultural variables. The
impact of revenue is smaller when measured by simple averages, while the impact of cost
is greater. The most likely reason is that, as discussed in Section 5.1, the population
growth is correlated with unobserved crops so that estimations with simple averages are
not consistent. It may also be because of the introduction of Farm Resource Region in 1996
according to which ERS estimate the regional cost of each products.
Table (7) and (8) report results with dollar measures. When including 2000 (column
(7)), both the impacts of revenue and government are not significant, while that of the
cost is significantly negative. However, when 2000 was dropped, the impact of revenue is
significantly negative.
In all these estimations, results with 2000 are generally worse than those without 2000.
The most likely reason is the adjustment of census population data. When 2000 was in-
cluded, even the first order difference of the population (population growth rate) did not
pass the panel unit root tests. However, when 2000 was excluded, the growth rate series
become stationary.
The AR(2) testing results show that when including declining MSAs, the estimation
errors are serial correlated. But it is not the case when declining MSAs were dropped. This
confirms the finding of Glaeser and Gyourko [2005] that population decreases in a persistent
way in declining areas.
6Many of the coefficients of controls also changes significantly for regressions with and without
declining MSAs, say, the share of high and low income families, the share of population with Bachelor
degree or higher, and the share of elder.
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Because the price of agricultural products spike peaked in 1996, I cut the panel at 1996
and 1997 to observe the impact of the spike.7 Results are presented in Table 6.9. For
the period after 1996, I also examining the impact of 2000 by running regressions with
and without it. Because the government payment is not significant in any of this set of
regressions, I also examine the results without government payment, hoping more significant
results will be obtained because the collinearity between government payments and revenues
and costs.8 For the period of 1990-1996, the revenue is significant at 1% level.9 It is worth
to mention that the size of the coefficient is close to that of 1978-1990 results with a similar
sample, i.e. restricting observations to MSAs with base land share greater than 30%. The
significant results disappear when the ending year was pushed back to 1995. This result
confirms the impact of the price spike from 1994 to 1996.
Table 6.9: Influential Years for Population: 1990-2000
1990-1996 1996-2000 1996-1999
All Var. No Gov. All Var. No Gov.
log(Revenue)t−1 -0.0239*** -0.0261*** -0.0026 -0.0088** -0.0085**
log(Cost)t−1 0.0132 0.0144* 0.0003 0.0057 0.0056
log(Gov’t Pymt)t−1 -0.0013 0.0019* 0.0003
N 89 89 89 89 89
T 5 5 5 4 4
Significance Level:*0.10;**0.05;***0.01
Table 6.10 summarizes results for single year measures, which answer the question
whether the population respond to instantaneous differentials in revenues, costs, and gov-
ernment payments. In these regressions, lagged agricultural variables were also controlled
for. As can be seen, the lagged and contemporaneous single year revenues are both signifi-
cant with the same size, while the costs are not.
7I also cut the data at 1997 to examine whether the introduction of the new definition of
agricultural regions, based on which the ERS cost estimates were conducted, will change the results.
Only the 1996 cut is reported because there will be only 3 years of observation for 1997-1999 period.
But similar results were obtained for periods of 1990 to 1996 and 1997.
8The degree of correlation was not high though. When I regressed the government payment
with revenue and cost, the squared R is only 18%, almost half of that in 1978-2000.
9It is also significant at 0.1%, but because the sample size is small for this period, I raised the
significance level to 10%, 5%, and 1%.
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Table 6.10: Time Structures of Agricultural Variables on Population: 1990-2000
Lagged Contempo Forward
log(Revenue) -0.0053** -0.0018 0.0014
log(Cost) 0.0048 -0.0057 -0.0010
log(Gov’t payments) 0.0001 0.0001 -0.0001
Significance Level: * 0.10; ** 0.05; *** 0.01
Table 6.22 examines the impact of price changes on population levels. However, no
significant results were found.
6.3.3 Population Growth
Results for population changes for all observations in all years are reported in Table 6.23.
Again, 2000 turns out to be influential in estimation. As mentioned earlier, the panel
unit root test shows that the panel contains unitroot in population growth rate, which is
unreasonable because the growth rate is believed to be stationary at least for growing MSAs.
Moreover, while 2000 was dropped, the testing results show that panels are stationary.
When 2000 is excluded, the estimation results are as expected again. Estimation results
with simple averages of agricultural variables are more significant this time. But as discussed
earlier, they may be inconsistent due to the correlation between the measurement error with
the population growth.
Results for population changes before and after 1996 are reported in Table 6.11. As can
be seen, the estimated impact of agricultural variables are stronger for the period of 1990
to 1996 than 1996 to 1999. The contrast is mainly due to the price spike. For example, the
stronger result does not change when the ending year of the first period was extended to
1997, but drops significantly when the ending year was pushed back to 1995.
Table 6.24 reports the impact of agricultural variables with different time structures.
Two periods of deeper lags for each agricultural variables are also controlled in these re-
gressions. Only the lagged revenue was found having significant impact with the correct
sign. The forward revenues and costs have counter-intuitive signs, but they did not pass
the Granger causality test.
Table 6.25 reports the results for agricultural variable changes on population growth
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Table 6.11: Influential Years for Population Growth: 1990-2000
Variables 1990-1996 1996-2000 1996-1999
log(Revenue)t−1 -0.0143* -0.0229*** -0.0030 -0.0083* -0.0079*
log(Cost)t−1 0.0073 0.0116 -0.0017 0.0036 0.0033
log(Gov’t payments)t−1 -0.0050* 0.0017 0.0003
N 89 89 89 89 89
T 5 5 5 4 4
SignificanceLevel:*0.10;**0.05;***0.01
rate. No significant results were found. This may due to the price changes in 1990 were to
limited. Again, the counter-intuitive signs for the forward costs and revenues do not pass
the Granger causality test.
6.4 Final Estimation
6.4.1 Results
Analyses of previous sections have provided several implications for estimating the impact
of the agricultural variables. First, only observations with fair amount of agricultural
lands should be included. Previous results have shown that spurious correlation may arise
in metropolitan areas with restricted agricultural land. This is understandable because
the agricultural land value is a poor measure for the opportunity cost of land in those
metropolitan areas. Therefore, I chose MSAs with base land share greater than 30% as
my sample to estimate the impact of agricultural variables. While there is no rationale
stating a reasonable criteria for the sampling, I found that 30% is a good choice. In a set
of unreported estimations, the estimation results had become stable when base land share
was raised to 30% and above. The sample size is also acceptable with 119 MSAs/PMSAs.
As stated previously, the panel is unbalanced with the average time span of 18.25. Table
6.26 reports summary statistics of the sample. Table 4.32 in Appendix lists these MSAs
together with their mean revenues, costs, and government payments.
Second, decennial years have influential impacts. The estimation results, especially
those for growth rate, are sensitive to decennial years. This issue is especially serious
for 2000 where even the series of the population growth rate with 2000 is not stationary.
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Therefore, I both present the results with and without decennial years.
Third, results in previous section have shown that the contemporaneous change in agri-
cultural variables do not have significant impact on growth, therefore I first chose to use the
lagged 3-year moving averages in the regression. The lagged terms of agricultural variables
also help to overcome the endogeneity issue as discussed in Chapter 4. While using the 3–
year moving averages puts a structural constraint on the agricultural variables of different
time structures, i.e., agricultural variables of each year having the same impact on growth,
I relaxed the constraint by including agricultural variables of different years (up to 3 year
lag) separately in the estimation.
Finally, as have been shown in Chapter 5 and previous sections, county weighted aver-
ages of agricultural variables behave better in estimations than simple averages, e.g., the
results are more stable with weighted averages, and the relationship between the coefficient
of revenue and cost is more consistent with the analysis in Section 5.1. Therefore, I chose
to use the weighted averages in the final estimation.
Table 6.12 reports the results of agricultural variables on population levels. Column (1)
reports the regression result with 1990 and 2000, while the column (3) reports the result
without 1990 and 2000. The estimation results with decennial years show that as the 3-year
moving average of the weighted revenue doubles, the population will decrease by 1.53%.
When decennial years are excluded, the impact is reduced to 1.35%. As the 3-year moving
average of the weighted cost doubles, the population will increase by 1.05% according to the
estimation with decennial years, or by 0.83% according to the estimation without decennial
years. The ratio of the coefficient of revenue to cost is between 1.6 to 1.7, which is greater
than the ratio of mean revenues to mean costs (217/162=1.33). This is as expected however.
Recall the cost estimates are on regional levels, which will introduce measurement error in
the estimation. The coefficient of cost then will be biased toward zero. Because revenues
and costs are positively correlated, the estimation for revenue will be biased up. Future
works need to address such biasness. The estimated impact of government payment is not
significant in regressions with decennial years, but is significant at 5% level (one-tail) in
regressions without decennial years.
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Table 6.12: The Impact of Agricultural Variables on Population: 1978-2000
1978-2000 1978-1999‡
Variables (1) (2) IV (3) (4) IV
log(Revenue)t−1 -0.0153*** -0.0184*** -0.0135*** -0.0150***
log(Cost)t−1 0.0105*** 0.0130*** 0.0083*** 0.0086***
log(Gov’t payment)t−1 -0.0001 0.0000 -0.0004 -0.0003
log(population)t−1 0.9549*** 0.9566*** 0.9191*** 0.9204***
Colleget−1 0.0699* 0.0371 0.2701*** 0.2143***
Blackt−1 0.0079 -0.0112 0.1044* 0.0635
Eldert−1 0.0304 -0.0082 0.0918 0.0643
Poverty ratet−1 0.0493 0.0326 0.1219* 0.1176
Manufacturet−1 -0.0380* -0.0442* -0.0463* -0.0654*
Immigrantst−1 0.2525*** 0.1963*** 0.3659*** 0.3012***
Unemploymentt−1 -0.1347*** -0.1403*** -0.4283*** -0.4365***
Popu densityt−1 -0.0242*** -0.0192* -0.0520*** -0.0486***
†Low inc familiest−1 -0.2917*** -0.2399*** -0.3543*** -0.3160***
††High inc familiest−1 -0.1279*** -0.0734* -0.0733 -0.0196
N 119 119 119 119
Avg T 17.25 16.20 15.61 14.56
SignificanceLevel:*0.05 **0.01 ***0.001
‡ 1990 also excluded.
† Share of family below national 20 percentile income.
†† Share of family above national 80 percentile income.
Column (2) and (4) report IV estimations, with agricultural variables being instru-
mented by further lags, i.e., log(Revenue)t−1 is instrumented by log(Revenue)t−2 and so
on. As discussed in Chapter 5, even agricultural variables are already in lagged forms,
it is still possible that they are correlated with contemporaneous growth if the impacts
of shocks to labor market or growth are persistent. In fact, empirical results show that
both population and population growth rate are serially correlated. And if the endogeniety
problem is mainly caused by unobserved crops, such correlation will bias our results down.
Instrumenting with further lags helps to reduce this issue of endogeneity. As can be seen
in column (2) and (4), the results do improve.10
Table 6.13 reports the results of agricultural variables on population growth. According
to the estimation results, population growth rate will be 1.12 to 1.30 percent point lower,
10In a set of unreported regressions with simple averages of agricultural variables, the coefficients
of all agricultural variables are smaller in magnitude than those with weighted averages.
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depending on the sample and specification used, as the revenue doubles, and will be 0.6 to
0.84 point higher as the cost doubles. The impact of revenue is significant at 0.1% level.
The impact of cost is also significant at 0.1% level, but when observations from decennial
year are dropped,it is only significant at 5% level. Note the estimation results are generally
lower than those for population levels, which suggesting lnNtRt−1 6= 0. This is because the
measures we use here. Although previous sections show that the contemporaneous impact
of single year measures of agricultural variables is zero, it is not the case for moving averages
because the contemporaneous moving averages also contain information from t−2. Similar
to estimations with population levels, column (2) and (4) report results of IV estimations.
As can be seen, coefficients of IV estimations are greater in magnitude.
Table 6.13: The Impact of Agricultural Variables on Population Growth: 1978-2000
1978-2000 1978-1999‡
Variables (1) (2) IV (3) (4) IV
log(Revenue)t−1 -0.0130*** -0.0152*** -0.0112*** -0.0125***
log(Cost)t−1 0.0084*** 0.0099*** 0.0060* 0.0061*
log(Gov’t payment)t−1 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0003 -0.0003
log(population)t−1 -0.0431*** -0.0442*** -0.0803*** -0.0831***
∆log(population)t−1 0.2734*** 0.2817*** 0.2072*** 0.2078***
Colleget−1 0.0265 0.0209 0.2128*** 0.1886***
Blackt−1 -0.0443 -0.0413 0.0460 0.0457
Eldert−1 0.0273 0.0149 0.0852 0.0775
Poverty ratet−1 0.0513 0.0469 0.1495* 0.1474*
Manufacturet−1 -0.0337* -0.0340* -0.0471* -0.0520*
Immigrantst−1 0.1737*** 0.1579*** 0.2968*** 0.2777***
Unemploymentt−1 -0.0867* -0.0812* -0.3651*** -0.3547***
Popu densityt−1 -0.0230* -0.0184* -0.0517*** -0.0469***
†Low inc familiest−1 -0.2081*** -0.1880*** -0.2965*** -0.2850***
††High inc familiest−1 -0.0542 -0.0317 -0.0138 0.0036
N 119 119 119 119
Avg T 16.25 16.20 14.61 14.56
SignificanceLevel:*0.05 **0.01 ***0.001
‡ 1990 also excluded.
† Share of family below national 20 percentile income.
†† Share of family above national 80 percentile income.
Table 6.14 reports the estimates with single year measures.11 According the estimation
11Decennial years were dropped in these regressions.
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results, the population will be 0.5% lower when the revenue doubles in the previous, and
will be 0.78% higher if the cost double in the previous year. Moreover, the estimation
results also show that agricultural variables in the most recent year have the strongest
impact. While revenues in all years are significantly negative, the second and third order
lags of cost are not significant.12 However, no significant results are found for government
payments for all lags. Note that the coefficients of single year measures are less than those of
moving averages. This is because the moving averages contains information for all past three
years, so doubling the moving averages requires all three single years measures to doublee.
A more sensible comparison should be comparing the summation of the coefficients for
different years. The sum of the coefficients for revenues of different lags is -1.24%, close to
the estimation of 3-year moving averages which is -1.35%. The similar is also true for costs.
6.4.2 Sensitivity Checks: Further Lags for Population
Table 6.15 reports the sensitivity of the results to further lags of population. Column
(1) reports the base result for population level, and column (2) reports the results with a
further lag of population level. Column (3) reports the base result for growth rate, which
is mathematically equivalent to the result in column (2), and column (4) reports the result
with a further lag for growth rate, i.e. ∆ logpopulationt−2, which is equivalent to a lag up
to time period of t − 3. As can be seen, the impact of agricultural variables declines with
more lag. However, the impact of lag population disappear at t− 3, but the impacts of our
agricultural variables are still highly significant with correct signs.
6.4.3 Sensitivity Check for Control Variables
As mentioned in Section 4.5, it is very likely that the controls used may be endogeneous.
If these controls are uncorrelated with agricultural variables, including them into the re-
gression may not bias the results, but may change the standard error. To check whether
our results are sensitive to these controls, two strategies were applied. First, I ran a set
12As discussed above, this might be because of the measure error of the cost measure.
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Table 6.14: Final Estimation 1978-2000: Single Year Measures‡
Variables Popu. level Popu. Growth
log(Revenue)t−1 -0.0055*** -0.0045*
log(Cost)t−1 0.0078*** 0.0053*
log(Gov’t payment)t−1 0.0001 0.0000
log(Revenue)t−2 -0.0038* -0.0025
log(Cost)t−2 0.0009 0.0006
log(Gov’t payment)t−2 0.0002* 0.0002
log(Revenue)t−3 -0.0031* -0.0020
log(Cost)t−3 0.0030 0.0026
log(Gov’t payment)t−3 0.0000 -0.0001
log(population)t−1 0.9556*** -0.0475***
∆log(population)t−1 0.2718***
Colleget−1 0.0871*** 0.0875***
Blackt−1 0.0286 0.0144
Eldert−1 0.0441 0.0705
Poverty ratet−1 0.0075 0.0220
Manufacturet−1 -0.0507*** -0.0357*
Immigrantst−1 0.1876*** 0.1676***
Unemploymentt−1 -0.2148*** -0.1436***
Population densityt−1 -0.0200*** -0.0194***
†Low income familiest−1 -0.2320*** -0.1863***
††High inc familiest−1 -0.1168*** -0.0844*
N 119 119
Avg T 14.56 14.56
Significance level: * 0.10, ** 0.05, *** 0.01
‡: Both 1990 and 2000 are excluded.
† Share of family below national 20 percentile income.
†† Share of family above national 80 percentile income.
Agricultural variables are single year measures.
Table 6.15: Sensitivity to Further Lags of Population
Population Level Growth Rate
(1) (2) (3) (4)
log(Revenue)t−1 -0.0153*** -0.0130*** -0.0130*** -0.0119***
log(Cost)t−1 0.0105*** 0.0084*** 0.0084*** 0.0107***
log(Gov′tpayment)t−1 -0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001
log(population)t−1 0.9549*** 1.2305*** -0.0431*** 0.2417***
log(population)t−2 -0.2734*** -0.2877***
∆(population)t−1 0.2734***
∆(population)t−2 -0.0293
Significance Level: *0.05 **0.01 ***0.001
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of regressions with each control individually each time, and compare the results with the
base result in Subsection 6.4.1. These results are reported in Table 6.27 and Table 6.28.
These results show that, including a different control variable each time does not change the
estimation result much: for population levels, the estimation results range from -0.0120%
to -0.0189% for revenue, and between 0.0093% and 0.0142% for cost; for growth rate, the
estimation results range from -0.0098% to -0.0160% for revenue, and between 0.0062% and
0.0107% for cost.
The second strategy is to include each control variable in a stepwise way. Table 6.29
and 6.30 report results for these regressions. For population levels, the coefficient of revenue
ranges from -0.0164% to -0.0130% with correct signs, and the coefficient for cost ranges from
0.0062% to 0.0081% with correct signs. For growth rate, the coefficient for revenue ranges
from -0.0108% to -0.0130%, and the coefficient for cost ranges from 0.0062% to 0.0086%.
The sensitivity check shows that although these controls may have some impact on the
estimated impact of agricultural variables, such impacts are generally mild and keep the
estimation results in a relatively narrow range.
6.5 Simulations
6.5.1 Simulation of Government Subsidies
To simulate the impact of government payments, I used estimation results with 3-year
moving averages of agricultural variables. Decennial years were excluded.
Simulated Impacts of Government Subsidies on Population Level
According to the simulation results, on average, the population would have been 4,763
higher between 1980 to 2000 for our agricultural MSAs. Figure 6.5 illustrates the average
impact of government payment over time. The impact ranges from as low as 2,500 in
1981 when commodity prices were still high, and to as high as 6,700 in 1988. In 1988,
the simulated population change led by government payments is -1.38%, i.e., population
would have been 1.38% higher without government payments. Simulated population change
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Figure 6.5: Simulated Impact of Government Payments on Population Level
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led by government payments in 1988 ranges from 104 of population loss, or -0.02% of the
population, for Vallejo–Fairfield–Napa of California, up to 124,393 of population loss, or
-1.69% of the population, for Chicago PMSA. Table 6.32 reports these simulated population
changes of agricultural MSAs in 1988.
As for the population growth rate, government payments had decreased the population
growth rate of those agricultural MSAs by 0.094%, or 11% of the average growth rate, from
1978 to 2000. In 1988, the average growth rate of our agricultural MSAs would have been
0.14% higher without government payments. In the same year, The impact of government
payment ranges from 0.002% for Vallejo-Fairfield-Napa of California to 0.18% for Lancaster
of Pennsylvania.
To illustrate the impact, I chose two MSAs with different base land share: Cincinnati
with the base land share of 40%, and Indianapolis with the base land share of 60%. Both
MSAs grew steadiy during 1980 to 2000,13 and have complete and consistent records of
13The average growth rate is 0.5% for Cincinnati and 1% for Indianapolis during this period
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Figure 6.6: Simulation of the Impact of Government Payments on Population Growth
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agricultural variables.
To simulate, I use the data from 1978 to 1999 for these two MSAs assuming government
payments were absent. The agricultural variables used are 3-year moving averages. On
average, the government payment have reduced the growth rate by 0.03%, or 5% of the
average growth rate, for Cincinnati during 1978 to 2000; and the growth rate of Indianapolis
has been reduced by 0.06% by government payments, or 6% of the average growth rate,
during the same period. Of course, the impact of government payment is not constant over
time. The strongest impact happened in 1988 where the government payments were the
highest: a decease of 0.12% in growth rate, or 23% of the growth rate in 1988, for Cincinnati,
and a decrease of 0.16% in growth rate, or 22% of the growth rate, for Indianapolis. Figure
6.6 and 6.7 illustrate the simulation results for these two MSAs.
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Figure 6.7: Simulation of the Impact of Government Payments on Population Growth
Rate: Indianapolis
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6.5.2 Simulation of of Biofuel Demand
To illustrate the simulated impact of price shocks, I used the changes in corn prices between
2000 (1.85 $/lb) and 2007 (4.0 $/lb).14 According to the simulation of Rosegrant [2008],
39% of the price increase between 2000 and 2007 was attributable to biofuel demand. This
is to say, the real corn price would have increased by 80% and 45% with and without the
demand of biofuels. I then will use these information to examine the impact of biofuels on
urban population growth. The hypothesized price serie together with the actual price are
plotted in Figure 6.8.
To simulate, I first selected 36 MSAs with a minimum of 40% of agricultural land used
for corn production. I then calculated the hypothesized revenues, with and without the
impact of boifuel respectively, for each of them. The increase of the revenue attributable
to boifuel demand ranges from 0.2% to 25.9%. The hypothesized revenue is then used
14Prices are nominal. CPI is 172.2 for 2000, and 207.3 for 2007.
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Figure 6.8: Corn Prices
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to predict the population. Simulation results for each selected MSA are reported in Table
6.33. Simulation results show that, on average, the annual population change would be 415,
or 0.06%, higher without the demand of biofuel, and the total average population change
between 2000 and 2007 is 2907, or 0.4% of the population. The relatively low change is
because the shock has been smoothed over 2000 and 2007, ending up with an annual increase
of 4% in prices led by biofuel.
For a specific MSA, the impact of biofuel can be more significant. Take Des Moines as
an example. Des Moines is composed of 5 counties by 1999 OMB definition. Another three
counties are included by its buffer. The average base land share of the buffer defined MSA
is 73.3%, with a minimum of 50.87% and a maximum of 90.03% for different composing
counties. The top product in this area, followed by soybean, is corn, with an average 52%
of its crop land engaged in corn production over time.
To calculate the revenue and cost, I used the actual data on all products from 2000 to
2007 in this area except for corn, i.e., only the hypothesized revenue captures the marginal
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Figure 6.9: Simulation: The Population Growth Rate of Des Moines
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impact of the corn price shock. The simulated population growth rate was calculated
by using the hypothesized revenue and the actual cost The simulation result is shown in
Figure 6.9. As the Figure shows , the simulated population growth rate is always lower
because the hypothesized prices are higher, which reflects the level effect. The average
difference between the actual growth rate and the simulated growth rate is 0.2%. As the
actual corn price begins to accelerate in 2005, the two growth rates begin to converge.
As for the hypothesized price series netted of biofuel demand, because a fixed percentage
is assumed (39%), the simulated growth rate is parallel to the previous simulation results,
which accounts for .0078 percent point, or 7.6% change, decrease in population growth rate.
6.5.3 Technological Change: Yield Increase of Corn
The impact of technological change is rather complicated. It may increase the revenue
of farmers because the productivity of land has increased, but it may also decrease the
revenue because the increase in supply may reduce the price. Furthermore, the change in
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the equilibrium price depends on the elasticity of the supply and demand of agricultural
products. Another complexity is that the technological change can be a consequence of
price changes rather than the cause. The period that the U.S. agricultural recovered from
the 1980 crisis, say 1988 to 1994, provides an opportunity of simplifying these complexities.
First, the yield of corn increased about 15% during this period15. Second, the price of corn
was relatively stable during this period so it is hard to believe the technological change was
induced by increasing price. This change may just be because of the structural change in
the agricultural sector.
To simulate the impact of the technological change during this period, I first calculated
the land share of corn for all agricultural MSAs in the sample, then calculated the change in
revenue led by the change in yield of corn. Finally, I applied the coefficient estimated in the
last section to find the impact on population. Because the technological change was a rather
slow process, I calculated the accumulated impact on population of such change instead of
the annual impact. Table 6.16 reports the average impact for each agricultural region. The
impact of such changes was most pronounced in the Heartland and Northern Crescent, which
is reasonable because these two regions had the highest land share for corn. The population
was decreased by 0.088% and 0.051% respectively. In 9 MSAs, the impact of the increase
in corn yield had been greater than 0.1%, including Bloomington-Normal, Chicago-Gary-
Kenosha, Davenport-Moline-Rock Island, Decatur, New York-Northern New Jersey-Long
Islan, Peoria-Pekin, Philadelphia-Wilmington-Atlantic City, Rockford, and Springfield. The
corn land in these area accounted for at least 60% of all agricultural land.
15There may have been other factors that was attributable such as favorable weather, but here
we just assume this increase was completely due to technological change.
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Table 6.16: Simulated Impacts of Technological Improvement in Corn Production:
1988–19941,2
Land share Population Change Growth
Region for corn Populatioin % Number Rate
Hearland 0.396 611,858 -0.088 -538 -0.086
Northen Crescent 0.264 482,830 -0.051 -248 -0.051
Northern Great Plains 0.040 115,014 -0.016 -18 -0.015
Prairie Gateway 0.031 275,724 -0.010 -27 -0.011
Eastern Uplands 0.061 468,087 -0.014 -64 -0.014
Southern Seaboard 0.103 198,017 -0.022 -44 -0.018
Fruitful Rim 0.034 681,860 -0.008 -54 -0.008
Basin and Range 0.012 560,873 -0.007 -39 -0.005
Mississipp Portal 0.038 324,496 -0.009 -30 -0.009
1. The impact is the accumulated impact during 1988 and 1994.
2. The change in yield is assumed to be completely attributable to technological change.
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Table 6.17: Influential Years for Population: 1978-1990
1986-89 † 1986-90 † 1978-1986 0††
MA3 Single year MA3 Single year MA3 Single year
log(Revenue)t−1 -0.0241** -0.0072 -0.0272*** -0.0077 -0.0153*** 0.0000
log(Cost)t−1 0.0107 -0.0001 0.0190* 0.0026 0.0118** 0.0034
log(Gov’t payments)t−1 -0.0003* 0.0001 0.0008 0.0007 -0.0015* -0.0010*
Significance Level: * 0.05; ** 0.01; *** 0.001
Agricultural variables are weighted averages.
†: MSAs with base land share greater than 30%.
††: MSAs with base land share greater than 40%.
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Table 6.18: The Impact of Agricultural Variables on Population Growth:1978-1990
Southern Seaboard 1990 Declining MSA Simple Dollar
Variables All Obs Excluded Excluded Excluded Averages Value
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
log(Revenue)t−1 -0.0055 -0.0125*** -0.0158*** -0.0137*** -0.008 -0.00003***
log(Cost)t−1 0.0040 0.0094** 0.0120*** 0.0106** 0.0127* 0.00003**
log(Gov’t payments)t−1 -0.0009* -0.0007 -0.0011* -0.0011* -0.0007 0.0005**
∆log(population)t−1 0.3352*** 0.3824*** 0.3721*** 0.3700*** 0.4008*** 0.3559***
log(populations)t−1 -0.0094 0.0042 -0.022* -0.0118*** 0.0001 0.0201
Colleget−1 -0.0147 -0.1252** -0.0547 -0.0686 -0.0723 -0.1442*
Blackt−1 0.1953*** 0.1894* 0.0570 0.2018* 0.3084** 0.2010*
Eldert−1 0.1848** 0.2900*** 0.2026** 0.2554** 0.0864 0.2208**
Poverty ratet−1 0.2499*** 0.1796** 0.1513* 0.1074 0.0630 0.0403
Manufacturet−1 -0.0764*** -0.0614** -0.0651** -0.0861*** -0.0764** -0.0629**
Immigrantst−1 0.2862*** 0.2418*** 0.2053*** 0.2621*** 0.2740*** 0.2502***
Population densitt−1 -0.0344*** -0.0273** -0.0357*** -0.038 0*** -0.0360** -0.0344**
†Low income farmilies -0.4478*** -0.4139*** -0.4506*** -0.3369*** -0.2762*** -0.2547***
††High inc Families -0.1268*** -0.1062** -0.1204** -0.1128** -0.0758 -0.0191
Significance Level:* 0.05; ** 0.01; *** 0.001
† Below national 20 percentile
†† Above national 80 percentile
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Table 6.19: The Number of MSAs by Regions (1990-2000): Base Land Share>30%
Region Number Per cent
Heartland 40 29
Northen Crescent 28 21
Northern Great Plains 5 4
Prairie Gateway 11 8
Eastern Uplands 15 11
Southern Seaboard 5 3
Fruitful Rim 22 16
Basin and Range 5 4
Mississippi Portal 5 5
Total 136 100
Table 6.20: Summary Statistics of MSAs (1990-2000): Base Land Share > 30%
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Revenue 187.14 95.64 6.63 712.47
Cost 161.73 102.65 3.74 708.11
Gov Payment 10.97 8.56 0.00 51.34
popu 503875 911026 56507 8291553
∆log(population) 0.009 0.012 -0.041 0.094
popu dencity 0.644 0.554 0.018 3.450
Share of Bach Degree 0.207 0.062 0.109 0.417
†Low income families 0.193 0.050 0.101 0.365
††High income families 0.161 0.047 0.075 0.330
Share of Manu workers 0.193 0.075 0.042 0.426
Unemployment rate 0.055 0.013 0.026 0.109
Poverty rate 0.120 0.033 0.052 0.266
Share of immigrants 0.030 0.021 0.004 0.172
Share of elder 0.161 0.023 0.086 0.239
Share of black 0.096 0.095 0.001 0.515
†: Share of families below national 20 income percentile
††: Share of families above national 80 income percentile
N=95, T=11
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Table 6.21: The Impact of Agricultural Variables on Population: 1990-2000 †
All Obs Declining MSAs Excluded
Weighted Averges Weighted Averges Simple Averages Ag Variables in Dollars
Variables 1990-2000 1990-1999 1990-2000 1990-1999 1990-2000 1990-1999 1990-2000 1990-1999
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
log(Revenue)t−1 -0.0116** -0.0176*** -0.0140*** -0.0176*** -0.0115** -0.0133*** 0.0000 -0.0001***
log(Cost)t−1 0.0024 0.0085* 0.0028 0.0085* 0.0090 0.0170*** -0.0001* 0.0000
log(Gov’t payments)t−1 -0.0008 -0.0010 0.0012 -0.0010 0.0019* -0.0012 -0.0001 -0.0001*
log(population)t−1 0.9190*** 0.8391*** 0.9076*** 0.8391*** 0.9043*** 0.8334*** 0.9198*** 0.8483***
Colleget−1 0.0571 0.3431*** 0.0330 0.3431*** 0.0376 0.3527*** 0.0055 0.2897***
Blackt−1 -0.0483 0.1183* -0.1206 0.1183* -0.1407* 0.0913 -0.1738** 0.1068
Eldert−1 0.0294 0.1508** -0.0267 0.1508** -0.0570 0.1155 -0.0664 0.1423*
Poverty ratet−1 -0.1439 -0.1879 0.0206 -0.1879 0.0389 -0.1751 0.0755 -0.1592
Manufacturet−1 -0.0726* -0.0874** -0.0810** -0.0874** -0.0778** -0.0773** -0.0721* -0.0676*
Immigrantst−1 0.6078*** 0.6060*** 0.5488*** 0.6060*** 0.5252*** 0.5818*** 0.4639*** 0.5479***
Popu Densityt−1 -0.0714*** -0.0499** -0.0680*** -0.0499** -0.0590*** -0.0400** -0.0612*** -0.0362*
Low income Familiest−1 0.0002 -0.1854* -0.1082 -0.1854* -0.1174 -0.1859* -0.1110 -0.1848*
High income Familiest−1 0.2377** -0.0122 0.2555*** -0.0122 0.2485** -0.0250 0.2334** -0.0261
N 95 89 89 89 89 89 89 89
T 9 8 9 8 9 8 9 8
Significance Level: *0.10; **0.05; ***0.01
† Base Land Share > 30%
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Table 6.22: The Impact of the Agricultural Variable Change on Population:1990-2000
Lagged Contemporaneous Forward
∆log(Revenue)t−1 -0.0035
∆log(Cost)t−1 0.0035
∆log(Gov’t payments)t−1 0.0000
log(Revenue)t−2 -0.0072**
log(Cost)t− 2 0.0080*
log(Gov’t payments)t−2 0.0002
∆log(Revenue)t -0.0029
∆log(Cost)t -0.0067
∆log(Gov’t payments)t 0.0000
log(Revenue)t−1 -0.0079**
log(Cost)t−1 0.0006
log(Gov’t payments)t−1 0.0001
∆log(Revenue)t+1 0.0016
∆log(Cost)t+1 -0.0015
∆log(Gov’t payments)t+1 -0.0001
log(Revenue)t -0.0027
log(Cost)t -0.0012
log(Gov’t payments)t -0.0001
Significance Level:*0.10;**0.05;***0.01
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Table 6.23: The Impact of Agricultural Variables on Population Growth:1990-2000
All Obs Declining MSAs Excluded
Weighted Averges Weighted Averages Simple Averages Ag Variables in Dollars
Variables 1990-2000 1990-1999 1990-2000 1990-1999 1990-2000 1990-1999 1990-2000 1990-1999
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
log(Revenue)t−1 -0.0080 -0.0140*** -0.0102** -0.0140*** -0.0076 –0.0099*** 0.0000 -0.0001***
log(Cost)t−1 -0.0015 0.0050 -0.0015 0.0050 0.0047 0.0129** -0.0001*** -0.0000
log(Gov’t payments)t−1 -0.0008 -0.0012* 0.0011 -0.0012* 0.0019* -0.0015* -0.0002** 0.0000
∆log(population)t−1 0.1090** 0.0792** 0.1038** 0.0792** 0.1089** 0.0857*** 0.1147** 0.0798**
log(population)t−1 -0.0920*** -0.1898*** -0.1022*** -0.1898*** -0.1048*** -0.1948*** -0.0900*** -0.1780***
Colleget−1 0.1319* 0.4819*** 0.1027 0.4819*** 0.1051 0.4894*** 0.0906 0.4340***
Blackt−1 -0.0536 0.1177* -0.1267 0.1177* -0.1424 0.0943 -0.1871** 0.1043
Eldert−1 0.0281 0.1549** -0.0338 0.1549** -0.0588 0.1255* -0.0767 0.1419**
Poverty ratet−1 -0.1691 -0.2768** -0.0035 -0.2768** 0.0191 -0.2564** 0.0279 -0.2649**
Manufacturet−1 -0.0705* -0.0954*** -0.0798* -0.0954*** -0.0790* -0.0893*** -0.0748* -0.0812**
Immigrantst−1 0.6428*** 0.6804*** 0.5862*** 0.6804*** 0.5591*** 0.6520*** 0.5172*** 0.6322***
Population Densityt−1 -0.0690*** -0.0438** -0.0679*** -0.0438** -0.0588** -0.0346* -0.0702*** -0.0380*
Low income Familiest−1 0.0735 -0.0925 -0.0309 -0.0925 -0.0405 -0.0946 -0.0124 -0.0643
High income families 0.2143** -0.0621 0.2348** -0.0621 0.2325** -0.0671 0.2226** -0.0686
N 95 89 89 89 89 89 89 89
T 8 7 8 7 8 7 8 7
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Table 6.24: Time Structure of Agricultural Variables on Growth: 1990-2000
Lagged Contemporaneous Forward
log(Revenue) -0.0049** -0.0003 0.0038*
log(Cost) 0.0056 -0.0057 -0.0148***
log(Gov’t payments) 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0002
Significance Level: *0.10;**0.05;***0.01
Agricultural variables are single year measures.
Table 6.25: The Impact of Agricultural Variables Change on Growth: 1990-2000†
Lagged Contemporaneous Forward
∆log(Revenue)t−1 -0.0031
∆log(Cost)t−1 0.0045
∆log(Gov’t payments)t−1 0.0000
log(Revenue)t−2 -0.0068**
log(Cost)t−2 0.0080
log(Gov’t payments)t−2 0.0001
∆log(Revenue)t -0.0032
∆log(Cost)t -0.0009
∆log(Gov’t payments)t 0.0000
log(Revenue)t−1 -0.0064**
log(Cost)t−1 0.0065
log(Gov’t payments)t−1 0.0000
∆log(Revenue)t+1 0.0039*
∆log(Cost)t+1 -0.0143***
∆log(Gov’t payments)t+1 -0.0002
log(Revenue)t 0.0012
log(Cost)t -0.0114**
log(Gov’t payments)t -0.0002
Significance Level:*0.10;**0.05;***0.01
† Agricultural variables are in single year measures.
136
Table 6.26: Summary Statistics of Agricultural MSAs∗
Variable Mean s.d. Min Max
Revenue 217.659 114.936 2.666 716.827
Cost 162.628 98.620 1.657 708.114
Gov’t Payments 15.793 18.611 0 128.752
Base land share 0.549 0.16 0.303 0.851
Population 497596 823598 56507 8291553
Population Growth Rate 0.009 0.013 -0.044 0.097
College 0.192 0.064 0.087 0.44
Poverty Rate 0.118 0.034 0.049 0.266
Manufacture 0.202 0.083 0.041 0.447
Population Density 0.63 0.552 0.033 3.445
Low income families 0.19 0.049 0.094 0.365
High income families 0.175 0.054 0.075 0.429
Black 0.088 0.087 0.001 0.515
Elder 0.158 0.034 0.084 0.424
N=119, Avg. T = 18.25
∗ Base land share > 30%
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Table 6.27: Sensitivity to Other Determinants: Population
Baseline (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
log(Revenue)t−1 -0.0153*** -0.0143*** -0.0124*** -0.0153*** -0.0151*** -0.0152***
log(Cost)t−1 0.0105*** 0.0097*** 0.0093*** 0.0103*** 0.0130*** 0.0108***
log(Gov’t payment)t−1 -0.0001 -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0004 -0.0006 -0.0005
log(population)t−1 0.9549*** 0.9573*** 0.9386*** 0.9710*** 0.9398*** 0.9451***
Colleget−1 0.0699* 0.0499
Blackt−1 0.0079 -0.2113***
Eldert−1 0.0304 0.0969*
Poverty ratet−1 0.0493 -0.1361***
Manufacturet−1 -0.0380* -0.0063
(6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
log(Revenue)t−1 -0.0153*** -0.0189*** -0.0164*** -0.0120*** -0.0166*** -0.0189***
log(Cost)t−1 0.0105*** 0.0142*** 0.0131*** 0.0083* 0.0139*** 0.0146***
log(Gov’t payment)t−1 -0.0001 -0.0002 -0.0008* -0.0002 -0.0005 0.0001
log(population)t−1 0.9549*** 0.9162*** 0.9546*** 0.9546*** 0.9311*** 0.9316***
Immigrantst−1 0.2525*** 0.2975***
unemploymentt−1 -0.1347*** -0.2113***
Popu densityt−1 -0.0242*** -0.0123*
Low income familiest−1 -0.2917*** -0.2114***
High income familiest−1 -0.1279*** 0.1602***
Significance Level: *0.05 **0.01 ***0.001
138
Table 6.28: Sensitivity to Other Determinants: Population Growth
Baseline (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
log(Revenue)t−1 -0.0130*** -0.0108*** -0.0117*** -0.0120*** -0.0136*** -0.0135***
log(Cost)t−1 0.0084*** 0.0062* 0.0074* 0.0065* 0.0098* 0.0100***
log(Gov’t payment)t−1 0.0000 -0.0001 -0.0002 -0.0004 -0.0005 -0.0005
log(population)t−1 -0.0431*** -0.0375*** -0.0549*** -0.0287*** -0.0494*** -0.0536***
∆(population)t−1 0.2734*** 0.2832*** 0.2242*** 0.3037*** 0.2393*** 0.2114***
Colleget−1 0.0265 0.0062
Blackt−1 -0.0443 -0.1872***
Eldert−1 0.0273 0.0452
Poverty ratet−1 0.0513 -0.0883*
Manufacturet−1 -0.0337* -0.0076
(6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
log(Revenue)t−1 -0.0130*** -0.0135*** -0.0136*** -0.0098* -0.0151*** -0.0160***
log(Cost)t−1 0.0084*** 0.0090* 0.0103*** 0.0054 0.0107*** 0.0107***
log(Gov’t payment)t−1 0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0006 -0.0003 -0.0004 0.0001
log(population)t−1 -0.0431*** -0.0659*** -0.0386*** -0.0396*** -0.0568*** -0.0567***
∆(population)t−1 0.2734*** 0.2367*** 0.2358*** 0.2574*** 0.2402*** 0.2591***
Immigrantst−1 0.1737*** 0.1803***
L.unemployrate -0.0867* -0.1339***
(Popu density)t−1 -0.0230* -0.0145*
Low income familiest−1 -0.2081*** -0.1626***
High income familiest−1 -0.0542 0.1261***
SignificanceLevel:*0.05 **0.01 ***0.001
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Table 6.29: Stepwise Regression: Population Level
Baseline (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
log(Revenue)t−1 -0.0153*** -0.0143*** -0.0130*** -0.0153*** -0.0143*** -0.0142***
log(Cost)t−1 0.0105*** 0.0097*** 0.0088*** 0.0110*** 0.0104*** 0.0098***
log(Gov’t payment)t−1 -0.0001 -0.0002 -0.0001 -0.0003 -0.0001 -0.0001
log(population)t−1 0.9549*** 0.9573*** 0.9550*** 0.9705*** 0.9658*** 0.9694***
Colleget−1 0.0699* 0.0499 0.0465 0.0778* 0.0550* 0.0286
Blackt−1 0.0079 -0.1768*** -0.1489*** -0.1363*** -0.1316***
Eldert−1 0.0304 0.0673 0.0368 0.0307
Poverty ratet−1 0.0493 -0.1054*** -0.1013***
Manufacturet−1 -0.0380* -0.0207
(6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
log(Revenue)t−1 -0.0153*** -0.0150*** -0.0154*** -0.0144*** -0.0164*** -0.0153***
log(Cost)t−1 0.0105*** 0.0107*** 0.0104*** 0.0095*** 0.0109*** 0.0105***
log(Gov’t payment)t−1 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 0.0000 -0.0001
log(population)t−1 0.9549*** 0.9557*** 0.9550*** 0.9636*** 0.9513*** 0.9549***
Colleget−1 0.0699* 0.0060 0.0137 0.0629* 0.0370 0.0699*
Blackt−1 0.0079 -0.0859* -0.0462 -0.0238 -0.0222 0.0079
Eldert−1 0.0304 0.0212 0.0075 0.0066 0.0262 0.0304
Poverty ratet−1 0.0493 -0.1442*** -0.1009*** -0.1140*** 0.0705 0.0493
Manufacturet−1 -0.0380* -0.0237 -0.0108 -0.0268* -0.0387* -0.0380*
Immigrantst−1 0.2525*** 0.1779*** 0.1945*** 0.2328*** 0.2011*** 0.2525***
unemploymentt−1 -0.1347*** -0.1908*** -0.1861*** -0.1520*** -0.1347***
Popu densityt−1 -0.0242*** -0.0289*** -0.0215* -0.0242***
Low income familiest−1 -0.2917*** -0.2180*** -0.2917***
High income familiest−1 -0.1279*** -0.1279***
Significance Level: *0.05 **0.01 ***0.001
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Table 6.30: Stepwise Regression: Population Growth
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
log(Revenue)t−1 -0.0108*** -0.0114*** -0.0119*** -0.0118*** -0.0114***
log(Cost)t−1 0.0062* 0.0071* 0.0074* 0.0073* 0.0072*
log(Gov’t payment)t−1 -0.0001 -0.0000 -0.0001 0.0000 -0.0001
∆(population)t−1 0.2832*** 0.2758*** 0.3005*** 0.2955*** 0.2842***
log(population)t−1 -0.0375*** -0.0412*** -0.0307*** -0.0327*** -0.0335***
Colleget−1 0.0062 0.0133 0.0366 0.0138 -0.0128
Blackt−1 -0.1537*** -0.1497*** -0.1346* -0.1430***
Eldert−1 0.0336 0.0190 0.0133
Poverty ratet−1 -0.0723* -0.0816*
Manufacturet−1 -0.0168
(6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
log(Revenue)t−1 -0.0119*** -0.0122*** -0.0116*** -0.0133*** -0.0130***
log(Cost)t−1 0.0079* 0.0081* 0.0075* 0.0086*** 0.0084***
log(Gov’t payment)t−1 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
∆(population)t−1 0.2887*** 0.2724*** 0.2788*** 0.2764*** 0.2734***
log(population)t−1 -0.0425*** -0.0422*** -0.0339*** -0.0450*** -0.0431***
Colleget−1 -0.0226 -0.0145 0.0331 0.0124 0.0265
Blackt−1 -0.1112* -0.0813* -0.0596 -0.0584 -0.0443
Eldert−1 0.0081 0.0030 0.0059 0.0238 0.0273
Poverty ratet−1 -0.1112*** -0.0762* -0.0866* 0.0667 0.0513
Manufacturet−1 -0.0192 -0.0101 -0.0241 -0.0330* -0.0337*
Immigrantst−1 0.1202*** 0.1335*** 0.1699*** 0.1496*** 0.1737***
unemploymentt−1 -0.1239*** -0.1196*** -0.0925* -0.0867*
Popu densityt−1 -0.0277*** -0.0221* -0.0230*
Low income familiest−1 -0.1806*** -0.2081***
High income familiest−1 -0.0542
Significance Level:*0.05 **0.01 ***0.001
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Table 6.31: Simulated Impact of Government Payment on
Population in 1988
Simulated Simulated Base Land
MSA/PMSA Population Change % Change Share
Provo-Orem, UT MSA 254,274 0.97% 2,467 0.30
Harrisburg-Lebanon-Carlisle, PA MSA 578,886 1.64% 9,509 0.30
Wilmington-Newark, DE-MD PMSA 499,209 1.61% 8,021 0.31
Dothan, AL MSA 131,148 1.13% 1,480 0.31
Santa Rosa, CA PMSA 367,893 0.96% 3,533 0.31
Texarkana, TX-Texarkana, AR MSA 120,789 0.96% 1,165 0.32
Sacramento, CA PMSA 1,245,576 1.44% 17,912 0.32
Akron, OH PMSA 652,814 1.62% 10,608 0.32
Huntsville, AL MSA 283,769 1.29% 3,650 0.32
Decatur, AL MSA 129,017 1.14% 1,467 0.33
Rochester, NY MSA 1,047,237 1.61% 16,823 0.34
Goldsboro, NC MSA 102,269 1.50% 1,533 0.36
Fort Smith, AR-OK MSA 174,978 0.42% 736 0.36
Bloomington, IN MSA 105,324 1.49% 1,564 0.36
Hagerstown, MD PMSA 118,237 1.57% 1,856 0.38
Syracuse, NY MSA 730,011 1.60% 11,659 0.38
San Jose, CA PMSA 1,472,234 0.61% 8,948 0.38
Vallejo-Fairfield-Napa, CA PMSA 416,178 0.02% 104 0.38
Chico-Paradise, CA MSA 171,909 1.68% 2,888 0.39
Memphis, TN-AR-MS MSA 993,254 1.25% 12,411 0.39
Cincinnati, OH-KY-IN PMSA 1,513,847 1.22% 18,484 0.39
Jackson, MI MSA 148,357 1.63% 2,422 0.40
Benton Harbor, MI MSA 163,001 1.54% 2,509 0.41
York, PA MSA 330,944 1.54% 5,097 0.41
Ann Arbor, MI PMSA 472,981 1.60% 7,562 0.42
Canton-Massillon, OH MSA 393,752 1.56% 6,154 0.42
Nashville, TN MSA 964,521 0.91% 8,810 0.42
Jackson, TN MSA 90,160 1.44% 1,302 0.42
Green Bay, WI MSA 190,270 1.61% 3,057 0.42
Fayetteville-Springdale-Rogers, AR MSA 202,656 0.47% 944 0.43
St Barbara-St Maria-Lompoc, CA MSA 355,810 0.24% 855 0.43
Fresno, CA MSA 709,420 1.54% 10,924 0.44
Clarksville-Hopkinsville, TN-KY MSA 163,843 1.38% 2,256 0.44
Minneapolis-St. Paul, MN-WI MSA 2,467,274 1.61% 39,754 0.44
Gary, IN PMSA 597,140 1.66% 9,917 0.44
St. Louis, MO-IL MSA 2,502,635 1.39% 34,833 0.44
Kenosha, WI PMSA 123,794 1.69% 2,095 0.46
San Francisco, CA PMSA 1,593,098 1.03% 16,372 0.46
Salt Lake City-Ogden, UT MSA 1,053,397 1.02% 10,720 0.46
Milwaukee-Waukesha, WI PMSA 1,409,602 1.69% 23,772 0.48
La Crosse, WI-MN MSA 114,981 1.52% 1,748 0.48
Grand Rapids-Muskegon-Holland, MI MSA 913,462 1.57% 14,296 0.49
Eau Claire, WI MSA 136,125 1.53% 2,088 0.49
Lansing-East Lansing, MI MSA 429,673 1.59% 6,825 0.50
Appleton-Oshkosh-Neenah, WI MSA 309,604 1.66% 5,150 0.52
Racine, WI PMSA 171,934 1.65% 2,829 0.53
Dover, DE MSA 106,965 1.66% 1,773 0.54
Hamilton-Middletown, OH PMSA 283,064 1.62% 4,576 0.54
South Bend, IN MSA 243,656 1.67% 4,064 0.54
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Table 6.31: Simulated Impact of Government Payment on
Population in 1988
Simulated Simulated Base Land
MSA/PMSA Population Change % Change Share
Oakland, CA PMSA 2,010,342 0.50% 10,068 0.55
Columbus, OH MSA 1,315,229 1.55% 20,420 0.56
Sheboygan, WI MSA 102,018 1.65% 1,682 0.56
St. Cloud, MN MSA 144,873 1.56% 2,260 0.56
Kalamazoo-Battle Creek, MI MSA 424,341 1.57% 6,660 0.57
Kansas City, MO-KS MSA 1,561,876 1.15% 17,904 0.58
San Luis-Atascadero-Paso, CA MSA 204,261 0.44% 905 0.58
Elkhart-Goshen, IN MSA 153,917 1.66% 2,562 0.58
Indianapolis, IN MSA 1,355,368 1.64% 22,284 0.60
Lancaster, PA MSA 410,152 1.83% 7,499 0.60
Madison, WI MSA 356,383 1.70% 6,060 0.60
Joplin, MO MSA 133,670 0.93% 1,239 0.60
Chicago, IL PMSA 7,357,678 1.69% 124,393 0.61
Salinas, CA MSA 345,947 0.18% 635 0.63
Janesville-Beloit, WI MSA 136,588 1.68% 2,298 0.63
Columbia, MO MSA 109,331 1.08% 1,186 0.63
Springfield, MO MSA 257,863 0.72% 1,856 0.63
Dayton-Springfield, OH MSA 950,632 1.62% 15,383 0.63
Grand Forks, ND-MN MSA 104,341 1.51% 1,576 0.65
Jonesboro, AR MSA 66,788 1.71% 1,141 0.67
Fort Wayne, IN MSA 454,540 1.58% 7,178 0.68
Rochester, MN MSA 102,923 1.66% 1,707 0.69
Rockford, IL MSA 325,254 1.75% 5,676 0.70
Toledo, OH MSA 616,985 1.60% 9,874 0.71
Iowa City, IA MSA 92,566 1.63% 1,511 0.73
Des Moines, IA MSA 381,462 1.56% 5,970 0.73
Lima, OH MSA 154,898 1.57% 2,430 0.74
Dubuque, IA MSA 87,351 1.61% 1,408 0.74
Lexington, KY MSA 399,394 0.81% 3,242 0.75
Sioux City, IA-NE MSA 114,224 1.52% 1,732 0.75
Lincoln, NE MSA 207,785 1.40% 2,913 0.75
Modesto, CA MSA 336,063 1.44% 4,835 0.75
Cedar Rapids, IA MSA 165,979 1.64% 2,715 0.76
Springfield, IL MSA 188,519 1.62% 3,063 0.77
Merced, CA MSA 167,749 1.49% 2,493 0.77
Lafayette, IN MSA 159,002 1.66% 2,632 0.79
Omaha, NE-IA MSA 630,342 1.54% 9,738 0.79
Fargo-Moorhead, ND-MN MSA 150,478 1.44% 2,173 0.81
Champaign-Urbana, IL MSA 174,411 1.66% 2,899 0.84
Stockton-Lodi, CA MSA 457,138 1.47% 6,699 0.85
Bloomington-Normal, IL MSA 126,021 1.66% 2,096 0.85
Average 563,841 1.38% 6,775 0.53
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Table 6.32: Simulated Impact of Government Payment on
Population Growth in 1988
Population Growth Simulated Base Land
MSA/PMSA Rate % Change % Share
Provo-Orem, UT MSA 1.60 0.10 0.30
Harrisburg-Lebanon-Carlisle, PA MSA 0.81 0.16 0.30
Wilmington-Newark, DE-MD PMSA 1.97 0.16 0.31
Dothan, AL MSA 1.19 0.11 0.31
Santa Rosa, CA PMSA 3.25 0.09 0.31
Texarkana, TX-Texarkana, AR MSA 0.57 0.10 0.32
Sacramento, CA PMSA 3.50 0.14 0.32
Akron, OH PMSA 0.77 0.16 0.32
Huntsville, AL MSA 2.52 0.13 0.32
Decatur, AL MSA 0.68 0.11 0.33
Rochester, NY MSA 0.66 0.16 0.34
Goldsboro, NC MSA 0.96 0.15 0.36
Fort Smith, AR-OK MSA 0.52 0.04 0.36
Bloomington, IN MSA 1.17 0.15 0.36
Hagerstown, MD PMSA 0.26 0.15 0.38
Syracuse, NY MSA 0.43 0.16 0.38
San Jose, CA PMSA 1.69 0.06 0.38
Vallejo-Fairfield-Napa, CA PMSA 3.50 0.00 0.38
Chico-Paradise, CA MSA 2.92 0.17 0.39
Memphis, TN-AR-MS MSA 1.45 0.12 0.39
Cincinnati, OH-KY-IN PMSA 0.52 0.12 0.39
Jackson, MI MSA 0.40 0.16 0.40
Benton Harbor, MI MSA 0.02 0.15 0.41
York, PA MSA 1.53 0.15 0.41
Ann Arbor, MI PMSA 1.53 0.16 0.42
Canton-Massillon, OH MSA 0.41 0.15 0.42
Nashville, TN MSA 1.52 0.09 0.42
Jackson, TN MSA 0.46 0.14 0.42
Green Bay, WI MSA 1.27 0.16 0.42
Fayetteville-Springdale-Rogers, AR MSA 1.82 0.05 0.43
St Barbara-St Maria-Lompoc, CA MSA 1.07 0.02 0.43
Fresno, CA MSA 3.09 0.15 0.44
Clarksville-Hopkinsville, TN-KY MSA 1.19 0.14 0.44
Minneapolis-St. Paul, MN-WI MSA 2.24 0.16 0.44
Gary, IN PMSA 0.28 0.16 0.44
St. Louis, MO-IL MSA 0.39 0.14 0.44
Kenosha, WI PMSA 1.90 0.17 0.46
San Francisco, CA PMSA 0.21 0.10 0.46
Salt Lake City-Ogden, UT MSA 0.69 0.10 0.46
Milwaukee-Waukesha, WI PMSA 0.82 0.17 0.48
La Crosse, WI-MN MSA 0.70 0.15 0.48
Grand Rapids-Muskegon-Holland, MI MSA 1.80 0.15 0.49
Eau Claire, WI MSA 0.66 0.15 0.49
Lansing-East Lansing, MI MSA 0.71 0.16 0.50
Appleton-Oshkosh-Neenah, WI MSA 1.55 0.16 0.52
Racine, WI PMSA 1.02 0.16 0.53
Dover, DE MSA 0.66 0.16 0.54
Hamilton-Middletown, OH PMSA 1.08 0.16 0.54
South Bend, IN MSA 0.59 0.16 0.54
Oakland, CA PMSA 2.06 0.05 0.55
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Table 6.32: Simulated Impact of Government Payment on
Population Growth in 1988
Population Growth Simulated Base Land
MSA/PMSA Rate % Change % Share
Columbus, OH MSA 1.82 0.15 0.56
Sheboygan, WI MSA 0.66 0.16 0.56
St. Cloud, MN MSA 1.78 0.15 0.56
Kalamazoo-Battle Creek, MI MSA 0.75 0.15 0.57
Kansas City, MO-KS MSA 1.10 0.11 0.58
San Luis Obispo-Atas-Paso Robles, CA MSA 2.44 0.04 0.58
Elkhart-Goshen, IN MSA 1.80 0.16 0.58
Indianapolis, IN MSA 0.72 0.16 0.60
Lancaster, PA MSA 2.06 0.18 0.60
Madison, WI MSA 1.80 0.17 0.60
Joplin, MO MSA 0.29 0.09 0.60
Chicago, IL PMSA 0.19 0.17 0.61
Salinas, CA MSA 1.36 0.02 0.63
Janesville-Beloit, WI MSA 0.70 0.17 0.63
Columbia, MO MSA 1.80 0.11 0.63
Springfield, MO MSA 1.58 0.07 0.63
Dayton-Springfield, OH MSA 0.73 0.16 0.63
Grand Forks, ND-MN MSA 0.88 0.15 0.65
Jonesboro, AR MSA 1.76 0.17 0.67
Fort Wayne, IN MSA 0.69 0.16 0.68
Rochester, MN MSA 2.80 0.16 0.69
Rockford, IL MSA 0.29 0.17 0.70
Toledo, OH MSA 0.63 0.16 0.71
Iowa City, IA MSA 2.26 0.16 0.73
Des Moines, IA MSA 1.26 0.15 0.73
Lima, OH MSA 0.56 0.15 0.74
Dubuque, IA MSA 0.26 0.16 0.74
Lexington, KY MSA 1.08 0.08 0.75
Sioux City, IA-NE MSA 0.73 0.15 0.75
Lincoln, NE MSA 1.26 0.14 0.75
Modesto, CA MSA 3.85 0.14 0.75
Cedar Rapids, IA MSA 1.00 0.16 0.76
Springfield, IL MSA 0.49 0.16 0.77
Merced, CA MSA 2.90 0.15 0.77
Lafayette, IN MSA 0.92 0.16 0.79
Omaha, NE-IA MSA 0.71 0.15 0.79
Fargo-Moorhead, ND-MN MSA 1.27 0.14 0.81
Champaign-Urbana, IL MSA 0.32 0.16 0.84
Stockton-Lodi, CA MSA 2.53 0.14 0.85
Bloomington-Normal, IL MSA 1.36 0.16 0.85
Average 1.27 0.14 0.54
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Table 6.33: Simulated Impact of Biofuel Demand: 2000-2007
Simulated Simulated
Annual Total
MSA/PMSA Population change Change
Appleton-Oshkosh-Neenah, WI MSA 439176 112 784
Bloomington-Normal, IL MSA 169657 132 923
Cedar Rapids, IA MSA 228981 151 1057
Champaign-Urbana, IL MSA 291830 217 1518
Chicago, IL PMSA 8291553 5965 41752
Davenport-Moline-Rock Island, IA-IL MSA 452807 313 2190
Dayton-Springfield, OH MSA 1063752 567 3969
Decatur, IL MSA 196270 134 941
Des Moines, IA MSA 647524 450 3153
Elkhart-Goshen, IN MSA 359340 161 1130
Evansville-Henderson, IN-KY MSA 339093 210 1468
Gary, IN PMSA 631644 446 3124
Grand Rapids-Muskegon-Holland, MI MSA 1151741 349 2446
Indianapolis, IN MSA 1613258 1086 7605
Iowa City, IA MSA 179148 123 858
Janesville-Beloit, WI MSA 337715 159 1111
Kalamazoo-Battle Creek, MI MSA 525877 265 1854
Kankakee, IL PMSA 163947 117 820
Kenosha, WI PMSA 150074 72 503
Kokomo, IN MSA 260343 158 1108
Lafayette, IN MSA 291906 211 1480
Lancaster, PA MSA 471776 96 674
Madison, WI MSA 498080 216 1512
Milwaukee-Waukesha, WI PMSA 1588266 451 3158
Muncie, IN MSA 338017 183 1280
Omaha, NE-IA MSA 795368 477 3336
Peoria-Pekin, IL MSA 404834 295 2066
Racine, WI PMSA 188974 93 648
Rochester, MN MSA 268374 140 978
Rochester, NY MSA 1102134 364 2547
Rockford, IL MSA 421044 295 2066
Sioux City, IA-NE MSA 175003 98 689
South Bend, IN MSA 411393 272 1901
Springfield, IL MSA 345877 246 1722
Terre Haute, IN MSA 224680 150 1051
Waterloo-Cedar Falls, IA MSA 252742 174 1216
Average 702006 415 2907
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Chapter 7 Conclusion
7.1 Contributions
Previous studies of urban growth have mainly focused on factors within urban areas, e.g.,
local productivity growth, amenities, infrastructures, and public services. The impact of
opportunity cost of land has long been ignored even though the theory has a clear predic-
tion about its impact on growth. Even in studies focusing on urban land uses, for example,
the literature of urban sprawl, the opportunity cost of land has not attracted serious atten-
tion. In these studies, measures of the land cost were either imprecise1 or endogeneous.2
Therefore, it is not surprising that empircal results regarding the opportunity cost of land
are limited and ambiguous. Questions such as whether and to what extent the opportunity
cost of land affects urban growth, and, as the opportunity cost of land is not consistent
over time, whether the growth respond to short term changes in land cost, have not been
answered.
Answers to these questions, however, are important. As agricultural productions are
distributed unevenly in this country, changes in the agricultural sector will have different
impacts in different regions or metropolitan areas. This is especially true in analyzing
the incidence of federal policies such agricultural subsidies and price supports. As these
programs should change the value of agricultural land, or the opportunity cost of land,
urban growth will also be affected by these programs. Simulation results in this study show
that nullifying agricultural subsidies would have increased the population of “agricultural”
MSAs3 by as much as 1.38%, or 6,775, in 1988. The opportunity cost of land also affects
the population growth rate. According to these simulation results, the growth rate of those
1For example, as in McGrath [2005], the opportunity cost of land was measured by state level
agricultural land value.
2For example, as in Mills and Lubuele [1997], Wassmer [2008], and Spivey [2008] among others,
the opportunity cost of land was measured by the market value of agricultural land from census
directly.
3The share of crop land and grazing land in metropolitan areas is greater than 30%. See Table
6.31.
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MSAs would have been 0.14 percent higher (11% of the average population growth rate)
without agricultural subsidies.
In addition to the agricultural policies, fiscal and monetary policies can also affect
agricultural land values, and urban growth in turn, by affecting the interest rate, which is
an important component of agricultural costs. From 1986 to 1993, for example, when the
U.S. agricultural sector recovered from the previous crisis, nearly half of the decrease in
agricultural cost can be attributed to the decrease in interest expenditures. As found by
this study, urban population is responsive to changes in agricultural costs. For example,
the study estimates that population growth rate would increase by 0.53% when the cost of
the previous year doubles.
The commodity price is another important factor affecting agricultural land value. The
variable of agricultural revenue created in this study captures the impact of price changes.
According to the estimation of this study, the population growth rate will be 0.45% lower
if the agricultural revenue of the previous year doubles, and will be 1.25% lower if the
3-year moving average of revenue of the previous year doubles. According to another set
of simulations, the increase of corn price driven by the biofuel demand had increased the
agricultural revenues by 13% from 2000 to 2007 in MSAs major in corn production4, which
had reduced the population by 2,907on average, or 0.4% of the total population, for these
areas in this period.
Academically, this study provides a test for the prediction of the traditional Alonso–
Mills-Muth model that urban growth is hindered by the increase of agricultural rent. The
measure of the agricultural rent used in this study, based on a unique data set composed
of extensive information on agricultural production, is more precise and exogenous than
those used in previous studies. Moreover, as the data set contains information of overtime
changes in agricultural prices and costs, this study is capable of examining the impact of
agricultural rent in the short run. As the opportunity cost of land affects the growth by
affecting the housing cost, this study is also a complement to the literature of the housing
supply and urban growth that emerged in the past ten years.
4MSAs with a minimum of 40% of agricultural land for corn.
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Chapter Review
In Chapter 1, changes in agricultural prices were reviewed for 1978-2000. Two periods
stood out, i.e., the early 1980s featured by the farm crisis and the mid 1990s featured by a
price spike. Casual observations show that correlations between the agricultural prices and
population growth do exist.
Chapter 2 reviews two lines of literature that can be related to this dissertation. The
first line is the literature on urban growth based on the intercity spatial equilibrium. Guided
by the traditional Alonso–Mills–Muth model, studies along this line do consider agricultural
rents. But because their measures of the agricultural rent were either imprecise or endoge-
neous to the growth, their results regarding the agricultural rent were rather limited, which
calls for better measures of the opportunity cost of land. The second line is the literature on
housing supply and urban growth which emerged in the past decade. Various studies have
shown the supply conditions of the housing market is indeed important, and two aspects
of the shifters of the housing supply have been examined: regulations of land uses and
geographic characteristics of urban areas. The opportunity cost of land, however, has not
been examined.
Based on the intercity spatial equilibrium framework, Chapter 3 provides a model to
analyze the impact of opportunity cost of land on urban populations. According to this
model, local wages must increase to compensate higher cost of land, which leads employment
or population to decrease.
Chapter 4 discusses data issues, including sources and quality of the data, imputation
of the agricultural variables, the validity of the imputation, aggregation of the county-level
variables, and measures of the dependent variable and other determinants of growth.
Based on the county-level agricultural data of prices, yields, costs, and land used on
selected agricultural products, I first imputed the average revenues, costs, and government
payments per acre of land, weighted by the land used by each product, for each county and
each year. To verify the validity of the imputation, I regressed the value of farmland from
the census, for each agricultural region, on those three variables with a sample of counties
out of metropolitan areas. Results show that the correlation between the land value and
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revenue is positive, and the correlation between the land value and cost is negative. The
overall R2 is 50% for dollar to dollar regressions, and is 60% for log–log regressions.5 These
results show that the imputed agricultural variables are valid in measuring the value of
agricultural land. In a similar set of regressions by using the sample of counties within
metropolitan areas, the correlation is much weaker (Table 4.2), suggesting that the value
of farmland within metropolitan areas are affected by unobserved urban factors. These
results justify my choice of using agricultural prices rather than the market land value as a
measure of the opportunity cost of land.
Before aggregating those county-level agricultural variables to MSA levels, component of
MSAs must be determined first. To address possible spillover effects, counties close enough
to the city center but not in MSAs were also included into aggregation. To determine which
counties to include, I used GIS software to create a buffer of 30 miles in radius about the
center of the principal city of each MSA. All counties touching this buffer were included.
Figure 4.10 shows that the choice size of the buffer is appropriate for inland MSAs such as
Lexington and Louisville.
Chapter 5 discusses the empirical methodology, including methods of aggregating county-
level agricultural variables to MSA levels, the choice of subsamples, regression specifications,
and the choice of estimation techniques. To obtain a measure of agricultural land value, I
first discussed the implications and differences in simple averages and weighted averages of
county-level agricultural variables. The weighted average is presumably superior to simple
averages because counties with more agricultural land are more insulated to unobserved
urban impacts and have less unobserved agricultural products. Regarding the regression
model specifications, the high frequency annual data used by this study requires a dynamic
set up which calls the use of Arellano–Bond estimator to handle the dynamic panel bias.
Chapter 6 presents and analyzes empirical results. To get preliminary results, I first
used the entire sample of 269 MSAs. The results show that all agricultural variables have
significant impacts on both population level and growth with correct signs. I then examined
5In the set of region by region regressions, the R2 ranges from 21.6% (for Southern Seaboard)
to 80.3% (for the Northern Great Plains). Table 4.3.1 reports these results.
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the impact of agricultural variables for two shorter periods: 1978 to 1990, and 1990 to 2000.
The reason of splitting the sample is that these two periods provide two different patterns
of price change: while the former contains a period of long and drastic price drop, the latter
contains a period of short price spike.
For the period of 1978 to 1990, significant results regarding the population level and
growth rate retain for all measures of agricultural variables. As observations were restricted
to more agricultural MSAs, say, with a minimum base land share6 of 20% and 30% respec-
tively, both the size and significance of the coefficients increased. I also split the sample
by agricultural regions to examine the possible influential region. Results show that the
Southern Seaboard, which has the lowest share of base land, is influential, bluring the re-
sults in several cases.7 To examine the short term impact of price changes, I further split
the sample at 1986 where the price decline ended. Results show that the impact of agri-
cultural variables is stronger in the period prior to 1986. By using single year measures, I
also examined the impact of contemporaneous and future agricultural variables where no
significant impacts were found. Finally, I examined the impact of the changes of agricul-
tural variables. While the impacts of first order lagged revenue and cost are significant for
population levels, they are not significant for population growth rate.
For the second period, 1990 to 2000, I conducted a similar set of regressions. No
significant results were obtained when all observations were included, but as I restricted
observations to MSAs with a minimum base land share of 30%, significant results emerged
for both population levels and growth rates. Moreover, as the observations were further
restricted to the period of the price spike, say, 1994 to 1996 or 1997, the impacts became
stronger. I also examined the time structure, the results of which show that only the lagged
revenue is significant. Finally, no significant impacts of the changes in agricultural variables
were found.
For each period, I also conducted a set of panel cointegration tests. Testing results show
6The share of crop land and grazing land with respect to the total land area of the metropolitan
area.
7Results without the Southern Seaboard are close to results with the sample with a minimum
base land share of 30%, suggesting the influence of the Southern Seaboard is more likely due to the
lack of agricultural land rather than regional heterogeneities.
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that the panel is not cointegrated when all MSAs are included. However, as I restricted
observations to MSAs with base land share greater than 30%, the tests were passed.
There were several general conclusions based on the empirical analysis of the two periods.
First, spurious correlation may arise in metropolitan areas with restricted agricultural land.
This is because the agricultural variables poorly measure the opportunity cost of land in
these areas. Second, observations in decennial census years are influential. The series of
population growth rate with 2000 are not even stationary. Third, contemporaneous and
future impact of agricultural variables do not exist. And fourth, weighted averages of
agricultural variables are superior to single averages in the sense that estimation results are
more consistent.
Guided by lessons learnt from the two periods, I pooled observations in both periods,
restricting observations to MSAs with base land share greater than 30%, to provide a final
estimation of the impact of agricultural variables. Based on the estimation results, I also
the simulated the impact of government payment and a series of hypothesized price shock
of corn for selected MSAs.
7.2 Caveats with Suggested Improvement on Future Work
Although the primary goal of study has been accomplished, there are still opportunities
for improvement. First, the measure of agricultural rents can be improved. As has been
mentioned in Section 4.3, the imputed revenues, costs, and government payments for the
Northern Crescent and the Southern Seaboard do not fit the market value as well as other
regions. However, when milk was removed from calculation, the R2 was raised to about
50%.8 Because milk cows in the North depend more on feed grains, including milk cows
for this area may overstate the value of land. As more data on cattle on feed are available,
say, after the mid of 1990s, we can get better measures.
Another issue is the unobserved products. As has been discussed in Chapter 4, the
wood land accounts for about 30% of the total agricultural land. Unfortunate, data on
wood products are not available. One solution may be using commercial data provided by
8This result does not apply to other regions, however.
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regional wood product associations. Another set of unobserved products are the unobserved
crops, such as beans, tobaccos, potatoes, vegetables, and fruits. Data for these crops are
more available in recent Annual County Crop surveys, say, after 1990. Therefore, the study
can be updated with the new data with a focus on periods after 1990. The most recent
price spike since 2006 will be especially interesting because the supply of agricultural land
is far more tight than the 1990s, which suggests stronger impacts of the commodity prices
on urban growth.
Regardless of measurement issues, the study will be more complete if the impact of
agricultural variables on income can be examined. The appeal of the intercity spatial
equilibrium framework, after all, is its capability of endogenizing the labor market. While
time series data on income are not available for 1980s, they are more available in recent
years. We can update this study by using more recent data and examine whether income
respond to changes in opportunity cost of land.
One more interesting question to ask is who will be affected more by the shock in land
cost. When the commodity price increase, there are two reasons why the growth should
slow down: first, local residents find it is time to leave; and second, potential immigrants
postpone their plan of moving in. Do the change in land cost affect different people the
same or affect more for margin residents? Furthermore, as the opportunity cost of land
has a stronger impact on the edge of the metropolitan areas, we may expect the latter is
true, therefore it is interesting to know who are those marginal residents. Answers to this
question certainly require more information on the behavior of migrants.
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